Votel to Asharq Al-Awsat: US Deterred Iran in Iraq, Syria… It Could in Yemen

A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)
A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)
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Votel to Asharq Al-Awsat: US Deterred Iran in Iraq, Syria… It Could in Yemen

A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)
A handout photo made available by German Armed Forces shows a C-130 of the bi-national German-French squadron “Rhein/Rhin” drops relief supplies over the Gaza Strip, 16 March 2024. (EPA/Sherifa Kaestner / German Armed Forces / Handout)

The dire humanitarian situation in Gaza constitutes a major point of contention between the United States and Israel, General Joseph Votel, the former commander of the US Central Command, said in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that Israel has eliminated 20 to 30 percent of Hamas so far.  

The four-star General said that the Houthis attacks against navigation in the Red Sea have become a “major problem.” He suggested an increase in the assets of the U.S. military in the region to make it “extremely painful” for the Houthis and Iran, to stop their attacks against the ships and international navigation in the Red Sea, noting that the United States recently “deterred” Iran from continuing its militia attacks in both Iraq and Syria against American forces and interests in the region.  

Votel said he believes that “there is no interest’ for Israel or Hezbollah in a full confrontation. He also expressed "concern" about the ongoing discussions regarding the withdrawal of American forces stationed in Iraq, which could also affect the presence of the US forces in Syria.  

Here is the full interview:  

* Let me start from the situation in Gaza, because the President tried to arrange for some ceasefire during Ramadan. Apparently, it's not the case. And probably that would have some implications from the military perspective, including on the US forces in the region. Your insights, please.  

I think everybody can agree that Israel needs to do what it needs to do to protect itself from the threat of Hamas, but I think a large part of the disagreement from our government standpoint is that the military operation does not seem to take into consideration the extreme humanitarian situation that is playing out on the ground.  

Nearly 80-90 percent of the population of Gaza has been displaced by this conflict, and a military operation while necessary, must also take place in the context of planning and coordinating and synchronizing with the humanitarian community to ensure that we don't we don't exacerbate the humanitarian situation and make things worse than they already are. So, I think this has been the major sticking point between the United States government and the government of Israel toward coming operations particularly in the southern part of Gaza in and around Rafah.  

Humanitarian challenge  

*If you were in the same position you were previously, and had the President needed your advice on the situation, what would say?

I think that some of the actions that we’ve seen by the administration reflects some of the advice that would be provided. For example, one of the things that I would try to emphasize is that we should do those things that are within our capacity to do, like delivering aid by air or by the sea. That's an appropriate thing for us to do. It helps demonstrate that we are attuned to the humanitarian situation, and we are trying to take measures to remedy it, and hopefully these means will provide a way to perhaps address the broader challenge of humanitarian issues in Gaza.

I think secondly, it's important to make sure that we are maintaining very good communications, not just with the Israelis, but with our other partners on the region, and across the region, to make sure that we are sharing best insights and then we are preserving relationships going forward. I am concerned that some of the political discourse that is taking place could be affecting some of the effectiveness of our military to military or intelligence community to intelligence community relationships. So, those are very important.  

Third, I would be encouraging the administration to be stronger against those activities that are outside of the Gaza area, for example, what's happening in the Red Sea. This has become a big problem.   

Not enough  

*While the US is trying to make some arrangements for humanitarian aid either by air or by sea, humanitarian organizations and the UN are saying that this is not enough to prevent famine. After five months of war, what has Benjamin Netanyahu have achieved other than this humanitarian crisis and the destruction of the strip?

I agree that airdrops of humanitarian food supplies are not going to be enough to address the problem. They are a start, and they will address some small portion of the problem. But again, the most effective way of addressing humanitarian situation will be to open up ground lines of communication, ground routes with non-government organizations, UN organizations, other humanitarian aid organizations who can be on the ground to distribute and make sure these materials get to the people that are needed, and can assess the progress we're making. So yes, I do agree what we are doing while it's necessary, it's insufficient to the to the need.

