Lebanese Ex-FM Boueiz Responds to Lahoud: His Memory Is Betraying Him, Deliberately or Not

Lebanese former FM Fares Boueiz speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat during an exclusive interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Lebanese former FM Fares Boueiz speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat during an exclusive interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Lebanese Ex-FM Boueiz Responds to Lahoud: His Memory Is Betraying Him, Deliberately or Not

Lebanese former FM Fares Boueiz speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat during an exclusive interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Lebanese former FM Fares Boueiz speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat during an exclusive interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Lebanese Former Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz responded to the attack against him by former President Emile Lahoud over the time they served in office.

Asharq Al-Awsat had published a five-part interview with the former FM to discuss his long political career, including the time he was minister when Lahoud was army commander and later, when Lahoud became president.

Lahoud retorted to Boueiz’s version of events in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat published on Friday. Boueiz telephoned Asharq Al-Awsat to refute his allegations, saying: “It appears that age has taken its toll on him.”

The first point Boueiz refuted was Lahoud’s accusation that he had demanded, through the Higher Defense Council, that the army be deployed to the South to prevent the resistance from retaliating to Israel during its 1993 offensive.

“First of all, the Council met at the request of then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. I had nothing to do with it and I don’t have jurisdiction there,” he explained.

“Second, Boueiz is a man of law and he knows full well that the Council doesn’t have the authority to make orders to the army. It observes the army and security forces’ implementation of government decisions”, he clarified.

Lahoud, who was then army commander, was absent from the Council meeting to address the Israeli attack.

“His absence spoke for itself,” remarked Boueiz. “He may have known what order the Council intended to take and probably had no intention of carrying it out.”

“Hariri was the one who brought up the order and I objected to it because the Council had no jurisdiction over giving orders to the army. I told him that the government needed to meet to tackle the issue,” he recalled.

Third, such an order would have had broad regional implications and could not have been taken without regional contacts at the highest level, explained the former FM.

Fourth, Boueiz said he had headed a delegation at the Madrid peace talks. “I knew that any diplomatic negotiations needed to be based on the reality on the ground. Given that a tenth of Lebanon was occupied by Israel at the time, it would have been impossible for any sound individual to demand the elimination of the resistance at the Madrid talks.”

“Such a suggestion would have cost Lebanon any leverage it had at the negotiations,” he added.

“Therefore, it would not have been in the interest of anyone leading the negotiations over Israel’s withdrawal from the South to strike the resistance,” he continued.

“Were Lahoud adept at politics, he would not have made such an error that could not be farther removed from all reason,” he stressed. “It is as though he is claiming false heroics by saying had refused to carry out the Higher Defense Council order.”

“The truth is, he waited for Syria’s opinion on the matter before he could announce his refusal,” Boueiz stated.

On Lahoud’s claim that he had demanded that the army strike the resistance, Boueiz said: “I would like to remind him that I never met or telephoned him throughout the time he served as army commander.”

“Moreover, I am not naïve enough to make such a request because I was aware that he did not carry out the orders of the Lebanese government, rather he took orders that came from beyond the border,” he stressed.

On Lahoud’s claims that he made very few visits to Syria because he was its “strategic ally,” Boueiz commented: “What is Lahoud’s strategic vision? What is his strategic weight?”

“The truth is he didn’t need to contact them [Syrian officials] because someone else was contacting them on his behalf and relaying to him the summary of their call, in a so-called ‘order of the day.’”

“There was no need for him to contact him because perhaps he didn’t understand them, or they didn’t understand him. So, it was easier for someone else to assume this task and brief him with a summary,” Boueiz added.

Tackling Lahoud’s claims on how Boueiz was appointed minister in 2004, he said: “Lahoud alleged that President Elias Hrawi had requested that I be named a minister. The truth is that when I learned that my name was being floated, I called for a press conference to declare my immediate resignation in advance.”

“I knew that it would have been impossible for me to serve as a foreign minister in a government headed by Lahoud.”

“That was when Hariri contacted me. In fact, he visited my house late at night to insist against my resignation and that I agree to become environment minister so that he would not be alone in the government in confronting Lahoud,” added Boueiz.

“He insisted on me because he was the one who proposed my name and clung on to it in spite of our past disputes because we could not allow Lahoud to run things in government unchecked,” he stated.

“After over an hour of insistence, I relented and forged a new understanding with Hariri,” he revealed.

Boueiz addressed Lahoud’s allegations related to then MP Walid Jumblatt’s efforts direct protests towards the presidential palace in wake of Hariri’s assassination in 2005.

“Yes, he did want to use the rage at the moment to send the protests to the palace to demand Lahoud’s resignation,” recalled Boueiz.

“However, he was challenged by some Maronites who said that they could not agree to this without first consulting the Maronite patriarch, who feared the creation of vacuum in the presidency.”

“Jumblatt assured them that he had carried out intense contacts with all parties, including those that would eventually become part of the pro-Syria March 8 camp, who informed him that they agree to Lahoud’s resignation on condition that he would not be succeeded by a figure who is hostile to them,” Boueiz said.

“Jumblatt never proposed my name or the name of anyone else,” he stressed. “All he said was that he firmly believed that the vacuum could only be addressed with a president who is not hostile to the other camp.”

“Our ambitions were never aimed at Lahoud, his accomplishments and term. We never envied him and were never jealous of his style of rule and its results. Clearly, this is what led to our resignation from government,” Boueiz clarified.

“We were the first to resign when Lahoud’s term was extended, and we had objected to this extension. This needed to be clarified because it seems Lahoud’s memory had betrayed him, deliberately or naturally,” he stated.



