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International Architectural Competition to Reconstruct Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul

The Al Hadba Minaret which was a Mosul landmark before and after it was destroyed by ISIS- AAWSAT AR
The Al Hadba Minaret which was a Mosul landmark before and after it was destroyed by ISIS- AAWSAT AR
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International Architectural Competition to Reconstruct Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul

The Al Hadba Minaret which was a Mosul landmark before and after it was destroyed by ISIS- AAWSAT AR
The Al Hadba Minaret which was a Mosul landmark before and after it was destroyed by ISIS- AAWSAT AR

The Joint Steering Committee of UNESCO’s project for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Al Hadba Minaret and the Al-Nouri Mosque in Mosul Iraq took new steps to push on the reconstruction of the two architectural landmarks in Mosul’s Old City.

This came as the Committee was holding its 3rd session, which announced the initiation of the third phase of the UNESCO initiative to “revive the spirit of Mosul”.

Following the meeting, UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay said that "today marks the culmination of many months of hard work, but also of cooperation, dedication and determination to ensure that we all move ahead together, side by side, to revive the spirit of Mosul. At the end of phase one of the reconstruction of the Al-Nouri Mosque complex, I wish to reiterate UNESCO’s firm commitment to the successful implementation of the project for Mosul, for Iraq, and for the world."

Acting on behalf of the Committee, UNESCO will launch an international architectural competition for the reconstruction of Al-Nouri Mosque. The competition will incorporate the input of the residents of Mosul who will be invited to take part in a large-scale consultation concerning the main reconstruction options for the Minaret and the Mosque. These activities’ timeline will depend on the ongoing response to COVID-19 in Mosul.

The second phase of the Revive the Spirit of Mosul Project involves the consolidation of the remaining base and reconstruction of the Minaret and Mosque and will begin once field and soil investigations are completed and after an extensive consultation with the local community on the design of the edifice and on whether to make the Minaret lean to one side as the original did.

The Joint Steering Committee endorsed the reconstruction of the Al Hadba Minaret in its original location and opted for an intermediate solution for Al Nouri Mosque, aimed at maintaining the visual aspects of the building as it was before its destruction in 2017.

Recalling that “Al Nouri Mosque is a cultural asset, an archaeological and historical monument,” Iraq’s Minister of Culture expressed “a strong desire to maintain the authenticity of Al Nouri Mosque with the least modification.

The project, supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), aims to restore and reconstruct the historic landmarks of Mosul, notably the emblematic Al-Nouri Mosque and its celebrated, 45-meter tall leaning Al-Hadba Minaret, built more than 840 years ago, historic and defining structures which were all but leveled by violent extremists who occupied the city from 2014 to 2017. The project also provides employment opportunities and job training.

It is an integral part of UNESCO’s flagship initiative Revive the Spirit of Mosul and the Organization’s response for the recovery of one of Iraq’s most iconic cities through the revival of education, heritage and cultural life.

For her part, Noura bint Mohammed Al Kaabi, the United Arab Emirates’ Minister of Culture and Knowledge Development of the United Arab Emirates said: “We have come a long way since we set out our vision for the project which reerects a cultural and historical treasure. We will continue to engage Maslawis throughout the process and are committed to train and hire more Iraqis in the project.”

The first phase of the project, which began in early 2019 and lasted a year, consisted of clearing and demining the site, documenting and assessing it, stabilizing parts that could be salvaged as well as overall planning.

In October 2019, UNESCO, the UAE and the Government of Iraq agreed to undertake the reconstruction of two churches in the Old City of Mosul: The Al-Tahera Syriac Catholic Church and the Conventual Church of Our Lady of the Clock, with a view to reviving the cultural diversity that has characterized the history of Mosul over the centuries. he President of the Sunni Waqf of Iraq, Saad Kambash for his part said that “rebuilding Al-Nouri Mosque, Al-Hadba Minaret and Al saa’a and Al Tahera Churches, is an essential part of the process of reviving the Spirit of Mosul, spreading hope and enhancing community cohesion”.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the third meeting of the Joint Steering Committee was held virtually. It was co-chaired by the Minister of Culture of Iraq, Abdulameer Al-Hamdani, Minister of Culture and Knowledge Development of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Noura bint Mohammed Al Kaabi, and the Assistant Director-General for Culture of UNESCO, Ernesto Ottone R., with the participation of the President of the Sunni Waqf of Iraq, Saad Kambash, the Representative of the Christian Waqf, Safaa Saffo, and Nicolas Tixier, of the Provincial Dominican Order.

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Trump’s Greenland Ambitions Strain MAGA Ties with Europe’s Far-Right

Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
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Trump’s Greenland Ambitions Strain MAGA Ties with Europe’s Far-Right

Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)

Tensions over US President Donald Trump's plans to take control of Greenland have driven a wedge in the once iron-clad link between MAGA and Europe's far-right.

The rift seems to signal that ideological alignment alone may not be enough to temper worries among European nationalists over Trump's interventionism abroad.

