Exclusive - Half of 40,000 Iraqis Living in al-Hol Camp Long to Return Home

Women walk through al-Hol displacement camp in Hasakah province, Syria, April 1, 2019. (Reuters)
Women walk through al-Hol displacement camp in Hasakah province, Syria, April 1, 2019. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Half of 40,000 Iraqis Living in al-Hol Camp Long to Return Home

Women walk through al-Hol displacement camp in Hasakah province, Syria, April 1, 2019. (Reuters)
Women walk through al-Hol displacement camp in Hasakah province, Syria, April 1, 2019. (Reuters)

The al-Hol camp in northeastern-most point in Syria is home to thousands of refugees, the majority of whom are Iraqi women and children. Some came there willingly, while a few sought refuge after fleeing their homeland when the ISIS extremist group swept through the region. Others were forced to flee to the camp when the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq fought back against the terror group.

Al-Hol also houses the families of ISIS members. These families make up the majority of the residents, who came to the camp after the group lost its territories in Iraq and Syria in spring 2019. Iraqis make up some 40,000 of al-Hol’s 68,000 residents. The camp is home to women and children who have been abandoned by ISIS fathers, who headed to the battlefronts where they were either killed or captured. Little is known of the ISIS prisoners after the Baghdad government abandoned them. They are currently held in jails run by the US-backed Kurdish Democratic Forces (SDF).

Iraqi family

Shayma hails from the Iraqi city of Mosul. Now in her 50s, she fled the city with her family in summer 2015. Her husband and son, both members of ISIS, were killed. She escaped with what remained of her family to the Syrian border city of al-Qaim. After heavy fighting broke out there, she entered Syria and sought refuge in the village of Abou Hamam in the northern Deir Ezzor countryside. She moved from town to town until she and her family of five reached al-Hol.

She now lives in a tent that does little to keep out the bitter winter cold and scorching summer heat. She lives there with her three daughters and two sons, aged 10 and 5. Asharq Al-Awsat toured the sparsely furnished tent. In one corner, Shayma set up a makeshift kitchen, in another, she set up a bathroom, which is separated from the rest of the tent with a dark grey curtain. The rest of the tent is styled in traditional Arab furnishings.

Her oldest daughter, Haifa, 30 told Asharq Al-Awsat that she is married to an ISIS member who is still in the field. “I don’t know anything about him. He may have been killed,” she said, adding that she has a child with him. She was born in Syria’s Baghouz, where ISIS made its last stand in the war-torn country. She is now a year and two months old.

Another sister, Wadad, married a Moroccan ISIS fighter when she was only 14 years old. He was killed in the battle of Hajin two years ago. Now 17, she gave birth to a child from him a year ago. With tears in her eyes, she expressed her conflicting feelings: “I don’t know what to tell my child when she grows up. Who was her father? How was he killed? Will I list the areas we sought refuge in to flee the fighting?”

Al-Hol was set up in the late 1990s to house 20,000 people. The number of its residents ballooned after the battle for Baghouz and now it holds 70,000 people in the arid Syrian desert, some 30 kilometers from the Iraq border.

Anger and questions

The camp has become a hotbed of anger and unanswered questions. Iraqi women wander a market, shouting loudly: “Where are our husbands? Why don’t they release them? Why won’t the Baghdad government take us back?”

As of 2018, more than 50,000 Iraqis had voluntarily returned to their homes, revealed Adnan al-Obeidi, head of the Iraqi refugee council in al-Hol. However, a year and a half ago, Iraqi authorities have been refusing to take in any more refugees. The camp management said more than 20,000 want to go back home, but only under the supervision of United Nations and international humanitarian agencies out of their fear of reprisals from the PMF, which controls several Iraqi regions.

Obeidi revealed that his office has handed the Baghdad government a list with the names of refugees. The list was submitted through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and International Committee of the Red Cross and “each time, we receive approval to return the refugees, but the process is always aborted for unknown reasons.”

Camp director Majida Amine told Asharq Al-Awsat that diplomatic coordination was ongoing between the autonomous authority in northeastern Syria and the Iraq government. Various pledges were made to allow the refugees to return to their homes. In early 2019, Iraq stopped receiving refugees willing to go back home. She said Iraq was to blame for the halt. “We have submitted lists of voluntary refugees months ago and we have yet to receive approval.”

