Allawi: America Ruined Iraq, in Partnership with Iran

Allawi and Al-Maliki in one of their meetings in Baghdad in 2010 (Getty)
Allawi and Al-Maliki in one of their meetings in Baghdad in 2010 (Getty)
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Allawi: America Ruined Iraq, in Partnership with Iran

Allawi and Al-Maliki in one of their meetings in Baghdad in 2010 (Getty)
Allawi and Al-Maliki in one of their meetings in Baghdad in 2010 (Getty)

When the United States invaded Iraq, the Arabs were astonished and worried, and chose to stay away from the Iraqi scene so as not to be accused of supporting the occupation.

Iran took advantage of this Arab absence and launched a massive operation to prevent the establishment of a pro-Western Iraqi regime.

Tehran facilitated the invasion, but hastened to shake the stability that the Americans were betting on to build what they called the new democratic Iraq. Iran also benefited from dangerous decisions taken by Washington, including the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the de-Baathification, and the illusion of being able to rebuild Iraq from scratch after the dismantling of the state.

Once I asked President Jalal Talabani, who was returning from a trip to Tehran, what Iran really wanted from America. He said that he had concluded that it was ready to negotiate with Washington over files ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanon.

He explained: “Iran does not say that it wants a share, but rather that it seeks normal relations with the US, an end to hostility and to the seizure of Iranian funds in America.”

Talabani was more realistic than former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. He realized that the relationship with Washington was not enough, and it was necessary to pass through Tehran.

In 2007, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Baghdad, which was under the US occupation.

As American checkpoints facilitated the passage of the visitor’s convoy, it soon became clear that the Iranian president’s visit constituted a message that the American army would leave one day, but Iran, by virtue of geography, would remain near and inside Iraq. This is what actually happened, especially when slain IRGC Commander Qassem Soleimani began to destabilize Iraqi soil under the feet of the American army.

Iyad Allawi was not pro-American. He did not recognize their right to tailor the new Iraqi political scene as they wanted. Moreover, his meetings with a number of US officials were not fruitful. In parallel, no language of understanding was found with Tehran. He did not accept its terms, while the Iranian capital failed to tolerate his approach.

On March 7, 2010, general elections were held in Iraq. The “Iraqiya” list, led by Allawi, won 91 seats, while the State of Law coalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, obtained 89 seats.

According to the applicable interpretation of the constitution, Allawi was supposed to be entrusted with the task of forming the new government. Al-Maliki was able to get from the Federal Supreme Court another interpretation of the article that talks about the largest bloc. A severe political crisis erupted that lasted about nine months, and ended in Al-Maliki’s favor.

I asked Allawi about the parties that prevented him from forming the government, he replied: “We achieved victory in the elections despite everything we were exposed to. Five hundred people were subjected to procedures under the pretext of “de-Baathification.” Among them were a number of our candidates. They assassinated nine persons. They closed entire regions to prevent our supporters from voting, and yet we were ahead of them by three seats. In fact, I was surprised by what happened. I did not expect the American and Iranian stances to reach this point. America and Iran prevented me from forming a government. They worked together.”

Allawi continued: “During that period, then-US Vice President Joe Biden visited Baghdad about three times a month. His concern was that I would give up in favor of Al-Maliki. He asked me to assume the presidency of the republic, and I told him that the people elected us to form the government, so how could I become president of the republic without a job or work (the nature of the position is quasi-protocol)... Biden repeated his demand, and I replied: “By God, if you do not allow me to become prime minister, terrorism will grow stronger... as will hatred for the regime...”

“During that period, US-Iranian negotiations were taking place in Muscat. The American delegation was headed by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor under then-President Barack Obama. The Iranian side conveyed to the Americans a threat, stating that Iran will stop negotiations and cause problems in Iraq if Iyad Allawi becomes prime minister.”

“The truth is that I met Biden about 20 times. I’ve known him since he was in charge of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His personality is shaky, and he is a liar and a hypocrite,” Allawi stated.

I asked the former premier whether the US destroyed Iraq, he replied: “Yes, America ruined Iraq.”

On whether Washington had partners, he said: “Yes, Iran. Beginning with the dissolution of the Iraqi army, to the Popular Mobilization Forces, the armed militias and terrorism, the death of democracy and the spread of political sectarianism...”

I am Major General Qassem Soleimani

After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a prominent player appeared on the Iraqi scene: General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force. His role was not only limited to draining the American army, but went beyond to impose his decision in choosing presidents, forming governments, and determining paths. He assumed a similar role in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

I asked Allawi about his relationship with Soleimani, he said: “I met General Soleimani in the house of Adel Abdul Mahdi (later Prime Minister). Adel invited me to dinner, but he did not tell me who would be present... Half an hour later, two men arrived at the place... The first one approached me and said: “I am Major General Qassem Soleimani.” During the meeting, Soleimani told me: “We worked against you all the time.” I replied: “And I was against you all the time.”

