In Beirut Port, All of Lebanon’s Ills are Laid Bare

A view shows the grain silo that was damaged in the massive explosion at Beirut port. (Reuters)
A view shows the grain silo that was damaged in the massive explosion at Beirut port. (Reuters)
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In Beirut Port, All of Lebanon’s Ills are Laid Bare

A view shows the grain silo that was damaged in the massive explosion at Beirut port. (Reuters)
A view shows the grain silo that was damaged in the massive explosion at Beirut port. (Reuters)

The first of many warnings about a deadly cargo in Beirut’s port came in February 2014, about three months after its arrival. It was made by Colonel Joseph Skaf, described by his family as a diligent customs official.

Skaf, then the head of the anti-narcotics and money laundering division, informed the customs authority that the shipment of ammonium nitrate was “extremely dangerous” and posed a risk to the public.

In his handwritten letter, reviewed by Reuters and authenticated by a source familiar with the case, he urged that the ship, the Rhosus, be “moved away from the pier to the breakwater and if possible put under surveillance.”

Reuters couldn’t determine whether Skaf, who died in 2017, received a response to his letter or whether he followed up on his warning. The office of the customs director referred questions about the matter to the finance ministry. The ministry didn’t respond.

Skaf’s brother Elie recalls the colonel saying of the cargo, in 2014: “We will refuse to let them unload it.” Skaf’s son Michel says his father’s determination to keep the Rhosus out of the port was typical of a man who “didn’t let things pass” and challenged the wrongs he saw.

Skaf’s letter, dated Feb. 21, 2014, was the first of several warnings by port, customs and security officials about the ammonium nitrate on board the Rhosus. None were acted on.

Skaf moved a few months later to a new job overseeing airport customs. Shortly afterwards, in late 2014, the Rhosus’ cargo was transferred to a dockside warehouse. It exploded on August 4 this year, destroying whole neighborhoods and killing nearly 200 people.

For the people of Lebanon, the wreckage of the port, and the failure to heed the warnings of Skaf and others, has a wider symbolism. Nearly three months on from the blast, they are still waiting for the results of an investigation their leaders promised would reveal the truth within days. Efforts to form a new, non-partisan government foundered on Lebanon’s sectarian politics. In this chaos, international aid money, contingent on a new government stamping out corruption, has yet to flow.

Skaf’s family believes his death in 2017 was murder, possibly connected to his long career as a customs officer fighting criminality and drug smuggling, or his recent entry into politics. The official medical report, produced in 2017, found Skaf died in a fall. A second report, commissioned by the family, concluded in 2018 that Skaf was attacked.

Corruption beyond imagination
The port, one of the busiest in the eastern Mediterranean, handling an estimated $15 billion of trade a year at its height, was rife with corruption, negligence and sectarian politics, according to nine people involved in shipping, clearance and administration. Their accounts were buttressed by import documents that one of the sources showed to Reuters.

The port mirrored the country at large, with jobs shared out along sectarian lines among mainly Muslim and Christian groups. It’s an arrangement that has governed Lebanon over the past three decades, and is blamed by many for plunging the country into financial ruin.

As one senior minister told Reuters: “The level of corruption in all layers of the state is beyond imagination. How much more corruption, like the port, is hidden beneath the cloaks of politicians?” He said he has received threats warning him “not to dig into corruption.” He didn’t elaborate.

After Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war, a transitional committee, representing the main sectarian political groups, was formed to manage Beirut’s port temporarily. The committee remains to this day.

Port chief Hassan Koraytem is widely seen as a loyalist of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, while customs boss Badri Daher’s nomination was backed by President Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement.

Koraytem and Daher have been detained in connection with the explosion on suspicion of criminal negligence. Koraytem’s lawyer, who says his client bears no responsibility for the blast, told Reuters political appointments are commonplace in Lebanon, not only at the port, and “that doesn’t mean every appointee is corrupt.” A lawyer for Daher said he couldn’t comment during an ongoing investigation.

Hariri’s office denied putting loyalists into key jobs. Aoun’s media office said appointments during the president’s term, including Daher’s, were made based on “competence and experience.”

Iran-backed group Hezbollah maintains an indirect presence at the port through merchant allies, three of the sources said. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has denied it has any such influence.

With the port at the mercy of rival groups, decision-making was crippled, there was no oversight and a culture of impunity flourished, the nine sources told Reuters.

