Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
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Rifaat Assad: Challenged his Brother for Syria’s Presidency, Aged in Exile, Pardoned by his Nephew

Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)
Rifaat and Hafez al-Assad pictured in January 1984. (AFP)

The Syria that Rifaat al-Assad left when he was vice president to Hafez al-Assad decades ago is not the same one that he returned to after his nephew, President Bashar al-Assad, allowed him to return to as a “citizen.” The country has changed with its foreign alliances and role in the region. Its composition has changed and it is now “home” to five armies.

Accompanied by his wives, children and grandchildren, his first glimpses of Damascus, with its streets, checkpoints, officials and his former residence, may have rekindled memories of when he was at the height of his power. He may have recalled a time back in the 1980s when he orchestrated a “coup” against his brother and surrounded the capital.

Damascus, which 21 years ago ordered his arrest should he return from exile, rose above the wounds and received him so he can avoid imprisonment in France where he was sentenced to serve for five years. Days alone will decipher the “code” that was headlined by al-Watan newspaper last week and that said that Rifaat, 84, had returned “with no political or social role”. Days will tell the extent to which this “decree” will be implemented in Damascus and Latakia.

The brothers and the Brotherhood
When he was young, Rifaat had always been overshadowed by his stronger older brother, Hafez, who was seven years his senior. In 1952, he followed in his brother’s ideological footsteps and joined the Baath party. He also followed him in joining the military and later the interior ministry.

In March 1963, the Baath military committee, which his brother was a member of, seized power. Rifaat soon joined the military academy in Homs. After graduating, he served alongside his brother, who at the time was an air force commander.

His first military “tours” took place with Salim Hatoum and the raid of President Amin al-Hafez’s residence in February 1966. The raid was aimed at toppling the first Baath government. Under President Nureddin al-Atassi, Rifaat was tasked with commanding a special unit that was formed by the military committee to “defend the regime”.

Historians say that during the late 1960s, Syria witnessed two major conflicts. The first pitted Hafez and Rifaat against Salah Jadid and his chief of intelligence Abdulkarim al-Jundi. Between February 25 and 28, 1969, the Assad brothers launched a military operation in Damascus. Tanks moved in the capital against Jundi and Jadid loyalists. The former committed suicide on March 2, 1969, to avoid arrest. On November 17, 1970, Assad carried out the “comprehensive movement”, arresting Atassi and Jadid. Rifaat was then tasked with securing Damascus.

Rifaat became commander of the Defense Companies, which boasted some 40,000 soldiers and acted almost like an independent army that was not affiliated with the official military. Rifaat rose up the ranks in the party and he expanded his activities among students, the youth and the media.

The second conflict erupted in 1979. It pitted the regime against the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1979, Rifaat declared it was time to “respond with force” against the movement, calling on everyone to pledge their absolute loyalty. He was quoted as saying: “Stalin sacrificed 10 million people to protect the Bolshevik revolution. Syria must do the same to protect the Baath revolution.” He threatened to wage a “hundred wars, destroy a million forts and sacrifice a million lives” to preserve the state-regime. He let loose in suppressing the uprising between 1979 and 1982. The situation reached its peak when he struck Hama in February 1982.

In 1983, he sent his paratroopers to Damascus with the command to remove the hijab off women on the streets. The move was met with widespread criticism, even his brother openly condemned him.

Edge of danger
When Hafez fell ill in November 1983, it appeared that the moment Rifaat had long awaited had arrived. He began to act as though he were the “legitimate heir”, seeing himself as the only heir. He began to rally the support of his generals, drawing the extreme ire of the president.

Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled the tense situation in his memoirs, which were seen by Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he met with Hafez in March 1978 to address the extreme campaign against Rifaat among the Syrians. “This campaign weakens the regime,” Khaddam told Hafez. “You must address the situation with Rifaat.”

Indeed, Rifaat was meddling in the affairs of state and ordering around Prime Minster Mohammed Ali Halabi, who did not dare speak out.

Khaddam added: “The president wanted his brother to succeed him, but Rifaat committed a major sin when he tried to revolt against him when he had fallen ill in November 1983.”

He recalled that Hafez had at one point in 1980 told him that he wanted to appoint a vice president for the sake of “continuity, because no one knows when their time will come.” Khaddam, who was foreign minister at the time, understood that he was referring to Rifaat. His attempted coup, however, made his brother change his mind.