Allawi recounted his conversation with the Iranian commander.

“I told him: Why did you work against us? I included you in the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting in defiance of international will. I opened all ways for you. We stopped the activity of the Mujahideen Khalq and seized their heavy weapons. I sent you the strongest economic delegation, on the basis of improving the position of the Iraqi neighborhood. He replied: “We made a mistake, and I am now in the presence of a senior commander.” I told him: “I am neither a big leader nor a watermelon. Do not interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs, and things will return to their normal course.”

Putin: Why don’t you go to Iran?

I asked Allawi to recall the most important pieces of advice he was given to visit Iran, and I will let him narrate it.

“In the seventh month of 2010, I visited Moscow, but I did not have any official status. President Vladimir Putin invited me to a dinner in the Kremlin, attended only by the interpreter. Putin asked me why I don’t go to Iran, and I replied: “Would you, for example, go to Finland to become President of the Republic of Russia?” He said: “No.” I said: “Why do you want me to go to Iran to become their follower? I don’t want the premiership nor the presidency. I am a servant of the Iraqi people and the Arab nation and I am honored to do so, and I am not ready to beg Iran or others for a position.” He asked me: “Do you mind if I send them an advisor of my own?” I replied: “No, but on the condition that I meet them here, in Egypt, or in Baghdad, but I will not go to Iran.”

Allawi continued: “The truth is that Putin is a nice, important and knowledgeable person. My personal opinion is that Russia’s morals are closer to the Arabs than America’s. They are more serious, frank and direct than the Americans.”

Bush does not deserve to be president

I asked Allawi about his impression of his meeting with President George W. Bush. He replied: “He does not deserve to be president of America. I did not see him steadfast in clarity or ideas. They had no policy after the fall of the regime... Disbanding the army, de-Baathification, and all these random practices. I explained this to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and asked him to talk to him more about the Iraqi file.”



Shaibani: Syrian-Russian Ties Entering New Phase

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Syria's Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani attend a meeting in Moscow, Russia December 24, 2025. (Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via Reuters)
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Syria's Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani attend a meeting in Moscow, Russia December 24, 2025. (Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via Reuters)
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Shaibani: Syrian-Russian Ties Entering New Phase

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Syria's Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani attend a meeting in Moscow, Russia December 24, 2025. (Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via Reuters)
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Syria's Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani attend a meeting in Moscow, Russia December 24, 2025. (Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via Reuters)

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani stressed on Wednesday that relations between Damascus and Moscow were entering a new phase based on mutual respect.

He met in Moscow with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov, saying: “We aspire to establish balanced relations with everyone.”

“We are working on attracting investments to Syria to improve the economy,” he added, remarking: “We are forging ahead in rebuilding the country.”

For his part, Lavrov said the meeting tackled various issues, underlining the importance of maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity and bolstering bilateral ties between Damascus and Moscow.

On Tuesday, Shaibani and Defense Minister Major General Murhaf Abu Qasra met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss political, military, and economic issues of mutual interest, with particular emphasis on strategic cooperation in the defense industry sector, reported Syria’s state news agency SANA.

They reviewed ways to advance military and technical partnership in a manner that strengthens the defensive capabilities of the Syrian army and keeps pace with modern developments in military industries.

Discussions focused on upgrading military equipment, transferring technical expertise and know-how, and expanding cooperation in research and development to boost Syria’s national defense system and support security and stability in Syria and the region.

On the political front, the two sides exchanged views on regional and international developments, underscoring the importance of continued political and diplomatic coordination between Damascus and Moscow in international forums.

They stressed the need to respect international law, rejecting all forms of external interference in the internal affairs of states.

Economically, the meeting addressed prospects for expanding economic and trade cooperation, including support for reconstruction projects, development of infrastructure sectors, and encouragement of investment in Syria.

The talks also covered boosting trade exchange and facilitating partnerships in ways that positively impact the Syrian economy and contribute to improving living conditions.

Putin underscored Russia’s steadfast support for Syria, stressing the importance of preserving Syria’s unity, territorial integrity, and full sovereignty, and rejecting “any projects aimed at partitioning the country or undermining its independent national decision”.

He also renewed Moscow’s condemnation of repeated Israeli violations of Syrian territory, describing them as “a direct threat to regional security and stability”.