“This chaos suits everybody. It is very hard to crack,” said Lamia Bissat, head of Lebanon’s Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, an independent public body researching policy and governance.

According to a 2019 study by academics at Oxford University and Columbia University, 17 out of Lebanon’s 21 shipping line companies have links to politicians via their board members, managers or shareholders.

Lebanese analyst Sarkis Naoum estimates the state has missed out on billions of dollars in duty payments “because of the smuggling, under invoicing and theft that goes on” at the port. “Even warehouse guards have enriched themselves from bribes.”

Some importers have exploited duty exemptions for humanitarian and religious bodies as cover to import electronic items, construction materials, clothes, liquor, furniture and food, the sources said.

A clearing agent described paying $100 to a port inspector to get a container processed. Another showed Reuters two customs documents. In the first, his application to have his cargo cleared swiftly was rejected by customs officials. In the second, it was approved. The difference, he said, was that the second time he paid a bribe.

The sources said some porters were told to clear cargoes without checking them. Many scanners used to inspect goods didn’t work properly, said Fouad Bawarshi, Deputy CEO of Gezairi shipping agent. His account was confirmed by other shipping agents.

Under-invoicing - a ruse to avoid paying the full import duty - was routine. Merchants would pay bribes to politicians and their agents at the port to ensure cargoes were valued well below their worth, the sources said.

Bissat, the head of Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan, who has done extensive work on customs systems, said efforts to reform the port by installing automated systems and bringing in processes to curb corruption were resisted by all sides, including by politicians, customs and port officials and businessmen.

“No one could change without changing the whole system,” she said. “There was a proposal for modernizing the port authority.” It didn’t go anywhere. Bissat didn’t elaborate further.

She said she and other researchers had provided port authorities with a manual on how to handle chemicals, including nitrate. “You could not imagine that some people would be that reckless. It is just beyond imagination.”

A family seeks answers
Skaf’s family say he dealt with many sensitive cases during his career as a customs official, including some involving drugs. Colleagues sometimes warned him to be careful because of the nature of his work, said the source familiar with the case.

In the early hours of one morning in March 2017, Skaf’s jeep was found parked with its light on near his apartment building. The colonel’s bloodied body lay at the bottom of a nearly 1.8m drop nearby.

He had recently retired and was running for parliament in his hometown in south Lebanon. He was 57.

Skaf’s brother Elie said the first forensic doctor to examine Skaf told him that marks on the colonel’s body suggested he had been attacked.

Two medical reports, reviewed by Reuters, found Skaf had a fractured skull and listed injuries including a swollen eye, a broken rib and bruising. The first of these documents was the official medical committee report of 2017. It concluded a fall led to a brain hemorrhage, causing Skaf’s death. It made no mention of an attack.

Unconvinced, Elie hired a forensic expert to review the case file. This doctor concluded, in the second report, dated 2018, that Skaf’s injuries suggested he was “subjected to a sudden, aggressive act that led to his fall.” The report said Skaf suffered “a strong punch to his left eye” and a “very strong kick to the bottom of his rib cage.”

Elie appointed a lawyer who asked Lebanese authorities to re-examine the case. A spokesman for Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces, which Elie said was overseeing the case, didn’t respond to a request for comment. Questions to the interior ministry were referred to the ISF.

“It’s been about a year since then, and we don’t know anything,” said Elie. “They don’t tell us anything.”

The family’s struggle to get answers has struck a chord in a country where officials are rarely held to account.

In a Facebook post soon after the port blast, Skaf’s son Michel wrote: “A crime was committed in March 2017. My father did not slip and fall. He was brutally assaulted and murdered in front of his own house. The case was never closed and our family has been waiting for 3 years for a serious investigation, as his case sits on some desk gathering dust. We want a true investigation, we want justice and the truth for Colonel Joseph Skaf.”



Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
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Drones vs. Airstrikes: How the Deterrence Equation Between Israel and Hezbollah Changed

A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 
A fireball rises from a building in the southern Lebanese city of Tyre following an Israeli airstrike (AFP). 

Israel is pressing forward with firepower, evacuation warnings, and limited ground incursions, while Hezbollah is responding with drones and direct engagements along advanced positions north of the Litani River.

Yet behind this reciprocal escalation, the deterrence equation that governed the border throughout the years following the 2006 war appears to be facing an unprecedented test, as military operations expand and reach areas that until recently were considered beyond the immediate danger zone.