Remembering the failed coup, Khaddam said that when Hafez fell ill in November 1983, commander of the republican guard, Adnan Makhlouf, informed him that the president wanted to see him at hospital. “I believed that he was a victim of an assassination attempt,” said Khaddam. “I asked: ‘Was he shot or targeted by a bomb?’ to which Makhlouf replied: ‘He was struck by a heart attack.’ I headed to the hospital immediately.”

The next day, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel was scheduled to visit Syria. Hafez asked Khaddam to postpone the visit and to cite “his preoccupation with internal matters”. When Hafez left the ICU, Khaddam contacted army commander Hikmat al-Shihabi and asked him to come to the hospital. “We agreed to take measures that would avert attempts to blow up the situation in Syria, because I was fearful of Rifaat.”

Khaddam recalled how at one point he was on the phone with the Syrian ambassador to London to request that a doctor be flown over immediately. He demanded that the best doctor be sent to Syria. He had made a similar request to the envoy in Washington. Rifaat walked in at that moment and asked why should doctors be brought from abroad? Syria has doctors, he declared. Should doctors be brought in from abroad whenever anyone falls ill? Khaddam replied: “Your brother is called Hafez al-Assad, not Hafez Khaddam. It is my responsibility to provide all conditions for his recovery because I know what sort of chaos will happen if he is gone.”

Later, Khaddam said the American ambassador revealed to him that an American envoy was coming to Damascus to meet with Rifaat. He responded: “We won’t allow him to come. Syria has a state. If the United States wanted to contact us, then it should do so through the state that I represent as foreign minister.”

The next day, the Defense Companies paraded through the streets of Damascus and Rifaat declared to the people: “I am coming.” Soon after, Khaddam met with the military, Shihabi and Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. “We agreed to bring in two units from outside Damascus. They surrounded the city and the situation became tense. When senior officers who had pledged allegiance to Rifaat found out that Hafez was out of danger, they abandoned his brother. Rifaat became isolated.”

Tense meeting
At the time, the Central Command held a meeting. Everyone was shocked at the large numbers of Defense Companies members. Addressing the meeting, Rifaat said: “The Central Command must expel from the party Ali Duba (chief of military intelligence), Ibrahim Safi (commander of Syrian forces in Lebanon), Ali Haidar (commander of the special forces) and Mohammed Khawli (director of air force intelligence) because they are insulting me. I am the brother of the president. I should be treated like the president. If you don’t take a decision, then my forces will immediately occupy Damascus.”

Some of the members of the Central Command appeared hesitant. General Mustafa then addressed the gatherers: “These are your brothers. The problem can be solved if you meet together.” Khaddam then interjected, addressing Rifaat, he said: “You want to launch a coup? Go ahead. If every officer with a tank and soldiers wants to ride on our shoulders, then that is a dangerous thing. You have the tanks. Go ahead, make your move.” Rifaat was gradually becoming angrier. “I never said such a thing,” he retorted. Khaddam replied knowingly: “The discussion was recorded.”

After the meeting, Khaddam contacted Hafez to inform him of what happened. The president said he will check with Zuhair Masharqa, who was a member of the Central Command. Minutes later, Hafez told Khaddam that Masharqa had informed him that Rifaat did not make any threatening remarks. Khaddam told Hafez to check with the minister of defense and commander of the army because Masharqa was loyal to Rifaat. After around a quarter of an hour, Hafez contacted Khaddam again. “What you said was right. Zuhair is a coward and he lied to me,” said Hafez.

‘I am the regime’
In February 1984, Hafez carried out his retaliation. He ordered the arrest of Salim Barakat, Rifaat’s security aide. He also sent a message through their other brother, Jamil, to Rifaat, saying: “I am your older brother, whom you must obey. Do not forget that I am the one who made you.”

In March 1984, Hafez appointed Rifaat as vice president but with no official duties. In fact, this was not a form of promotion, but an attempt to curb Rifaat’s power through appointing him to a purely political role, one that would be under the constant watchful eye of the president. His security duties, as commander of the Defense Companies, were referred to Mohammed Ghanem.

