Sudan’s FFC in Cairo to Discuss a ‘Political Vision’ to End War

Smoke rises in Omdurman, near Halfaya Bridge, during clashes between the Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army as seen from Khartoum North, Sudan April 15, 2023. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah
Smoke rises in Omdurman, near Halfaya Bridge, during clashes between the Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army as seen from Khartoum North, Sudan April 15, 2023. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah
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Sudan’s FFC in Cairo to Discuss a ‘Political Vision’ to End War

Smoke rises in Omdurman, near Halfaya Bridge, during clashes between the Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army as seen from Khartoum North, Sudan April 15, 2023. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah
Smoke rises in Omdurman, near Halfaya Bridge, during clashes between the Paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army as seen from Khartoum North, Sudan April 15, 2023. REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

Sudan’s Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) on Monday commenced a series of meetings that will extend until Tuesday in the Egyptian capital, Cairo.

The primary objective of these meetings is to formulate a political vision for halting the current conflict in Sudan between the military forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Meanwhile, the country’s Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council Malik Agar continued his consultative meetings with various Sudanese political and non-partisan figures in Cairo to develop a shared vision.

According to participants of FFC meetings, the number of attending party and political leaders has reached 45 individuals. Many of them arrived in Cairo over the past two days specifically to take part in these discussions.

Among the prominent attendees are Yasser Arman, a leader within the FFC and its official spokesperson, Sudanese Congress Party President Omar Al-Dagir, Khalid Omar Yousif, the party’s deputy, and Babiker Faisal, the Executive Office of the Unionist Alliance.

During the opening session, Al-Dagir stated: “Prolonging the war’s duration may lead to the risk of it escalating into a civil war, which would open the door to foreign interventions.”

He further added that the FFC have been committed since day one to “halting the war,” in contrast to the stance of the remnants of the ousted regime who beat the drums of this war in their quest to return to power from which the Sudanese people removed them during the December 2018 revolution.

Al-Dagir emphasized that the FFC extended their hands to all democratic forces and components to work towards ending the war and mobilizing international and humanitarian efforts to bring about reforms in the country.

According to well-informed Sudanese sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, an arranged meeting between Agar and Arman is expected to take place in the coming hours.

Arman arrived in Cairo recently, coming from the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, and was unable to attend the first meeting with the FFC leadership.

Following the FFC meetings, a press conference is anticipated to be held on Wednesday to announce the outcomes of the discussions.



Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
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Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)

As war rages between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran may soon need to call upon its network of regional allies - groups it has armed and funded for years. But now, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” looks strained, fragmented, and far from ready.

On June 19, 2025, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard urged Iran’s regional allies to take action to relieve mounting pressure on Tehran. At that point, Iran was entering its second week of heavy Israeli bombardment. Strategically, an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital once seemed unthinkable, but the regional terrain has since shifted. Iran’s supply routes are now disrupted, and its key proxy groups have either been neutralized or weakened.

According to The Times of Israel, Israel launched this war after nearly two years of systematically targeting Iran’s allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel had triggered a chain of retaliation that left many of Iran’s partners damaged or demoralized. With the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon, and Hamas reduced to guerrilla tactics in Gaza, few proxies appear ready for a new confrontation.

In Gaza, Hamas has been forced into small ambushes and urban warfare, its rocket arsenal depleted and many senior leaders killed. Iranian communication channels with the group have also eroded. Israel’s targeted assassination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander linked to Palestinian factions, further strained coordination. For now, Hamas can offer little more than rhetorical support.

In Iraq, US forces have fortified their embassy in Baghdad, while withdrawing from bases such as Ain al-Asad. Iraqi factions loyal to Iran are posturing, threatening US interests should America enter the war. But most Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to drag the country into open conflict, knowing the consequences could be disastrous. Iran, too, is cautious about sacrificing Iraq’s political and economic value.

Hezbollah, reeling from the death of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2024 Israeli strike, is in disarray. Its military capacity and leadership have been significantly degraded. Though the party retains some strategic capabilities, domestic and regional pressures have so far restrained it from opening a major front.

In Yemen, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s last viable card. They now play a key role in smuggling weapons and expanding Iranian influence into Africa. Should the US directly join Israel’s war, Tehran may finally authorize the Houthis to use their stockpile of ballistic missiles, signaling a decisive and potentially catastrophic new phase of the conflict.