Airstrikes that now reach as far as Zahrani, clashes around Zawtar al-Sharqiya, and Israel’s gradual advance toward the outskirts of Nabatieh all indicate, according to Lebanese military assessments, that the confrontation has entered a different phase.

In this new stage, drones alone are no longer capable of maintaining a deterrent balance, while Israel is pursuing a policy of mounting military pressure aimed at reshaping realities on the ground ahead of any potential settlement or negotiations.

Drones Do Not Create Deterrence

Retired Brig. Gen. Dr. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies argued that the drones used by Hezbollah do not achieve genuine deterrence against the continued expansion of Israeli air and ground operations.

He maintained that Israel’s ongoing airstrikes and ground incursions demonstrate that the deterrence equation is no longer functioning.

Jaber also linked battlefield developments to the erosion of the deterrence that had existed after the 2006 war, arguing that “the deterrence that lasted from 2006 to 2023 was real and effective.” However, he said Hezbollah’s entry into a war of attrition after opening its support front for Gaza led to the collapse of that equation.

He further warned that Israel’s objectives may not be limited to Zawtar and its surroundings but could expand farther north.

A Policy of Depopulation and Prolonged Attrition

Jaber said Israel’s policy of warnings and evacuations is designed to empty areas of their civilian populations.

“Once Israel evacuates an area of its residents, it becomes able to strike any movement within it,” he explained. “At that point, anyone traveling by car or motorcycle becomes a potential target.”

He added: “My greatest concern is that southern Lebanon may already have entered a prolonged war of attrition, because current battlefield indicators do not suggest a quick path toward ending this escalation or returning to the previous rules of engagement.”

Assessing both the military and political landscape, he argued that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “will not stop the war in Lebanon at this stage, regardless of the losses incurred,” noting that Israel “has not yet achieved any of its declared military or political objectives.”

He added that “Tel Aviv has failed to disarm Hezbollah and has also been unable to impose the conditions it seeks on Lebanon.”

According to his assessment, current developments indicate that “things will not return to the way they were,” arguing that the conflict has entered a new phase that will have lasting consequences for southern Lebanon and the balance of power there.

As for Hezbollah, Jaber said the group also “cannot simply halt the war midway through, given the complexities of the battlefield and the interwoven regional and international calculations.”

No Deterrent Balance Exists

For his part, retired Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou argued that “the drones used by Hezbollah have failed to establish a deterrent balance against Israel’s intensive air campaign,” stressing that “Israel is inflicting far greater damage and losses than it is receiving.”

He explained that fiber-optic-guided FPV (First-Person View) drones suffer from technical limitations related to both range and payload capacity.

“In practical terms, the range of these drones is between three and 15 kilometers and may reach around 20 kilometers as a reasonable upper limit,” he said. “The cable connecting the drone adds weight and affects its operational capabilities.”

Helou argued that claims of their use at distances of up to 60 kilometers are “militarily unrealistic.”

He added that “Hezbollah is attempting to achieve battlefield effects and inflict casualties through drones, but developments on the ground show that Israel is imposing far greater damage on both Hezbollah and Lebanon.”

 

 

 


Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)

The “support war” waged by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in backing Hamas in late 2023 shattered the doctrine of “deterrence” that the Iranian-backed group had embraced and promoted for nearly two decades in its confrontation with its traditional adversary, Israel. Israel, for its part, also helped reinforce this assumption, which proved entirely mistaken the following year. The new round of fighting in 2026 then offered both sides an opportunity to establish a new set of rules governing the conflict.

Israeli patience and cunning

Israel did not rush into a direct war with Hezbollah after the group launched a wave of largely “performative” attacks, beginning with rockets fired at the outskirts of Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms. Instead, it quietly steered the confrontation in a different direction, displaying notable restraint and considerable strategic calculation.

This approach was reflected in diplomatic efforts undertaken by Tel Aviv through Washington to persuade Hezbollah to separate the Lebanese front from the Palestinian one. In July 2024, then US envoy Amos Hochstein reportedly told Lebanese officials that he was prepared to deliver what would amount to a political victory for Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah if the group halted its operations.

Nasrallah immediately rejected the proposal. According to those who relayed the message to him, he replied that the war in Gaza would first have to end. After that, other matters could be discussed.

This was not Hezbollah’s first strategic misjudgment. The shape of the new conflict unfolding in Lebanon’s border villages quickly revealed a clear Israeli technological and military advantage. A senior Hezbollah official later disclosed that in previous confrontations, fighters could launch a rocket, calmly gather their equipment after informing command that the launch had been successful, and leave the site before Israeli aircraft arrived.