Khaddam recalled how Rifaat’s appointment was announced. He said Hafez called the Central Command to meet in early March 1984. He informed the leadership that he had decided to appoint three vice presidents. He said he alone has the right to make such an order and name the officials, who were Rifaat Assad, Zuhair Masharqa and Abdul Halim Khaddam.

“I immediately told him that I didn’t want to be vice president or serve in any government or party position,” said Khaddam. “Hafez ended the meeting and then called me to his office. He asked me: ‘Why did you object?’ I replied: ‘How can you put Rifaat and Zuhair above me? Rifaat should be in jail, not act as first deputy to the president. I have worked tirelessly to serve my country. I will not practice any state or partisan work.’ He told: ‘Then take over the position of secretary of the Central Command.’ I rejected his offer and went home.”

“After about an hour, he called me back to his office. He welcomed me back with a laugh: ‘You are stubborn.’ He informed me that he issued a decree naming me as first vice president, followed by Rifaat and then Zuhair. I asked him what a vice president does. He replied that he is in charge of foreign policy. Soon after the decree was announced and I accepted.”

On March 30, 1984, Rifaat responded to the move. His soldiers entered Damascus with clear orders to seize power. They took over strategic positions throughout the capital and its surroundings. Rifaat’s forces clashes with Hafezloyalists, such as Ali Haidar of the special forces and Adnan Makhlouf of the republican guard.

Patrick Seale, author of Assad’s biography, “Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East,” wrote that had the two sides struck each other in the capital, the destruction would have been massive and the image of the regime would have been irreparably damaged. Hafez left the noose dangling enough for Rifaat to hang himself.

Hafez was in full military uniform, accompanied by his oldest son Bassel, who was to become his father’s right-hand man until his death in a car accident in 1994.

Hafez drove his car alone without any guards to confront Rifaat at the headquarters of his military command. Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass recalled the developments in a book, “Three months that shook Syria”. “Adnan Makhlouf, commander of the republican guard, informed me that Mr. president has headed alone to his brother’s headquarters in Mazzeh. He said the president had told him that if he was not back in an hour, then Tlass must carry out the plan (of confronting Rifaat’s forces),” wrote Tlass.

“Do you want to overthrow the regime?” Hafez asked Rifaat. “Here I am. I am the regime!” They argued and then Hafez offered Rifaat a way out, vowing to respect his dignity and interests and provide him with a safe exit to exile of his choosing. He promised that he would not arrest him.

In late April 1984, Rifaat sensed that the balance of power had started to lean in his brother’s favor to an extent that he could no longer move. He contacted his brother Jamil so that he could mediate a reconciliation and to say that he was ready to do anything the president wanted. Hafez was impatiently waiting for Rifaat to collapse and resign himself to the authority. He won the waiting game. Then the difficult negotiations began.

They agreed that the Defense Companies would come under the authority of the operations command in the armed forces. Rifaat would remain as vice president tasked with security affairs. They agreed that senior officers would travel with him to Moscow. On May 28, 1984, a plane carrying Rifaat and his senior officers flew to Moscow to cool down. They were summoned one by one back to Syria and Rifaat alone remained in exile.

‘My brother doesn’t love me’
It was said that prior to leaving Syria, Rifaat had thrown a huge banquet for his friends. “It appears as though my brother no longer loves me. When he sees me, he frowns. I am not an American agent. I did not conspire against my country,” he told them. “If I were a fool, I would have destroyed the entire city, but I love this place. My men have been here for 18 years, the people are used to us and they love us. Now the commandos want to kick us out.”

Rifaat returned to Syria in 1992 at the wishes of his mother, who died later that year. In 1994, he extended his condolences to Hafez when his son Bassel died. Later that year, he was discharged from his position in the army and kept his post as vice president before later being relieved of his duties.

In 1999, his supporters clashed in a gunfight with government forces in Latakia. He set up a satellite channel in London in September 1997. He established his own party in Europe that is headed by his son, Sumer. The party had called for political change and was met with criticism by loyalists and the opposition.

When Hafez died on June 10, 2000, he issued a statement to elegize him. He claimed to be his heir, but his calls fell on deaf ears. Khaddam ordered Rifaat’s arrest should he attempt to attend his brother’s funeral.