Hamas to Conceal Identity of Sinwar’s Successor, Five Candidates Considered

Yahya Sinwar in a file photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011 (AP)
Yahya Sinwar in a file photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011 (AP)
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Hamas to Conceal Identity of Sinwar’s Successor, Five Candidates Considered

Yahya Sinwar in a file photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011 (AP)
Yahya Sinwar in a file photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011 (AP)

Hamas is set to keep the identity of its new political bureau chief secret after Israel assassinated Yehya Sinwar, the group’s Gaza leader, on Wednesday.

This follows the killing of former political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran less than three months ago.

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hamas leaders are discussing the decision to hide the new leader’s name due to growing security risks.

“The leadership is likely to keep the identity confidential for safety reasons,” one source said.

The move is aimed at giving the new chief more freedom to operate and avoiding Israeli assassination attempts, which have targeted many of Hamas’ leaders.

The secrecy is also expected to help maintain internal order and protect the group’s structure.

Hamas wants to keep Israel uncertain about who will make decisions if talks resume on a ceasefire and a prisoner exchange in Gaza.

Since Friday, after officially announcing Sinwar’s death, Hamas leaders have been discussing who will replace him and whether to reveal their identity.

Sinwar was appointed about three months ago to send a defiant message to Israel and to show Hamas’ commitment to its “Al-Aqsa Flood” campaign.

His selection also aimed to reduce pressure on the group’s external leadership, which faces Israeli threats, political pressure from mediators, and calls for host countries to expel Hamas leaders.

Potential Successors:

Darwish, the ‘Shadow Man’

Several candidates are being considered to replace Sinwar, who faced no competition for Hamas’ political leadership after Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran on July 31.

The focus is now on Mohammad Darwish (Abu Omar Hassan), head of Hamas’ Shura Council. He was relatively unknown until gaining attention after Haniyeh’s death.

Many believe he has a strong chance, having appeared in recent official meetings ahead of some long-standing leaders.

A Hamas source said Darwish, once seen as the “shadow man,” is now taking on a more prominent role, receiving visitors and leading key activities.

Darwish spent much of his life abroad and was closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas originally emerged. Hamas later revised its charter and distanced itself from the Brotherhood.

Khalil al-Hayya: Sinwar’s Deputy

Alongside Darwish, Khalil al-Hayya is seen as a key contender, believed to be Sinwar’s deputy. Al-Hayya became a leading figure in Gaza after Sinwar’s disappearance and assassination.

A veteran political leader in Gaza, al-Hayya became Sinwar’s deputy and a close ally. He now leads Hamas in Gaza and is in charge of ceasefire negotiations and a potential prisoner exchange.

Al-Hayya has represented the group on key occasions, including speeches marking the October 7 attack and mourning Sinwar, calling him “the leader of the Al-Aqsa Flood battle.”

He promised that Hamas would continue its fight for full Palestinian liberation and a state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Al-Hayya also stated that Israeli prisoners held by Hamas would not be released unless Israel halts its offensive on Gaza, withdraws, and frees Palestinian prisoners.

Known as a political hardliner, al-Hayya, like Sinwar, supports strong ties with Iran.

Khaled Meshaal: Closer to the Muslim Brotherhood than Iran

In addition to al-Hayya and Darwish, Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mohammad Nazzal are also possible candidates to lead Hamas.

Meshaal led Hamas’ political bureau for about 21 years and now heads the group’s external branch.

After Haniyeh’s assassination, Meshaal reportedly declined the leadership role due to health reasons and the current situation. It is unclear if he will now step in after Sinwar's death.

Meshaal is widely known politically and is seen as more connected to the Muslim Brotherhood than to Iran.

Mohammad Nazzal: A Hardliner in Hamas

Mohammad Nazzal’s influence was evident in the recent elections.

Born and raised in Amman, Jordan, Nazzal is originally from the West Bank and studied in Kuwait. He joined Hamas at its founding and has been a member of the political bureau since 1996. Nazzal is regarded as one of the hardliners within the group.

Mousa Abu Marzouk: First Head of the Political Bureau

Mousa Abu Marzouk is another candidate for leadership. He co-founded Hamas in 1987 and was its first head of the political bureau.

He currently serves as the deputy head of Hamas’ external branch. Born in 1951 in the Rafah refugee camp, his family was displaced from a village near Ramla.

It is expected that the next Hamas leader will be chosen from among these candidates rather than from Gaza, especially given the communication breakdown with some leaders in the territory.

Hamas has a system for selecting successors for vacant positions.

Hiding the Identity of Hamas' Leader

Hamas began concealing the identity of its leader in 2004 after Israel assassinated founder Ahmed Yassin on March 22, followed by his successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, on April 17.

For a long time, Hamas did not disclose the name of its leader in Palestine to avoid Israeli targeting.

Sinwar was killed on October 17, a major setback for Hamas that came just three months after former political chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran.

Sinwar’s death has prompted Hamas to start extensive consultations to shape its future approach to the ongoing conflict and ceasefire negotiations.

This shift returned decision-making power to the external leadership after Gaza had been the focus.

Future decisions are likely to involve broader discussions, especially with the absence of influential historical leaders. While not indicating a collective leadership model like Hezbollah's in Lebanon, it suggests a move towards more inclusive consultation.

Since its founding in 1987, Hamas has had four leaders of the political bureau: Abu Marzouk (1992-1996), Meshaal (1996-2017), Haniyeh (2017 until his assassination), and Sinwar. A fifth leader is expected to be chosen soon.