The over the shore option that we're not looking at for bringing up aid through a temporary port has the potential to have more impact. But again, it is just one other way of getting things in there. And there needs to be much more effort put into getting the right organizations on the ground to make sure the aid gets to where it is most needed. I agree with you that it is a humanitarian disaster.  

As to the leader of Israel, Mr. Netanyahu, my own personal opinion here is that what would they have accomplished so far, is they have removed a significant, or at least a good portion of Hamas' ability to effectively attack into Israel. They have neutralized a percentage of the of the Hamas fighters. I've seen estimates 20 to 30 percent.  

*Would you advise the President to put more pressure on Israel in order to try to alleviate this humanitarian disaster? This would have some military implications because the US is the main provider of arms to Israel.

I'm not sure I'm there on making a decision to stop providing all support to Israel. I'm not sure I'm there on that, or I would recommend that. I think the United States is putting a lot of pressure on the Israeli government, on the Prime Minister in particular. I mean War Cabinet Minister Benny Ganz was in Washington last week, and met with a number of our national leaders here. The President by the day has become more strident and more critical of the approach that the Netanyahu government is taking, to how they're conducting operations in Gaza.

I think it's important to keep that pressure up to try to change that. But I also think the United States has to continue to work, to connect all the different parties here, whether it is Hamas and in Israel to try to come to some kind of temporary or permanent ceasefire or some resolution of the hostage situation, or continuing to open up easier ways to get humanitarian aid into the people of Gaza. I think these are three areas where the United States should be continuing to push, and continuing to put pressure not just on Israel, but on Hamas and the backers of Hamas as well. I think it's important to make sure that we are putting equal pressure in all directions here.

Resistance Axis

*On the regional, or probably international dimensions of this conflict in the Red Sea. It seems to me, and probably this is silly to say, that the Houthis are happy that they are fighting America.

I think this is true. So far, the Houthis have derived more benefit by perpetrating these attacks than they have felt the effects of the pressure that we’ve put on them. While there have been a number of strikes that we have conducted and the British have conducted against coastal defense sites, against supply depots, against command and control nodes, they have not been to a level that has convinced the Houthis that they have more to lose than they have to gain by continuing to push these attacks and conduct these attacks. We've just seen waves and waves of them just over this last weekend, a lot of them launched at US military vessels that are operating in the Red Sea.  

So until we are able to do something that convinces the Houthis that the cost of continuing to have to take these attacks or launch these attacks, the cost associated that outweighs the benefit, they will likely continue to do this. And they are deriving a benefit from this. They are there in the news. They have had a significant impact on global shipping through the Red Sea; somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of it has stopped.  

They're being viewed as a group that is standing up against the United States and other Western powers, and they're being seen as a very good and loyal member of Iran's Axis of Resistance. So right now, all of these things are more beneficial to them than the cost associated with the strikes that we have done against them. So we either have to ramp things up and really go after this, and make it very painful for them and Iran who is supporting them, or we have to live with the fact that we're going to deal with these threats for a long time, for until the situation in Gaza is resolved.

*What is your main concern on the situation in the Red Sea for the time being?

 My main answer is that we have to go after the supplier routes and facilitation routes that are continuing to provide the Houthis with all the materials that they have. They’ve been getting these materials for years. So, they have a large supply on the ground. So, while we destroy some things, it's relatively easily replaced. If we want to stop this, we have to cut them off. And we have to go after those facilitators largely at the best of Iran, who are bringing materials into that country. We need to prevent them from doing that. And then in conjunction with our ongoing strike campaign, reduce their ability to launch these attacks. I think that's what we have to do. So that will require more resources. It'll require more focus, it'll likely require more combat to do that.  

These are all things that our government would weigh in when making a decision like this. But in order to address this effectively, we will have to commit more resources, and take more effort to shut this down completely, not just protect ourselves. Just shut down the ability of the Houthis to conduct these types of attacks.