People react while attending the funeral of an Israeli soldier Captain Doctor Ori Yosef Silvester, a 30-year-old army doctor for the Givati Brigade's Shaked Battalion, who was killed in southern Lebanon, at the Segula Cemetery in Petah Tikva on June 2, 2026. (AFP)

In the new conflict, however, the window between launch and retaliation had narrowed to between five and twenty seconds. As a result, the official said, fighters often dug into the ground and sought immediate cover after firing in the hope of surviving. Every launch effectively became a near-suicidal operation.

Subsequent developments underscored Israel’s superiority even more clearly. Israeli forces carried out a series of precise assassinations targeting Hezbollah military commanders, culminating in a strike that eliminated most of the leadership of the Radwan Force, the group’s elite unit.

Israel then killed Hezbollah’s military commander and launched the “pager operation,” which put thousands of Hezbollah operatives out of action at the push of a button. This was followed by the assassination of Nasrallah in a massive airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs and, later, the killing of his successor, Hashem Safieddine.

Instruments of war

According to field sources, the weapons and tactics employed by both sides suggest that they prepared for a prolonged war of attrition rather than a decisive battle.

Beginning in the first week after the latest ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah reduced its reliance on rockets, scaled back the use of suicide drones, and curtailed the deployment of guided anti-tank missiles, whose operators were often vulnerable to detection. Instead, it introduced first-person-view (FPV) drones.

These drones are typically operated within a range of 10 to 15 kilometers in southern Lebanon and are guided through fiber-optic cables linking the aircraft directly to its operator. A thin wire connects the control station to the drone carrying the explosive payload, allowing it to evade electronic jamming.

An Israeli self-propelled howitzer artillery gun fires rounds towards southern Lebanon from a position in the upper Galilee in northern Israel near the border on March 15, 2026. (AFP)

Hezbollah in 2026: A war of drones

Hezbollah sought to regain the initiative in the latest conflict, which erupted in March and coincided with the war with Iran. Israel conveyed a message that it was not interested in opening a front with Lebanon so long as Hezbollah remained on the sidelines.

The group reassured officials in Beirut that it would not initiate hostilities. It nevertheless surprised observers by launching rockets toward northern Israel, prompting a fierce Israeli response.

Unlike the image it initially projected through the launch of six rudimentary rockets, Hezbollah appeared far more organized and capable in the fighting that followed, revealing capabilities that had remained concealed during 15 months of relative calm. The group claimed to be carrying out as many as 100 operations a day against Israeli forces and introduced new weapons systems to the battlefield.

Its ground strategy also evolved. Rather than relying on static defenses or attempting to halt Israeli advances outright, Hezbollah focused on inflicting the greatest possible damage on advancing forces.

Rise of drones

Rockets no longer dominate the battlefield between Israel and Hezbollah. After weeks of fighting that erupted in the spring of 2026, a notable shift emerged in the military operations, with attack and suicide drones moving to the forefront and becoming one of the most influential factors shaping combat on both sides of the border.

For years, Hezbollah’s military identity was closely associated with its vast rocket arsenal, which represented Israel’s primary security concern. The current conflict, however, has shown that the group no longer relies exclusively on rockets. Instead, it has expanded its use of drones on a large scale.

According to Israeli assessments, a substantial share of Hezbollah’s recent attacks has involved attack and suicide drones, while conventional rockets have assumed a less prominent role than before.

Israeli researchers argue that this shift reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, where inexpensive drones demonstrated their ability to inflict significant losses on technologically superior forces.

According to Israeli reports and military studies published since the outbreak of the war in March, Hezbollah’s principal weapon is no longer its rocket arsenal alone but the attack and suicide drones that have become the primary threat facing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

Israeli soldiers operate a drone. (Israeli army)

Foremost among these are FPV suicide drones guided by thin fiber-optic cables, making them effectively immune to electronic jamming. Their small size, low-altitude flight profiles, and erratic maneuverability pose additional challenges for Israeli radar and air-defense systems.

These drones carry relatively small explosive payloads, typically weighing no more than five kilograms. A Lebanese security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah employs three different types of warheads depending on the intended target—whether a tank, a conventional vehicle, or personnel.