She described the situation in al-Hol as “very difficult and disastrous” because tens of thousands of people were in dire need of help. Many have witnessed atrocities, war and indescribable suffering, both physical and psychological. The Iraqis need safety, shelter, food and health care that is lacking in the camp.



Is There US-Turkish-Russian Coordination to Distance Assad from Iran?

An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).
An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).
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Is There US-Turkish-Russian Coordination to Distance Assad from Iran?

An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).
An opposition fighter crosses a wall painted with the colors of the Iranian flag in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, in rural Idlib, at a military site belonging to Iranian forces, after Syrian opposition forces took control of the town (EPA).

There has been widespread speculation on the escalating conflict in Syria, as observers attempt to understand its causes, implications, and the US position. The recent, unexpected offensive launched by Syrian opposition groups—led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is designated a terrorist organization by Washington—has significantly reshaped the Syrian civil war. The timing is particularly noteworthy, as the offensive began just two days after a ceasefire was announced in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah.

While some analysts suggest Türkiye may be behind the opposition’s assault, they also note a perceived laissez-faire attitude from the administration of President Joe Biden. This approach may serve multiple objectives: exerting pressure on Iran and Russia, influencing the incoming Trump administration, ensuring US forces remain in northeastern Syria, and maintaining protection for Kurdish forces against potential Turkish aggression, should political negotiations in Syria fail.

Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, asserts that Syria’s civil war “never truly ended.” It has persisted at a lower intensity, with the Bashar Assad regime continuing its attacks on civilians with support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. However, the renewed fighting complicates the situation for Kurdish fighters, another group opposing Assad, who have controlled parts of Aleppo. Reports indicate that these fighters began evacuating the region by bus on Monday.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Katulis argues that the primary driver of recent developments is internal, as sustainable stability has never been achieved. Opposition forces have exploited systemic weaknesses in the regime—such as corruption, stagnation, and a lack of political legitimacy—to reorganize. He emphasizes that millions of Syrians still aspire to freedom, a desire that remains unchanged despite ongoing challenges.

While external players like Türkiye, Russia, and Iran are significant, Katulis believes the central issue lies in Syria’s internal divisions and the power struggles among competing factions.

The US Position on Assad

Despite the renewed turmoil, the US stance on Assad has remained consistent for over a decade. A State Department spokesperson recently reiterated that while the US acknowledges Assad’s loss of credibility, removing him from power is not a priority. Nor does Washington actively support the opposition factions.

According to The New York Times, US and Gulf states, along with Israel, have previously extended proposals to Assad, urging him to sever his key regional alliances with Hezbollah and Iran. However, the ongoing offensive by opposition factions may derail these efforts. The report suggests that Assad is likely to double down on his reliance on Iran and its allies for survival.

Despite these challenges, sources in Washington have hinted at potential shifts on the ground. They suggest that Assad might now be more receptive to proposals for distancing himself from Iran. Reports indicate preliminary negotiations between Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reportedly brokered by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

According to these sources, recent Russian military support to defend Hama underscores Moscow’s commitment to preserving Assad’s regime. Simultaneously, discussions are underway to secure the withdrawal of armed factions from Aleppo—potentially before or shortly after Trump assumes office. These plans reportedly include neutralizing non-Syrian fighters within opposition factions, integrating Syrian fighters into a Ministry of Defense-controlled corps under Turkish and Russian guarantees, and paving the way for Iran’s eventual exclusion from Syria.

Türkiye’s involvement, whether direct or tacit, aligns with its tactical goals of expanding its influence in the Syrian conflict. Analysts suggest Ankara may be leveraging the transitional period between the Biden and Trump administrations to strike at Russian and Iranian influence in Syria. This follows Israeli efforts to weaken Hezbollah and Iran, coupled with Russia’s distraction due to its ongoing war in Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently highlighted Assad’s refusal to engage in any meaningful political process. He noted that the opposition factions’ advances underscore vulnerabilities among Assad’s backers, including Russia and Iran.

Meanwhile, Kurdish forces—long viewed as adversaries by Türkiye—reportedly had no option but to accept safe passage to northeastern Syria, where they have participated in US-led operations against ISIS over the past decade.

As opposition factions approach Hama, the regime’s response to the Aleppo offensive signals a potential resurgence of civil war. This shift complicates US efforts to turn the page on Syria’s conflict, an initiative that has yet to produce tangible results.