The Israeli army claimed it had uncovered documents revealing that Hezbollah provoked Hamas politburo members for not waging a war against Israel as promised.
During its operation in Khan Younis, the Israeli army alleged it obtained documents, including a report of Sinwar criticizing Hezbollah.
A report published by the military correspondent of the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, Yossi Yehoshua, stated that during operations in Khan Yunis, Israeli forces discovered new documents shedding light on why the Hamas leader believed the Shiite "axis of resistance," namely Hezbollah and Iran, would actively engage.
The document revealed Sinwar's communication with his people: "We received a commitment that the axis will participate in the large liberation project due to the nature of the relationship we are working on."
The newspaper said that there were additional documents that reaffirmed the commitment Sinwar received, stating that the operation in southern Israel would trigger concomitant action from the north, on which Hezbollah trained under the banner of "occupying the Galilee."
The Israeli newspaper said that in the end, the "mullahs in Tehran and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut let Sinwar down."
The newspaper published several justifications for Hezbollah's behavior, saying the party did promote 15 Fajr units - condensed battalions of its elite Radwan forces - along the border, from Naqoura in the west to Mount Dov in the east, and prepared for immediate invasion.
However, it did not know the exact timing of Hamas' action, and even after it happened, the order was not given as quickly as Sinwar would have hoped.
It claimed that Hezbollah's delay allowed Israeli forces, primarily reservists, who were mobilized from their homes, to arrive at their positions and hold the line for that tense day.
The gap between Sinwar's hopes, as shown in the document, and what happened in practice raises the question of why Hezbollah refrained from an action that would have presented Israel with a stricter challenge while still handling Hamas' surprise attack.
One explanation would be caution on Hezbollah's part to assess the operation's success, and by the time Nasrallah understood its dimensions, Israel had organized in the north in a way that prevented effective implementation of the plan to occupy Galilee settlements.
According to an Israeli source, the reason for avoiding a full-scale war in the north differs.
The source stated that Hezbollah's basic desire was to enter immediately, but Iran held the organization back because it knew Israel would react forcefully.
Tehran did not build Hezbollah's dangerous capabilities at a cost of a billion dollars a year to serve as a force multiplier for Hamas but instead as a sharp response to a potential Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities.
Last December, the French Le Figaro newspaper published a report claiming Sinwar was angry with Hezbollah because the party broke its pledge, but the group was also angry with him because he had not informed it in advance of the attack on Oct. 7.
Le Figaro said that Sinwar and Mohammad Deif were angry that Nasrallah did not use the full force of Hezbollah after the attack on southern Israel, and they sent an angry message to this effect.
The head of Hamas politburo, Ismail Haniyeh, traveled to Tehran to urge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to join the war, but he rejected his request.