Israel and Hezbollah

*And that might risk the US slipping into a war…

Well, it could. It would certainly require us to deploy more resources into the region that would draw get away from other things that are important to us, and likely could get us involved in more of a protracted conflict with the Houthis or, you know, maybe with Iran over something like this or others in the region. There are definitely risks that are associated with this, and as you know, there's risks involved in everything.  

*Another hot point is the border between Israel and Lebanon. And it's just simmering there, and we don't know what's going to happen in the in the near future, if the Gaza war doesn't stop.

My assessment is that both sides in this case the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli government, neither of them want to have a confrontation along the northern border. That's in no one's interests. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah certainly remembers what happened there the last time when there was an Israeli incursion into Lebanon. The amount of destruction that resulted in, and the pressure that was put on him from the rest of the Lebanese government, and the broader population largely because of the policies that he was pursuing. There is no strong desire to do that.  

That said, Hezbollah will continue to hedge their bets, and they will continue to conduct harassing attacks to make it difficult for Israeli citizens to come back into their homes near the border, and that will continue to put more pressure on Netanyahu. They see it in their interest to continue to launch a few strikes here, a few strikes there, that aren’t overly effective, but which are constant reminders that Lebanese Hezbollah can impact things in Israel.  

It's important that we try to get this back to more of a status quo, where there are very few attacks across the border, and people can go back to living their lives in these areas. I don't know that there's going to be a particularly big breakthrough politically here. I think the best case would be going back to the status quo to the situation before October 7.

*Israel wants Hezbollah to be pushed away from the border.

That's unlikely to happen as well.

*On Syria and Iraq, the US Army posture in both countries and the ramifications of what's going on in Gaza, what do you think?

We've absorbed a lot of attacks here from Iranian allied militias in both Iraq and Syria. That seems to have dropped off since we conducted a series of strikes several weeks ago.

I think Iran has seen that they are vulnerable in this area, and they have recognized that they have a lot to lose by continuing to push these attacks and in potentially put more American lives at risk in the in the region. I think we've been successful in beginning to deter that and trying to return it to a more normal situation. I am concerned about the ongoing discussions that are taking place in Iraq, and to some degree with the United States over the disposition of US troops in Iraq.  

It's my personal view that those troops, about 2,500 or so, that are in Iraq for the purpose of helping the Iraqi security forces with the remnants of ISIS are doing good work, doing important work for Iraq, and important work for the United States. I am concerned that these discussions may lead to the departure of US forces, and as a result, less of a focus on ISIS and other terrorist organizations that may arise in the region. I think the conditions are still around that would allow an organization to do what ISIS did and rise and come back.  

I think the role of the United States plan is helping prevent that right now. I'm concerned that if we have to depart, that becomes much, much more difficult to do, and that raises the risk for the region. Departing from Iraq will have an impact on our troops in Syria as well. They derive a lot of their support from our bases in Iraq and if those are gone, then it will be very difficult to sustain, or we will have to find new ways to sustain our troops and in Syria. There could be some effects in that country as well.

Edge of the abyss

*No matter how you look at the map or the picture in the region; Gaza, Yemen, Red Sea, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, you’d see Iran somehow in the picture. And you right on saying that the US strikes a few weeks ago were kind of effective in deterring Iran. Is that the way that Iran should be dealt with in order to try to contain the mayhem in the Middle East?

The best approach to creating a more stable situation in the Middle East, of course, is diplomatic relations, and opening ties and communication between different parts of the region. The United States has had some efforts in the past to try to reach out to the Iranians; we did this through the nuclear discussion talks that took place.  

Again, we had some different policies in our government that contributed to some of the confusion around this as well. But I think what's important for the long term is that the United States has to take a sustainable approach to the region. We have to be willing to commit some amount of military force to the region to look after our security interest. But more importantly, we have to make sure we're putting in the diplomatic informational and economic aspects into the region that better also as the as equally important as the military one is.  