After the eruption of the 2011 protests in Syria, Rifaat stood against the regime. His son, Ribal, is openly involved in politics. Rifaat’s presence in the media gradually faded. He appeared during the presidential elections this year when he voted for his nephew at the Syrian consulate in Paris. He then sent a cable of congratulation to Bashar on his reelection. On Thursday, he returned to Syria.



ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
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ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.


Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
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Greenland Galvanizes Europe to Confront New US Reality

Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)
Apartment buildings and houses light up the city of Nuuk, Greenland on January 22, 2026. (AFP)

Europe may have rallied to see off President Donald Trump over Greenland, but its leaders recognize the confrontation is unlikely to be the last in dealings with his increasingly strident version of the United States.

The stakes could hardly be higher, given the $2 trillion trading relationship between the European Union and the US and the dominant role Washington continues to play in the NATO alliance and in support of Ukraine against Russia.

This week, ​in the space of a few hours at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Trump first ruled out taking Greenland by force and then removed the threat of new tariffs on eight European states standing in his way - hailing instead a vague deal for the Arctic island with NATO chief Mark Rutte.

European leaders believe Trump backed down in part because - in contrast to their more accommodating stance in last year's tariff negotiations - this time they made it clear he was crossing a red line by asserting that Greenland's status as an autonomous territory of Denmark was non-negotiable.

"All this shows that you cannot let the Americans trample all over the Europeans," said a European Union official, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about US ties.

"We did the right thing to push back, to be firm in what we said, but it is not over. My sense is that we will be tested constantly on issues like this," ‌the official told ‌Reuters.

While Europe may have learned the value of standing up to Trump, the challenge is ensuring it ‌is ⁠less ​exposed next time.

"It's ‌a hard route, and it's going to take time," said Rosa Balfour, director at Carnegie Europe, adding that Europe had "far more leverage than it has dared to use".

EUROPE NOT SEEKING A SPLIT

An emergency summit of Europe's leaders on Thursday called for last year's EU-US trade deal to be put back on track after lawmakers suspended its ratification in protest over Greenland.

"Despite all the frustration and anger of recent months, let us not be too quick to write off the transatlantic partnership," German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said in Davos beforehand.

While seeking to stabilize the partnership, Europe is also taking steps aimed at "de-risking" it given the open antipathy from Trump, whose new national security strategy accuses the continent of freeloading on defense and demands it open its markets to US companies.

Europe is only too aware of how long it can ⁠take to get agreement among 27 nations with different histories, politics and economies, which was highlighted in taunts this week by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

Two EU officials said the Greenland row has accelerated discussions on ‌how the approach taken on Ukraine - in which countries offer security guarantees on a voluntary basis ‍and no one has a right of veto - can be extended.

"We should ‍do more with coalitions of the willing and leave it open for others to follow if they want," said one, adding that joint efforts to ‍boost Europe's development of artificial intelligence technology could be one example.

Coalitions such as the "E3" group comprising France, Germany and Britain focusing on security matters also allow non-EU states to take part, which speaks to others on the rough end of Trump policies.

"The middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu," Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said in a Davos speech to warm applause.

Another route is using the leeway afforded by EU law.

In December, EU states used an emergency provision ​to indefinitely immobilize hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets. That removed the risk of a pro-Moscow country like Hungary blocking the roll-over of the measure at some point and forcing the EU to return the money.

NEW EUROPEAN DOCTRINE

Europe also plans to toughen ⁠up on economic policy.

Next month it will kickstart legislation that will include "Made in Europe" requirements on strategic sectors and strengthening conditionality clauses for any foreign direct investment in the EU.

"Some provisions were originally conceived to reduce reliance on China but in reality they will help us to de-risk from other markets," European Commissioner for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy Stephane Sejourne told Reuters.

"This will totally change the European doctrine on those sectors," Sejourne added.

Unlike Canada, there is no plan in Europe to pivot more towards China to compensate for transatlantic strains. But the bloc is actively pursuing others in a diversification drive.

While the impact of higher US tariffs on European goods is not clear - in fact Europe's trade surplus with the US initially rose over the course of 2025 as companies front-loaded exports ahead of the new levies - recent data shows that German companies nearly halved investments there last year.

After the signing of the EU-Mercosur pact this month - the largest in EU history - European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it is now "on the cusp" of a deal with India.

However, nobody is saying Europe can redress the imbalance with the US overnight, particularly on security.