Former Israeli officers say the threat posed by these drones extends beyond fixed military targets. They are also capable of tracking moving forces and striking tanks, vehicles, and field command centers, placing continuous pressure on Israeli ground units in southern Lebanon.

No definitive figures are available regarding the number of suicide drones Hezbollah has used since the beginning of the war. Unofficial Israeli estimates, however, suggest that the number may range from several hundred launches to more than a thousand.

Israel recently stated that Hezbollah had launched more than 120 drones of this type. The group, meanwhile, has released dozens of videos purporting to show drones striking vehicles, armored platforms, electronic systems, and personnel in the field.

Israel says Hezbollah’s operations have killed 20 soldiers and wounded dozens more since March.

In addition, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for detonating explosive devices against Israeli vehicles deep inside operational areas and for repelling Israeli incursions using light and medium machine guns, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

A screengrab image taken from a handout video released by the Israeli army and created on April 27, 2026, shows Israeli army footage of what it says is the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon, where a ceasefire has been in place since mid-April. (Israel Army / AFP)

Anti-armor missiles

Anti-armor missiles remain the backbone of Hezbollah’s ground warfare capability and have been used against Israeli tanks, vehicles, and fortifications.

Israeli sources point in particular to the Almas missile family, derived from Israel’s Spike missile system. According to those sources, Iran reverse-engineered the weapon after Hezbollah fighters captured an Israeli missile during the 2006 war. Russian-made Kornet systems and other anti-tank platforms also remain in service.

A third category of weapons consists of short- and medium-range rockets and artillery projectiles used extensively against military positions, troop concentrations, and bases in the Galilee and northern Israel. Their use, however, declined relative to drones during many phases of the 2026 conflict.

Reconnaissance and attack drones

Reconnaissance and attack drones rank fourth among Hezbollah’s principal battlefield systems.

Not all of them are suicide drones. Some are used for surveillance, fire correction, and target acquisition, while others carry small munitions and return to base after completing their missions.

Israeli sources have also reported limited use of anti-aircraft missiles and air-defense fire directed at Israeli aircraft.

Nevertheless, these systems have not proven as decisive as drones and anti-armor missiles in the current conflict.

A photograph taken from the southern area of Marjeyoun shows flares fired by the Israeli military descending over the village of Arnoun late on May 13, 2026. (AFP)

Evolving tactics

Israel, too, has adapted its methods of warfare.

Rather than relying primarily on armored formations advancing under air cover, it has sought to reduce casualties and increase mobility.

Lebanese security sources said the Israeli military has adopted tactics centered on small special forces teams moving along unpaved routes to avoid mines and ambushes. At the first sign of resistance, these units withdraw while combat aircraft strike hostile firing positions.

Alongside heavy air raids conducted by fighter jets and precision strikes carried out by drones against individuals traveling in cars and motorcycles, Israel has introduced two additional systems to the battlefield.

The first consists of loitering munitions, which have appeared in footage targeting motorcycles and personnel in the field.

The second is the extensive use of guided artillery rounds in 155 mm and 240 mm calibers, according to field sources in southern Lebanon. These systems have been employed against villages located well beyond the border zone.

The sources described the rounds as laser-guided, providing greater accuracy and enabling strikes at distances reaching up to 30 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.

According to Israeli statements and observations by military research centers during the 2026 war, unmanned aerial systems have been among the most heavily utilized assets in Lebanon. Israel maintains an extensive drone network covering both front-line and rear areas, including the Hermes 900 and Hermes 450 platforms, as well as smaller Skylark reconnaissance drones.

These systems have been used for surveillance, target acquisition, fire direction, and precision strikes against both mobile and fixed targets.

A beachgoer stands in the water against the backdrop of smoke rising from the site of an Israeli strike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of al-Mansouri on May 22, 2026. (AFP)

Precision munitions and guided missiles

Israel has also employed long-range missiles from the Spike NLOS family, as well as precision-guided aerial munitions launched from aircraft and drones against command centers and launch sites.

Tanks and armored units remain central to Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon, although many have come under attack from drones and anti-armor missiles.

Israel has also employed artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns to strike targets deep inside Lebanon, along with precision ground-to-ground missiles against preselected objectives.

Air-defense systems

Israel possesses several major air-defense systems, most notably Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow.

Yet Israeli reports themselves acknowledge that these systems have faced difficulties countering the small suicide drones used by Hezbollah, particularly those guided through fiber-optic cables.