Muscat Detainee Swap Deal Tests Houthi Credibility

Prisoner swap success hinges on Houthi commitment, seriousness (Gov’t Media)
Prisoner swap success hinges on Houthi commitment, seriousness (Gov’t Media)
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Muscat Detainee Swap Deal Tests Houthi Credibility

Prisoner swap success hinges on Houthi commitment, seriousness (Gov’t Media)
Prisoner swap success hinges on Houthi commitment, seriousness (Gov’t Media)

The agreement reached by the Yemeni government in Muscat with the Houthis to exchange about 2,900 prisoners and detainees from both sides marks a new test of the group’s credibility in closing one of the conflict’s most complex humanitarian files after years of delays and failure.

Despite a broad local and international welcome for the deal, doubts still surround its implementation mechanisms, given the absence of final lists and continuing ambiguity over the fate of Mohammed Qahtan, a senior figure in the Islah party who has been abducted for nearly a decade.

According to sources close to the talks, the agreement, sponsored by the office of the United Nations' special envoy for Yemen and supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross, remains at this stage only a preliminary understanding, expected to be implemented within a month.

Sources familiar with the negotiations said the first clause of the agreement is limited to the release of prisoners affiliated with the Saudi-led coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognized government, in addition to Mohammed Qahtan. Other details of the deal, including the names of those to be included, remain subject to further bargaining and negotiations between the parties and the mediators.

The same sources stated that what has been achieved so far does not amount to a final settlement, noting that previous negotiation rounds have repeatedly been tied to complex Houthi demands. These have included the insertion of names of fighters missing on the front lines, whom the group claims are held by the government without providing evidence, as well as its repeated refusal to include abducted civilians on the grounds that they are “under judicial process.”

Circles close to the negotiations said appointing Yahya al-Razami, the Houthis’ representative on the military committee, to lead the group’s negotiating team instead of Abdul Qader al-Murtada helped create an atmosphere conducive to reaching the preliminary agreement.

They said al-Murtada, who has been accused of involvement in the torture of some detainees, was a key reason behind the failure of several previous negotiation rounds because of his hardline stance and insistence on what were described as unrealistic conditions.

The same sources added that al-Razami’s presence at the head of the Houthis’ team facilitated discussions and paved the way for agreement on the principle of a comprehensive exchange of prisoners and detainees from both sides, although this remains conditional on the Houthis’ commitment to their pledges and the sincerity of their intentions in providing accurate and reliable information about detainees.

In contrast, the Yemeni government, according to the same assessments, has voiced serious concerns that the Houthis may seek to strip the agreement of its humanitarian substance through stalling tactics or by reintroducing the same conditions that derailed previous attempts.

These indications underline that the success of the deal hinges on the Houthis’ seriousness in honoring their commitments and fully disclosing the fate of all abductees, foremost among them Mohammed Qahtan.

The fate of Mohammed Qahtan remains one of the primary obstacles to implementing the agreement. Although his name was included in the first phase of the deal, his fate has been unknown since his arrest in 2015 at a security checkpoint near the entrance to the city of Ibb. To date, the Houthis have not disclosed whether he is still alive.

According to the sources, this ambiguity has undermined previous understandings and led to the collapse of earlier negotiation rounds, after the Houthis demanded 30 prisoners if Qahtan was alive, or 30 bodies if his death was confirmed.

Officials involved in the file said such behavior raises serious doubts about his fate after more than 10 years and eight months of enforced disappearance, weakening the prospects for building the trust needed to advance the remaining stages of the exchange agreement.

The sources emphasized that the success of any prisoner exchange cannot be achieved without addressing the Qahtan case with clarity and transparency, as it represents both a humanitarian and a political issue, and a genuine test of the Houthis’ commitment to international humanitarian law.

Under the announced understandings, the deal is to be implemented in three main phases. The first phase includes the release of prisoners affiliated with the coalition supporting the Yemeni government, in addition to Mohammed Qahtan. In the second phase, which begins approximately a week later, a joint committee will be formed to conduct field visits to detention sites and document the names of all detainees related to the conflict.

The verified lists will then be submitted to the office of the UN special envoy for Yemen and the International Committee of the Red Cross for official approval and the launch of the exchange process. The third phase will be dedicated to the remains file, covering the exchange of bodies of those killed and the search for the remains of the missing in battle areas, with the aim of closing this painful chapter.

The sources stated that it was agreed upon to include a total number of individuals in the exchange from both sides, with names to be finalized within a month, as well as the recovery of all bodies from various fronts and their handover through the International Committee of the Red Cross. It was also agreed to form committees to visit prisons after the exchange and identify any remaining prisoners, in preparation for their release.

The greatest burden, the sources said, will fall on international mediators, particularly the office of the UN special envoy and the International Committee of the Red Cross, to ensure the agreement is implemented, prevent any party from circumventing it, and establish a clear timeline starting with gathering prisoners and abductees at designated points, matching lists, and setting a start date for the exchange operation.