Despite European commitments to a defense spending surge and even calls for an EU army, analysts say it will be years before its military might is up to ‌tasks which now include bolstering Arctic security.

The question is whether the past few weeks provide a catalyst for Europe to start reducing its US dependencies.

"All this is not surprising," Swedish deputy Prime Minister Ebba Busch said of Trump's showing in Davos.

"The EU needs to toughen up," she told Reuters.


Possible ‘Emergency Exit’ for Iraqi Factions, But Not for Everyone

An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
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Possible ‘Emergency Exit’ for Iraqi Factions, But Not for Everyone

An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 
An Iraqi man carrying the Iranian flag passes in front of security forces outside the Iranian embassy in Baghdad during a demonstration to show solidarity against US threats (DPA). 

Since protests erupted in Iran, political elites in Iraq have quietly debated whether the “Islamic Revolution” in Tehran might be nearing a rapid collapse. Yet the more cautious question circulating in Baghdad is different: what if the Iranian system survives, but weakened and stripped of its tools, for years to come?

This question now resonates within the corridors of the Coordination Framework, the coalition most closely tied to regional power dynamics. It appears to be repositioning itself amid shifting centers of influence, but not before paying a price.

Figures from Shiite parties and armed factions, as well as researchers interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat, say anxiety over Iran’s trajectory is palpable in Baghdad, though rarely expressed openly for ideological reasons and because of what they describe as a chronic inability to produce independent national policies.

Pressure on Shiite forces has been building for months. Washington is pushing to dismantle militias and sever their operational and economic ties with Iran. Tehran is weighed down by sanctions and protests whose sparks have reached even the bazaars. Meanwhile, the Coordination Framework is attempting to engineer a governing formula capable of surviving these pressures.

It is widely believed that the heavy presence of armed factions’ representatives in parliament - holding more than about 80 seats - is part of a broader strategy to adapt to US pressure, whether Iran’s system collapses or remains weak for years.

Accordingly, Shiite political actors appear compelled to move from the era of militias toward the state, though only after establishing a strong central power within state institutions, in order to avoid confrontation with Washington and prepare for the possibility of Iran’s declining influence.

Over time, it has become clear that avoiding confrontation with the United States requires not only reducing Iranian influence but also constructing local power under the umbrella of a national political settlement.

A situation resembling Saddam Hussein

Since 2003, Shiite parties have rarely debated Iran’s future publicly. There is a prevailing belief that discussing the fate of a system led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is ideologically taboo for those who profess absolute loyalty to him, according to a senior leader in the Coordination Framework.

Many also dismiss the possibility of Iran’s collapse altogether. But Hisham Dawood, a researcher at the French National Center, argues that the impact of maximum sanctions on Iranian society cannot be ignored. He said sanctions do not overthrow regimes as much as they reshape societies, shifting them from a culture of living to one of survival.

In private gatherings, Iraqi politicians have begun drawing an analogy that alarms Shiite groups. They note that Tehran’s system is approaching a condition similar to that of Saddam Hussein’s regime after the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent economic embargo, a crushed social base and a leadership gradually stripped of its traditional tools.

Aqeel Abbas, a researcher on US affairs, does not believe Iran’s system will collapse but is convinced that its behavior will change. On that basis, Shiite forces may seek to adapt in order to weather the storm.

This trajectory, however, does not appear sufficient in Washington’s eyes. The United States is not searching for treasure but for the key. US presidential envoy Mark Savaya wrote that militias are merely a symptom of a deeper disease in Iraq. For months, he has been shaping among Shiite circles in Baghdad a narrative of sustained pressure within a broader American strategy.

Groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq have shown striking flexibility compared with their past. The faction that once fought the Americans now stands as one of the main pillars of government and parliament and is reportedly planning to dominate both in the next legislative cycle, according to associates of its leader, Qais al-Khazali.

During his election campaign months ago, al-Khazali welcomed US investments. Yet Washington continues to press for the removal of his representative in parliament from the post of deputy speaker, according to information leaked from meetings held by Acting Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris with Coordination Framework officials.

A Western diplomat who served in a mission between Baghdad and Damascus during the fight against ISIS explains US behavior toward Shiite factions: after months of “power diplomacy” in exchange for avoiding military targeting, the Americans are not seeking a truce but a decisive blow followed by a deal on their terms. Savaya’s role, he says, is likely to clarify and enforce those conditions.