Israeli media previously reported that the military had introduced the Ro’em artillery system into service in southern Lebanon. The Israeli-made 155 mm system is wheel-mounted for enhanced mobility, features automatic loading, requires a crew of only three rather than seven personnel, offers a firing range of up to 40 kilometers, and incorporates advanced command-and-control capabilities.

Heavy machinery clears the rubble at the site of an overnight Israeli strike in the southern city of Tyre, Lebanon, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)

Rules of engagement

Since the ceasefire took effect, Hezbollah has sought to establish rules of engagement that would confine the fighting to occupied territory by refraining from targeting Israeli towns and settlements in the north. The Israeli military, however, gradually expanded the battlefield through sustained airstrikes and bombardment reaching the outskirts of Sidon.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, retired Brig. Gen. Said Kozah said Hezbollah has been attempting since the ceasefire to establish a new operational equation with Israel based on the principle that every Israeli strike should trigger a response. However, he argued, Israel continues to work against this.

Kozah noted that describing the situation as “rules of engagement” is not entirely accurate because the term is generally used between regular armies or within a clearly defined military framework.

“In practice,” he said, “Hezbollah is attempting to entrench a new set of rules under which any Israeli attack would be met with retaliation—whether through strikes against Israeli positions in occupied Lebanese territory or through rocket fire directed into Israel.”

He added that Hezbollah had recently carried out operations against Israeli positions in the border area, some involving drones and others consisting of infiltration attempts or direct attacks.

He also remarked that rocket launches into Israel had declined in recent days and that many had been intercepted because of the relatively limited numbers employed.

According to Kozah, Hezbollah seeks through these operations to reinforce the legitimacy of retaining its weapons under the banner of resisting occupation within Lebanese territory. At the same time, the group avoids addressing the factors that led to the current level of escalation and occupation.

As for whether Hezbollah has succeeded in imposing this new equation, Kozah said the situation suggests Israel remains the one setting the rules.

“The Israeli military is not limiting its operations to the buffer zone or the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’” he said. “It continues to conduct operations, clearing activities, and strikes against villages north of that line, effectively rejecting the balance Hezbollah is trying to establish.”


Report: World Conflicts Hit Peak in 2025

Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
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Report: World Conflicts Hit Peak in 2025

Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinians assess damage at the site of an Israeli airstrike in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on June 7, 2026. (AFP)

The world saw the highest number of state conflicts since the Second World War in 2025, a Norwegian study said on Tuesday, warning of a surge in attacks targeting civilians.

The annual "Conflict Trends" report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) said 65 conflicts involving at least one state were recorded worldwide last year, a new high since 1946.

Conflicts between states also hit a new 80-year peak, doubling from the year before to eight -- including border clashes between India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Cambodia and Thailand, as well as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Israeli military operations against Syria.

"Unfortunately, there are not a lot of positive things," researcher Siri Aas Rustad told a group of media outlets, including AFP.

"Usually, I'm able to sort of squeeze something positive out of it, but this year it's shocking, the numbers."

Last year was the third deadliest since the end of the Cold War, with around 245,000 deaths directly related to fighting or political violence -- nearly 76,500 of them attributed to attacks directly targeting civilians, compared with 14,200 in 2024.

The sharp increase in civilian deaths is due to the conflict between the army and paramilitaries in Sudan, where the siege and massacres carried out in El-Fasher city in the Darfur region are estimated to have left some 60,000 people dead.

Since the end of the Cold War, only 1994 and 2021 have seen more bloodshed, due to the Rwanda genocide and the war in Ethiopia's Tigray region respectively.

- Africa worst affected -

"What has happened in the past five or six years is that we have several big conflicts going on at the same time and they seem to take over from each other. The world doesn't get any break," Rustad said.

"And that's different from previously -- this continuous high intensity level of conflict globally."

The PRIO study is based on figures compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), attached to Uppsala University.

It distinguishes between three main types of organized violence: conflicts involving at least one state, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence against civilians.

Africa remained the region most affected by the first type of conflict with 29, followed by Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, and Europe.

Rustad said Israel was "clearly one of the most aggressive countries in the world at the moment", pointing to its involvement in different types of conflicts in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, against Iran, and against Houthi militants.

She also pointed to the United States, saying President Donald Trump's return to power had brought "not just attacking and increasing violence, but also the trade barriers they're putting up."

"We are putting a lid on collaboration. The (UN) Security Council doesn't work at the moment. We get a much more polarized world," she said.