We’ve got to foster conversations, we've got to foster discussions, we've got to change the nature of the discussion, from one of Iran against the United States, to one of how do we bring Iran into the region effectively. They’ve been around a long time. They are historic country in this part of the region. Their role should be one that is more constructive for the region. And that's only going to be done through diplomatic discourse between the various parties there. We've got to continue to emphasize all that. We've got to be willing to stick with it, and start to address some of these long-term underlying issues of the region.

I mean, we're seeing right now the whole Palestinian issue that has erupted now as a result of an underlying issue that we've known about for decades, we've known as a problem. And now it has come to the head, and it's now brought the region back to the brink. So if there's one good thing that comes out of this, perhaps it is that we can, from this move forward on some way to address the status and the situation of the Palestinians in the Middle East for the long term here. The United States obviously has a policy of the two-state solution, but we have to move forward and address some of these deep underlying tensions and issues of the region, and we need to do it before a crisis arises. 



Lebanon’s Leaders Unite on Technical, Security Track in Talks

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri meets with UN Security Council Delegation in Beirut (Lebanese Parliament)
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri meets with UN Security Council Delegation in Beirut (Lebanese Parliament)
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Lebanon’s Leaders Unite on Technical, Security Track in Talks

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri meets with UN Security Council Delegation in Beirut (Lebanese Parliament)
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri meets with UN Security Council Delegation in Beirut (Lebanese Parliament)

Cabinet sources said Lebanon’s three top leaders remain aligned as negotiations with Israel move into a new phase, marked by the appointment of a civilian envoy, former ambassador to Washington and lawyer Simon Karam, to lead Lebanon’s delegation to the Mechanism Committee.

The move is intended to jolt the committee out of months of stagnation and push it toward a security agreement anchored in enforcing a cessation of hostilities, after earlier rounds were dominated by routine tallies of Israeli violations conducted with United Nations peacekeepers.

The sources said the leaders’ agreement to pull the Mechanism out of its deadlock coincided with drawing political boundaries for the talks.

These boundaries are strictly limited to ending Israeli violations and attacks, securing a withdrawal from the south, releasing Lebanese detainees, and revisiting and correcting border demarcation in response to Lebanon’s reservations over disputed points along the Blue Line that it considers part of its sovereign territory.

The sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Lebanon insists on restricting the negotiations to non-negotiable security issues. It will not allow the talks to drift into discussions on normalizing relations with Israel or striking a peace agreement.

This position is shared by President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who was the first to propose adding civilians to the Mechanism.

The three leaders reiterated their stance ahead of the first round of talks, attended by US envoy Morgan Ortagus and joined by Karam, in defiance of the agenda set by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

They said Netanyahu is trying to raise the stakes to provoke Hezbollah against the state and sow confusion, even as the Israeli army continues its violations to turn the group’s base against it.

This became evident in the targeting of several homes between the banks of the Litani River, despite containing no weapons depots.

The sources said Netanyahu is escalating militarily to force Lebanon to accept Israeli terms, although he knows the negotiations will not deviate from their technical and security framework.

Lebanon, they said, remains committed to ensuring that only the state holds weapons.

The sources noted Berri’s insistence that he was the first to propose adding civilians to the Mechanism and asked where Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem stands on this proposal.

They asked whether he ever objected to his “older brother’s” suggestion, given that Qassem had declared in an open letter to the three leaders that he rejects negotiations with Israel.

Qassem later walked back parts of that letter by having a senior Hezbollah official convey a message that Berri was not its intended target, in an effort to prevent a rupture within the Shiite political camp.

The sources also questioned why Hezbollah objects to the talks if its “older brother” is the one negotiating on its behalf and was behind the United States mediated ceasefire agreement brokered by Amos Hochstein.

They said the only card Hezbollah has left is raising the ceiling of its objections, since it no longer has the ability to reset the negotiating table at a time when the balance of power has tilted in Israel’s favor, particularly after the group’s unilateral support for Gaza cost it its previous deterrence and rules of engagement.