Brother Details to Asharq Al-Awsat Luring, Disappearance of Lebanese Retired Officer

Abdul Salam Shukr speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat from Nabi Sheet. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdul Salam Shukr speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat from Nabi Sheet. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Brother Details to Asharq Al-Awsat Luring, Disappearance of Lebanese Retired Officer

Abdul Salam Shukr speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat from Nabi Sheet. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdul Salam Shukr speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat from Nabi Sheet. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Shock still grips the family of retired Lebanese General Security captain Ahmed Shukr, who was abducted days ago, as Lebanese security and judicial assessments increasingly point to Israeli intelligence as being behind his disappearance, over suspected links to the 1986 vanishing of Israeli airman Ron Arad in southern Lebanon.

His brother, Abdul Salam Shukr, told Asharq Al-Awsat the story began when a Lebanese expatriate living in Kinshasa, identified as A.M., contacted Ahmed and asked to rent his apartment in the Choueifat area, south of Beirut.

The two agreed months ago, and the man paid $500 in rent.

The expatriate made repeated visits to Lebanon and met Shukr at his home during one of them. He later contacted the retired officer to say that a wealthy African investor named Salim Kassab, later found to be a fake name, was interested in purchasing a plot of land in the eastern city of Zahle and needed his assistance.

Abdul Salam said the expatriate inspected the land, then called two weeks after leaving Lebanon to say the investor had agreed to buy it and would visit the country. He asked Ahmed to meet him at the site at 4:30 p.m. on the day of the abduction.

He said the expatriate insisted on the timing because it suited the buyer, despite Ahmed’s objections that darkness would have fallen by then, and the land’s features would not be visible. The expatriate later apologized for not attending, claiming he had broken his foot, and said the investor would visit the site alone with Ahmed.

At the time of the meeting, Ahmed disappeared.

“We know nothing about him except what we have heard through security and judicial leaks,” Abdul Salam said. He added that the abductors had rented a house in Zahle and erased all traces from it after kidnapping Ahmed.

Surveillance cameras tracked the vehicle as it headed toward the town of Souireh in the western Bekaa, where the trail then vanished. Souireh was previously used as a smuggling route from southwestern Damascus into Lebanon.

Loyalty to the state

“My brother served 40 years in the military establishment. His loyalty was only to the state and its institutions. He never belonged to any party,” Abdul Salam said. “We are a family that does not engage in politics.”

Ahmed was lured last week in a carefully planned operation that began in his hometown of Nabi Sheet in the northern Bekaa, before he went missing at a point very close to the city of Zahle.

Family members and residents have been gathering at the home of Nabi Sheet’s mukhtar, Abbas Shukr, to voice their protest and condemnation of the abduction.

The family said Ahmed Shukr retired nine years ago after serving for four decades in the General Security, during which he held several posts, including the Masnaa border crossing with Syria and the Qaa crossing in northeastern Lebanon.

“My brother joined the military in 1979, which means he was an ‘officer of the state’ when Arad disappeared in 1986,” Abdul Salam told Asharq Awsat. “An officer of the state does not belong to parties.”

He rejected attempts to link the family by kinship to Fuad Shukr, a Hezbollah leader killed by Israel in July 2024 in Beirut’s southern suburbs, saying no one in the town even knew him.

“He left the town in the early 1980s and never returned. He was distant even from his relatives,” he said, adding that since retiring, his brother “never left the Bekaa. He stayed at home and played cards with friends at night.”

The family home remains in a state of disbelief, a scene that has persisted since his disappearance last week. The case only began to move officially after Vice President of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council Sheikh Ali al Khatib contacted Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Interior Minister Ahmed al-Hajjar, according to Abdul Salam.

He said Aoun pledged to instruct security and judicial authorities to expand the investigation and uncover the circumstances surrounding the incident. Officials from the Amal Movement were also in constant contact with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is head of the movement, to follow up on the case.

Mystery remains

“We demand that the judiciary and security agencies confirm or deny the leak about an alleged link to Ron Arad’s disappearance,” Abdul Salam said.

“That leak does not concern us. What matters is what the security agencies say, including General Security, where Ahmed served, and the Information Branch of the Internal Security Forces, which is leading the investigation.”

He said the key to the mystery lies with A.M., a native of the southern town of Qana who lives in Kinshasa and has been evading the family’s calls.

“The Lebanese state must ask Interpol to arrest him and bring him to Lebanon for questioning,” he urged, adding that the man no longer answers his phone and that all available information about him, including video clips, is now in the hands of security agencies.

Abdul Salam said the family believes the expatriate coordinated the plot with Israel’s Mossad, guiding them to this point and enabling an operation carried out with precision and professionalism.

He said Lebanese security agencies told the family the abductors left no fingerprints, neither at the Zahle property nor at the Choueifat apartment, and that no evidence has been found. The kidnappers’ vehicle also remains unidentified.