More than weapons

Spokespersons for armed factions declined to comment on questions about their plans for dealing with US pressure. But a senior figure in an armed faction, speaking anonymously, said they had reached a stage of “confrontation without masks — no intermediaries, no maneuvering.”

Aqeel Abbas believes Shiite forces may attempt to transform existing militias into local forces under new names, limited to protecting the system inside Iraq without regional roles or provoking the United States and Israel.

Theoretically, such a shift could satisfy Washington. But the faction leader warned that the confrontation goes beyond weapons: the Americans, he said, want the core of influence and resistance. “We tried to confine the crisis to weapons, but now they are pressing on our existence, our economy, and our ideological ties. What room for maneuver remains except defending our dignity?”

He added that such questions are being raised in Baghdad faster than they are answered in Tehran.

Iran “that cannot be defeated”

Hisham Dawood divides Shiite reactions in Baghdad into three groups.

The first consists of pro-Iran forces with direct ideological ties to Tehran, which do not view the Iraqi state as the ultimate framework of political belonging but rather as a field of action within a transnational project. These forces, Dawood argues, are prepared to bear high costs - even if they affect the Iraqi state - so long as they serve what they consider a religious obligation toward Tehran.

Indeed, many factions place near-absolute confidence in Iran. A faction leader who was active in Syria before the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime said some battles are managed according to logic that transcends local calculations, and that the final decision is not always in the hands of those who pay the price on the ground. He argued that without Iran, the Islamic Revolution would have no meaning.

The second group comprises forces that have governed Iraq since 2003 and occupy a more complex position. They are not overtly pro-Iran ideologically or organizationally, but they remain deeply influenced by Tehran for historical and sectarian reasons, and out of fear that Iranian influence could reshape internal Shiite alignments.

These forces seek to present themselves as holders of national legitimacy, yet in decisive moments they still defer to Tehran. Many observers believe this dynamic was reflected in what was described as Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s “concession” to Nouri al-Maliki over the premiership - an attempt, according to a senior Shiite leader, to restore Maliki’s centrality through a new-old alliance.

Pro-Iran groups mobilized demonstrations in central and southern cities, carrying images of Khamenei and Iranian flags. But the Coordination Framework issued only one statement urging diplomatic solutions and warning of economic challenges and falling oil prices. This has revealed a leadership caught between traditional power calculations and growing risks.

The third group consists of a popular majority with weak political representation, which views the continuation of the Iranian model in Iraq as a source of political stagnation, economic crisis, social paralysis, and international isolation.

The Sadrist movement may represent part of this majority. Dawood argues that it is politically reduced to an image of Iranian extension, a simplification that imposes a heavy symbolic and political cost.

Most Iraqi Shiite forces - except some ideological actors - appear ready to strike deals with Washington, provided their interests within the Iraqi state are guaranteed, in a manner resembling the model the United States is testing in Syria.

Meanwhile, attempts to create a strong institutional umbrella to fill the vacuum have emerged through the prominent role of the Supreme Judicial Council. On the eve of the legislative elections, Judge Faiq Zaidan urged adherence to constitutional timelines for forming Iraq’s leadership. Weeks later, he began publicly naming factions that must limit weapons. Iraqi elites now speak of an alternative governing umbrella that could fill the vacuum with the force of law.

An emergency exit

A Western diplomat believes this is the first time in years that Shiite groups may be forced to reconsider options that appear unrealistic, not only for Washington but even for Tehran. He pointed to the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces as a warning for those who bet on open and absolute hostility.

While these developments paint a suffocating picture for Shiite factions, they also open an emergency exit from the old game toward new alliances.

A former government adviser described such an exit as a search for new alliances during a period in which Iran remains an ideological umbrella but without claws. He argued that pressures on armed factions leave no luxury of choice: Shiite forces must first build sustainable local partnerships and then balance relations with emerging centers of power in the region and the Arab world.

Yet this emergency exit may not accommodate all Shiite players within what Dawood describes as a fragmented state. The central question remains open: will the United States seek to preserve pluralism among Shiite political and factional actors, or will it prefer to support a centralized authority with an authoritarian grip, as some actors in Baghdad now advocate?