Could a war break out between Israel and Türkiye? This question has been raised repeatedly for over a year, since January 2025, when the report of what is known as Israel’s Nagel Committee spoke of the importance of preparing for war with Türkiye. Less than four months later, a meaningful report was issued by Türkiye’s National Intelligence Academy. Drawing on the lessons of the twelve-day war involving the United States and Israel against Iran, it recommended the construction of deep shelters in all major Turkish cities “to protect civilians,” as well as the adoption of advanced cyber security measures to protect the information infrastructure of official institutions, given that wars have now become multidimensional, involving all weapons, with intensive use of technology and unconventional methods in managing battle.
The Turkish report did not explicitly mention confrontation with Israel. However, many Turkish military experts involved in making the National Academy’s recommendations point to the possibility of a military confrontation with Israel, given the Jewish media’s focus on what it describes as a “Turkish threat that must be prepared for in advance.”
Israeli statements point in the same direction: describing Türkiye as supporting a terrorist regime in Iran, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, and as “the new Iran,” as former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett described it last February.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan responded to the Israeli statements by saying that Israel cannot live without creating an enemy, and that they are now trying to place Türkiye in that position for domestic purposes. That is, Ankara fully understands the predicament facing the Israeli elite, both the ruling one represented by Likud, far-right parties, and the Haredim, and the opposition from Zionist center-right parties. They are locked in a conflict over how to assess the returns of the wars in which Israel is involved, whether alone, as in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, or in partnership with Washington.
This is a conflict that relates to Israeli military doctrine itself and to the transformations each camp believes must take place to prevent Israel from facing a major existential confrontation. It also reflects the importance of always promoting threats in order to influence public opinion and achieve the greatest possible degree of social solidarity with any military confrontation Israel resorts to, in application of Israel’s familiar concept of preemptive war.
The reciprocal positions expressed in Turkish and Israeli media show an inclination to prepare for a military confrontation, while at the same time placing many restrictions on each side’s ability to initiate a military strike against the other. These restrictions stem primarily from geographic and strategic considerations that govern each side’s overall security doctrine.
A retired Turkish general presented a possible military-confrontation scenario in which his country, in an initial response to an Israeli strike, would use nearly 1,200 drones, including suicide drones and long-range drones loaded with precision weapons, and nearly 400 ballistic missiles covering the whole of Israel. He asked: “Do they have anything capable of stopping the potential losses from such a scenario?” The implicit message seemed to focus on deterrence and major losses, and on the idea that it is better to search for paths other than direct military confrontations whose outcomes are not guaranteed. The question remains: would international circumstances allow such a thing?
From the Israeli perspective, the issue is not imminent military confrontation, but rather the creation of an image of a potential enemy that calls for rallying behind a firm leader to protect the state. That has been the defining feature of the ruling Israeli coalition’s moves. Such are the governing elements in societies built on fear and uncertainty about the future, which always search for a collective state of mind that produces fragile social cohesion. What matters here is not rational thinking, but collective thinking that cannot determine how useful policies are for self-preservation.
Türkiye can be this Israeli propaganda target. It is the powerful competitor to Israel’s colonial ambitions in the new Syria. It is the state that has succeeded in developing domestic military industries whose effectiveness has been proven in more than one arena. It has the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, even if implicitly, focused on naval deployment in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It also has advanced political and military relations with many key countries in the region, especially Egypt and influential Gulf states.
Accordingly, Türkiye can represent the image of a potential threat around which Israeli public opinion can be rallied domestically. Yet the outside world remains a greater dilemma. Türkiye also has geographic and demographic depth incomparable to Israel’s. It is a member of NATO, and whatever attempts Tel Aviv makes to describe it as NATO’s troublemaker, and promote this image among alliance countries, it remains a fundamental pillar of the alliance that is difficult to abandon.
It is also difficult to engage in a military confrontation with it. Türkiye has good relations with different US administrations, based on strategic considerations linking the two countries. These relations may witness differences at times over various files, but strategic alignment continues to impose itself. As for Türkiye's influence on Muslim public opinion, it is not subject to debate, whatever Israeli propaganda campaigns may be, including those already taking place inside the United States.
The dilemma here was raised by official reports or analyses circulating in the media of both countries giving indications far removed from reality. It is true that there will continue to be intermittent clashes, primarily through propaganda, but the constraints of reality are greater than the incentives for direct military confrontation.
