Syrian lawmakers are gathering signatures to propose repealing a law that makes membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death, as the group signals it wants to return to politics after decades of prohibition.
The parallel moves have raised questions about whether Syria’s transitional authorities will allow the Brotherhood back into political life, and how much room they will give political parties.
Abdel Nasser Houshan, chairman of the People’s Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the proposal to repeal Law No. 49 of 1980 was still at the signature-gathering stage and had not been submitted to the assembly.
Under the assembly’s rules, 17 members must first approve the proposal before a bill can be drafted and submitted for referral to the relevant committee, he said.
The legacy of Law 49
Media leaks had suggested lawmakers could discuss the proposal at their next session, expected in the middle of this month. Houshan’s comments indicate that the steps needed to bring it before the assembly remain incomplete.
Enacted in July 1980 under former President Hafez al-Assad, Law 49 classified every member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a criminal punishable by death. It became a key weapon in the former government’s confrontation with the group, whose members and supporters faced decades of arrests and persecution.
Hussam Jazmati, a researcher on Islamist organizations and groups, expects “broad support inside and outside the assembly” for repealing the law, given the abuses associated with it under the former government.
Repealing the “strange” law matters regardless of whom it targeted, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
He called it “one of the instruments of state terror under the Assad regime,” saying security agencies used it to pursue people merely suspected of belonging to the Brotherhood.
The law left a deep legacy of intimidation in Syrian society, particularly in conservative and religious communities, he said.
“Sympathy for its victims could provide a basis for supporting its repeal, even among groups that do not support the Brotherhood politically.”
Yet the law’s legal status is itself unclear.
The declaration issued at the “Victory Conference” on Jan. 29, 2025, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, suspended all exceptional laws. It remains unclear whether that covered Law 49 — or whether the law still requires a legislative repeal.
The declaration also dissolved the Baath Party, the parties of the National Progressive Front and their affiliated organizations, and banned their reconstitution.
It dissolved military factions and revolutionary political and civilian bodies, requiring their integration into state institutions.
But it did not dissolve all political parties without exception, leaving unresolved the legal basis for party activity during the transition.
A test of political will
For Abdel Rahman al-Haj, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, bringing the repeal before the People’s Assembly would be “a test of the transitional government’s political will.”
An indefinite delay could signal that the authorities do not want to ease the Brotherhood’s return to politics or allow it an active role in the next phase, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
“Leaving the law in place without invalidating it in the constitutional declaration, and leaving it to the People’s Assembly, will be understood as additional pressure on the group,” he said.
The Brotherhood had already faced various forms of pressure to dissolve itself, he added.
The Syrian Brotherhood’s Shura Council held its fifth regular session on Sept. 27, 2026, issuing a 16-point statement on political, security and economic developments, as well as regional and international issues.
The statement affirmed the group’s desire to participate in political life and called for pluralism and rules governing party activity. Observers read it as preparation for a return to politics inside Syria.
Al-Haj said its second and sixth points showed that “the group wants to engage in party competition and is preparing for the return of political life as set out in the constitutional declaration.”
The Brotherhood appears to feel it faces “systematic exclusion and marginalization,” he said. At this stage of the transition, he added, it needs to test how serious the government is about establishing a legal framework for political activity ahead of an agreed political transition.
Jazmati sees a more immediate obstacle.
“The return of political life depends on the authorities’ will,” he said, adding that they do not appear to want organized parties, at least during the transition.
Still, he believes the Brotherhood could return to political activity “in one way or another.” Syria has a broad religious current that could find expression in several political parties and organizations, whether or not a new political parties law is enacted.
Sympathy for victims, doubts about the group
Jazmati draws a distinction between sympathy for the Brotherhood’s treatment under Assad and support for the organization today.
“There is widespread sympathy for the victims of arrests, persecution and abuses committed by the former regime, and support for addressing the injustices and providing redress for the harm they suffered,” he said.
That sympathy, however, “does not necessarily mean support for the group’s return in its current organizational form.”
The Brotherhood’s record during the Syrian revolution draws a less favorable assessment, he said, citing accusations that it tried to dominate opposition institutions and bore some responsibility for their failures, along with criticism of its management of political and relief work.
He described that negative view as resting on “a set of facts as well as a set of exaggerations,” stressing the need to distinguish between former detainees and victims of the government and the political organization that exists today.
Early in the revolution, sections of the Brotherhood’s support base welcomed its participation in preparatory conferences to establish the opposition Syrian National Council. Criticism of its performance within opposition institutions later intensified.
“The group’s popularity declined during those years, while other Islamist currents rose, particularly the current from which the leaders of Syria’s present authorities emerged,” Jazmati said.
Could a return spur other groups?
The Brotherhood’s signals have also raised questions about what its return could mean for Islamist organizations and other political forces waiting for rules governing party activity.
Al-Haj sees the prospect of its return encouraging other Islamist organizations as “possible, but unlikely.”
The Brotherhood’s presence rests on “its organizational and political history, rather than solely on its Islamist ideology,” he said. Other currents compete to represent that ideology, including the one from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emerged.
He expects the group to attract some Syrians who share its ideological outlook and are dissatisfied with the course of the transition.
Its return could do more to encourage non-Islamist organizations than Islamist ones to prepare for political participation, he said. But the transition’s uncertain contours make the consequences difficult to predict.
With the repeal proposal still at an early stage and the rules for party activity unresolved, the Brotherhood’s return to politics would test more than its own future.
It would also test the limits of pluralism Syria’s transitional authorities are prepared to allow.