Far-right leaders in Germany, Italy and France have strongly criticized Trump's Greenland plans. Even Nigel Farage, a longtime ally of Trump and head of the Reform UK nationalist party, called Trump's Greenland moves “a very hostile act.”

During a debate Tuesday in the European Parliament, far-right lawmakers typically aligned with Trump overwhelmingly supported halting a EU-US trade pact over their uneasiness with his threats, calling them “coercion” and “threats to sovereignty."

MAGA's trans-Atlantic partners

Such a divergence between Trump and his European acolytes came as some surprise.

Far-right parties surged to power in 2024 across the European Union, rattling the traditional powers across the bloc’s 27 nations from Spain to Sweden. Their political groupings now hold 26% of the seats in the European Parliament, according to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Less than a year ago, Europe's far-right parties gathered in Madrid to applauded Trump's election under the banner “Make Europe Great Again,” while Elon Musk, before his fall from Trump’s graces, had boosted European far-right influencers and figures on X, including Germany’s radical right Alternative for Germany party.

US Vice President JD Vance drew scorn from within Germany and across Europe after he met with AfD leader Alice Weidel during elections in February. The party, with which mainstream parties refuse to work, upset German politics by doubling its presence in the Bundestag to become the nation's second-largest party.

Yet deep divisions within MAGA itself over Trump’s approach to foreign affairs has reverberated in Europe, with his actions over Greenland, Venezuela and Iran forcing his political allies to favor their ideological convictions over their deference to the US president.

Sovereignty trumps shared values

France’s far-right National Rally has at times vaunted its ideological closeness to Trump, particularly on immigration.

A year ago, the party sent one of its senior figures, Louis Aliot, to attend Trump’s inauguration. In turn, Trump has staunchly defended party leader Marine Le Pen, describing her conviction for embezzling EU funds as a “witch hunt.”

Jordan Bardella, the 30-year-old National Rally’s president and a MEP, has praised Trump’s nationalist views, saying to the BBC last month that a “wind of freedom, of national pride” was blowing across Western democracies.

In recent days, however, Bardella has appeared to distance himself from the US administration. In his New Year’s address, he criticized US military intervention in Venezuela aimed at capturing then-President Nicolás Maduro, calling it “foreign interference” designed to serve “the economic interests of American oil companies.”

Going further, Bardella on Tuesday denounced Trump’s “commercial blackmail” over Greenland.

“Our subjugation would be a historic mistake,” Bardella said.

Another Trump ally, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, echoed this sentiment. In an interview on Rai television Wednesday, she said that she told Trump during a call that his tariffs threat over Greenland was “a mistake.”

Reluctance to criticize on the EU's eastern flank

Yet the reactions among European right-wing leaders has not been lockstep. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, widely regarded as the trailblazer of Trump’s brand of illiberal populism, has been careful to avoid even the slightest criticism of the US president.

Facing what is likely to be the toughest election of his 16 years in power in April, Orbán has built his political identity around his affinity with Trump, promising voters that his close relationship with the president will pay hefty dividends.

Trump, Orbán has insisted, is Europe’s only hope for peace amid the war in Ukraine and a guarantor of national sovereignty.

Orbán has sought to cast Trump's threats on Greenland and capture of Maduro either as beneficial for Hungary, or none of its business.

“It’s an in-house issue ... It’s a NATO issue,” Orbán said of Trump’s plans for Greenland during a news conference earlier this month, adding that any proposed change to Greenland's sovereignty can be discussed within NATO.

Despite his staunch advocacy of national sovereignty, Orbán also praised the US action in Venezuela, calling the country a “narco state” and suggesting Maduro’s ouster could benefit Hungary through future cheaper oil prices on world markets.

Hungary’s reluctance to push back on Trump’s actions reflected similar positions among far-right leaders in the EU’s eastern flank.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki, seen as an ally of both Orbán and Trump, said in Davos this week that the tensions over Greenland should be solved “in a diplomatic way” between Washington and Copenhagen — not a broader European coalition. He called on Western European leaders to tone down their objections to Trump’s conduct.

In the neighboring Czech Republic, prime minister and Trump ally Andrej Babis has declined to speak out against the US threats to Greenland, and warned against the EU allowing the issue to cause a conflict with Trump.

In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico has remained silent on Trump’s Greenland designs, even as he met with the president in his Mar-a-Lago resort last week.

Still, Trump’s deposing of Maduro led Fico to “unequivocally condemn” the action, calling it a “kidnapping” and the “latest American oil adventure.”

Disruption or division ahead

The ideology linking MAGA and its European allies might survive recent disagreements by doubling down on old, shared grievances, said Daniel Hegedüs, Central Europe director of the German Marshall Fund.

He pointed to recent votes against Brussels’ leadership in European Parliament by far-right European lawmakers on the EU migration pact and halting the massive trade deal with the Mercosur bloc of five South American nations.

“If Trump continues that way, posing a threat to the sovereignty of European countries, then of course that will divide the European radical right,” he said.

“We don’t know whether this division will stay with us or whether they can again unite forces around issues where they can cooperate. Those issues can be damaging enough for the European Union.”

