Algerian-Tunisian Security Meeting Targets Smuggling and Illegal Migration

The Algerian and Tunisian delegations during a meeting to address the risks at the borders. (Algerian Ministry of Interior)
The Algerian and Tunisian delegations during a meeting to address the risks at the borders. (Algerian Ministry of Interior)
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Algerian-Tunisian Security Meeting Targets Smuggling and Illegal Migration

The Algerian and Tunisian delegations during a meeting to address the risks at the borders. (Algerian Ministry of Interior)
The Algerian and Tunisian delegations during a meeting to address the risks at the borders. (Algerian Ministry of Interior)

The first session of the bilateral commission for the promotion and development of the Algerian-Tunisian border regions kicked off Monday in Algiers to discuss a strategy to develop shared border regions of the two North African nations.

Co-chaired by Algerian Interior Minister Brahim Merad and his Tunisian counterpart Kamel Feki, the session unfolded with a commitment to fortifying shared border areas in the face of armed individuals, smugglers, and illegal migration.

Addressing the session's opening, Merad highlighted the focus on realizing partnership opportunities and maximizing available potential in the border area.

He emphasized the establishment of a bilateral cooperation mechanism as a tangible outcome of what he termed "fruitful cooperation on all levels."

The minister pointed to discussions in 2021 between Presidents Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Kais Saied, where issues related to border region development and the mitigation of threats were extensively deliberated.

The Algerian minister underscored the ongoing efforts directed at implementing diverse development programs, with a strategic objective to alleviate disparities and address imbalances in the border regions.

Merad detailed government-launched initiatives for development projects in the border region, emphasizing the need to enhance conditions for travelers at the joint nine border crossings, which serve as active trading hubs.

Also, he called for reinforced epidemiological monitoring along the border to address new pandemics and ensure preparedness against emerging security challenges, particularly in the context of illegal migration.

The minister expressed anticipation that the meetings, attended by governors from southern states, would yield applicable recommendations that prioritize the aspirations and demands of residents in the southern region, ultimately contributing to economic and social development.

Of particular concern to Algeria is the smuggling of large quantities of subsidized gasoline to Tunisia, where its price is three times less.

Carnegie Middle East Center revealed in a study published in 2020 that “from the perspective of local authorities, smuggling functions as a safety valve that relieves some of the economic pressure felt by the inhabitants of Algeria’s neglected eastern provinces.” Moreover, smugglers enhance the security services’ efforts to keep the dreaded triple threat of drugs, weapons, and militants at bay.

“For communities of the borderlands, smuggling contraband into and out of Tunisia presents one of the precious few job opportunities in a region otherwise characterized by unemployment. The activity takes place on such a large scale that it has created a parallel illegal economy,” the Center confirmed.

“The products smuggled from Algeria into Tunisia include gasoline, livestock (especially sheep), auto parts, copper, electronics manufactured by the Algerian brand Condor, perfume, cosmetics, yogurt, powdered milk, and potatoes.”

The study revealed that a gasoline smuggler earns between $150 and $300 per day - and this activity accounts for 75 percent of the economic activity in the region.

“Were the state to clamp down on smugglers, borderland communities would feel even more alienated and might grow restive,” the Center noted, adding that “such smugglers might fall prey to the enticements of jihadis—who they have thus far shunned—and take up work transporting them and their weapons back and forth across the border.”



Uncertain Future for the PFLP-GC in Post-Assad Syria

Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Damascus on April 18 (AP) 
Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Damascus on April 18 (AP) 
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Uncertain Future for the PFLP-GC in Post-Assad Syria

Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Damascus on April 18 (AP) 
Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Damascus on April 18 (AP) 

The brief detention of Talal Naji, Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), by Syrian authorities has renewed scrutiny over the status of Palestinian factions still operating in Syria, particularly those that aligned with the former Assad regime.

Naji’s arrest and swift release come amid a major political realignment following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024. Once one of the most active and heavily armed Palestinian groups in Syria, the PFLP-GC now faces an uncertain future, along with other factions that were long tolerated—or even supported—under Assad’s rule.

A well-informed Palestinian source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new Syrian administration has appointed a figure known as Abu Abdul Rahman al-Shami to oversee the file of Palestinian factions. Since assuming the role, al-Shami has convened multiple meetings with faction representatives, including regular attendees from the PFLP-GC, to discuss the fate of their fighters, weapons, property, and military infrastructure.

According to the source, al-Shami has made it clear that the new government intends to hold accountable any individuals or groups implicated in crimes against Syrian civilians during the civil war. Palestinian factions have been instructed to surrender all weapons and military equipment, and to limit their activities to humanitarian and relief work. The PFLP-GC, the source said, has largely complied.

Despite the fall of the Assad regime, Naji and much of the PFLP-GC’s second- and third-tier leadership have remained in Syria. Its offices in Damascus reportedly continue to operate, though under heightened scrutiny. Other faction leaders, however, have fled. Among them are Khaled Abdul Majid (Popular Struggle Front), Ziyad al-Saghir (Fatah–Intifada), Mohammad al-Saeed (Liwa al-Quds), and Saed Abdel Al (Free Palestine Movement). Most are believed to have sought refuge in Lebanon.

Sources confirmed that several PFLP-GC fighters have been detained in recent weeks in connection with alleged war crimes committed during their cooperation with Assad’s forces. The Syrian government has also moved to seize faction offices and military installations across the country, including properties belonging to Fatah–Intifada, the Free Palestine Movement, and the Sa’iqa Forces. Sa’iqa’s leader, Mohammad Qais, remains in Syria.

In a further blow, authorities have reportedly frozen bank accounts belonging to some Palestinian factions, both in state and private banks, although it remains unclear whether the PFLP-GC is among them.

Additionally, it is widely believed that the PFLP-GC has handed over its military training camps, which were previously spread across Damascus countryside, Daraa, Aleppo, and Suwayda. “The situation is extremely sensitive, and everyone is anxious,” one Palestinian source told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It’s likely they’ve surrendered those sites.”

The sense of unease deepened last month when Syrian authorities detained two senior Islamic Jihad officials in Damascus: Khaled Khaled, head of the group’s Syria bureau, and Abu Ali Yasser, its chief organizational officer. Both remain in custody, and no official charges have been announced.

The current atmosphere of fear and uncertainty has driven faction leaders to avoid public comment. Most now insist on anonymity when speaking to local or international media.

Before the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, Syria hosted more than a dozen Palestinian factions. As the conflict escalated, the Assad regime encouraged the formation of new pro-regime groups, composed largely of Palestinian refugees, to fight alongside its forces.