Features

US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
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US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

As the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, several destroyers, and fighter aircraft, are expected to arrive in the Middle East in the coming days, a familiar but increasingly pressing question is back in play: Is Washington preparing the ground for another strike on Iran, or orchestrating a calibrated show of force designed to raise the psychological and political cost for Tehran without tipping into war?

The answer is not binary. The same military buildup can serve dual purposes: a defensive deterrent to shield US bases and allies, and a pressure tool that keeps the option of attack alive without formal warning.

According to US officials cited by media outlets, the movement of the force, alongside discussions about deploying additional air defense systems, comes at a sensitive moment following a broad crackdown on protests inside Iran.

President Donald Trump, for his part, has publicly insisted that he would prefer nothing happens militarily. Still, he has tied that preference to two conditions: that Tehran does not resume any nuclear path approaching the weapons threshold, and that it does not proceed with executions of protesters.

Three messages in one buildup

The first message is directed at Iran itself. Washington wants to signal that it can rapidly reposition forces and that it considers the “deterrence window” open. Months ago, the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, and Trump is now reminding Iranians that it will happen again if the same activity resumes.

The second message is aimed at allies and regional adversaries alike. The buildup is not only a threat to Tehran but also an umbrella to protect US interests and bases from potential Iranian retaliation, especially as Iran’s military leadership has openly warned that any attack would make US bases and interests legitimate targets.

Such threats are not new, but they raise the sensitivity of any US decision.

Today’s reinforcements could amount to a preemptive defense aimed at limiting losses if events spiral out of control.

The third message is domestic and political. Trump is also brandishing non-military tools such as “secondary tariffs” on countries that trade with Iran, seeking to combine pressure instruments between sanctions and military deterrence.

In January, he announced a punitive tariff mechanism targeting states that trade with Tehran.

Nuclear ambiguity

The nuclear file adds another layer of uncertainty. The International Atomic Energy Agency has not verified Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium for months. At the same time, estimates circulate of a large quantity enriched to 60 percent, a level technically close to the 90 percent required for a weapon.

This monitoring gap creates two contradictory dilemmas. Hardliners argue that ambiguity implies the possibility of covert rebuilding and therefore justifies tougher pressure.

Advocates of de-escalation counter that the same ambiguity makes any strike a blind gamble that could miss targets or widen the war, without guaranteeing that the program will be halted.

From this perspective, the military buildup could become a language of negotiation: raising the cost for Tehran to accept stricter verification arrangements, or to absorb an internal retreat without appearing defeated.

The Iranian street

If a strike were carried out, what would the Iranian street gain today, after the system has already suppressed protests? Here, limited expectations appear more realistic than grand promises.

Even in Washington, there is a clear debate: any military intervention, particularly a “limited strike” against instruments of repression such as the Revolutionary Guard, may not change the outcome of an internal confrontation if the opposition is fragmented, unarmed, and unorganized.

Analyses in the US press have warned that bombing alone does not “make a revolution.”

It may temporarily halt repression, but it does not dismantle the security apparatus without a lengthy and costly campaign.

Worse, a strike could produce the opposite effect: national mobilization in favor of the system through a narrative of “external aggression,” a hardening of repression under the banner of fighting agents and terrorism, expanded arrests or harsher sentences, and an uncontrolled slide toward internal conflict if some pillars of the state break while others remain intact.

With protest momentum receding after the crackdown, and with continued restrictions on the internet and communications, the “street effect” does not appear to be at its peak in a way that would allow Trump, if he wished, to tie any strike to a quick internal political outcome.

In recent days, there have been signs of debate inside Iran about easing the shutdown. Still, the information environment remains unstable to the point that state television was hacked, and inciting messages were broadcast.

The day after

The question prompting warnings in some Washington circles is this: what if a strike were decisive and weakened the head of the system or paralyzed its center, but the state did not collapse in an orderly way? This is where the specter of “the day after” looms large.

Michael Doran, a researcher at the Hudson Institute, warns that Iran, as a multi-ethnic state with sensitive border regions, could face fragmentation or internal conflict if the center of power collapses suddenly, as in historical cases where “state identity” eroded rapidly after a regime fell.

Doran notes that minorities, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and Turkmen, are concentrated along the periphery and have cross-border extensions, making neighboring states directly invested in Iran’s internal fate.

The most dangerous scenario, in this logic, is not only fragmentation but also the persistence of the system in another form: the Revolutionary Guard and security services retaining control, shedding the religious ideological cover, and adopting a nationalist or military guise.

That would amount to a change of head rather than a change of regime.

He urges avoiding the idea of “appointing a successor” for Iran from outside or presuming the shape of the state in advance, as this could inflame ethnic sensitivities and plant the seeds of early conflicts.

What has changed from previous buildups is that Washington is no longer facing only the question of “do we strike?” but also “what comes after the strike?” inside Iran and across the region. This equation makes the decision harder. A strike may satisfy the logic of deterrence. Still, it could also open doors that cannot be closed if policy is not designed around uncertainty, rather than the illusion of quick stability.

Features

ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
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ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.