The sources said Hezbollah lacks alternatives that would allow it to reverse the balance of power and is limiting itself to loud political objections that it cannot translate into military action.

This comes despite its insistence on keeping its weapons and its accusation that the Salam government committed a mistake by agreeing to the principle that arms must be exclusively in the hands of the state, beginning from north of the Litani to Lebanon’s international border with Syria, in parallel with progress in the negotiations.

They said Hezbollah is forced to calibrate its position, since it cannot afford to break with Aoun or jeopardize its alliance with Berri, a rupture that would leave the group exposed at a moment when it seeks internal protection.

Any strain in these relationships would also create negative repercussions for the Shiite community. The sources asked why the group does not place its cards in Berri’s hands, as he is better positioned to navigate Shiite public sentiment that seeks the liberation of the south and the return of its residents to their villages.

Berri is viewed, even by rivals, as the essential gatekeeper to any settlement that could restore international attention to Lebanon and open a path for reconstruction. He enjoys Arab and international ties that Hezbollah lacks, as the group remains reliant solely on Iran.

The sources said the negotiations’ entry into a new phase prompted United States pressure on Israel to prevent the war from expanding, after Lebanon agreed to Washington’s request to add a civilian to the Mechanism and task him with leading the delegation.

They urged Hezbollah to stand behind the state’s diplomatic choice and said the group’s fears that the talks could lead to a peace treaty with Israel are unfounded.

They noted that Berri himself was the first to support bringing civilians into the process, which should reassure Hezbollah and encourage it to give diplomacy a chance.

They added that Salam is not acting unilaterally and is coordinating with Aoun. Both leaders are working together to implement the government’s commitment to ensuring that only the state holds weapons.

They also revealed that communication between Aoun and Berri has not stopped. The two men reviewed the atmosphere surrounding the Mechanism’s meeting in Naqoura before the latest cabinet session.

According to the sources, Berri instructed his parliamentary bloc and senior Amal Movement members not to comment on the negotiations, positively or negatively.

The directive came because he wants to centralize the political message and avoid dragging party members on both sides into disputes that could spill into the streets.

Hezbollah, they said, also wants to protect its relationship with its sole remaining ally in Lebanon after its former partners in the so-called Axis of Resistance endorsed the principle of exclusive state authority over weapons.

The sources said Hezbollah knows that avenues for repairing its Arab and international relations remain closed, unlike Berri who maintains wide ties.

They questioned what Hezbollah is counting on after its leadership rejected Egypt’s initiative, insisting, according to Western diplomatic sources cited by Asharq Al-Awsat, on linking its position to US-Iran negotiations in hopes of safeguarding Iran’s leverage in Lebanon after regional setbacks for the Axis.

They said the government will take note of Hezbollah’s objection, although it will have no impact on the course of the talks.

Hezbollah will not mobilize its supporters in the streets to avoid friction with Amal, particularly since Berri does not oppose the launch of negotiations, which remain tied to liberating the south and implementing Resolution 1701.

Any attempt by Hezbollah to outbid Berri for populist gain would backfire and weaken the group’s standing within its own community.


Iraq’s New Government Faces Unpredictable Prospects

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stands beside Nouri al-Maliki during a religious event in Baghdad (Government Media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stands beside Nouri al-Maliki during a religious event in Baghdad (Government Media)
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Iraq’s New Government Faces Unpredictable Prospects

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stands beside Nouri al-Maliki during a religious event in Baghdad (Government Media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stands beside Nouri al-Maliki during a religious event in Baghdad (Government Media)

Tension rippled through Iraq’s ruling Shiite alliance after authorities briefly listed Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi group as terrorist organizations, then swiftly reversed the move, at a time when debate over the next government is intensifying.

The decision and the rapid retreat from it revived scrutiny of a long running point of friction between United States pressure on Baghdad and Iranian influence in the country.

Iraq’s presidency said on Friday it had no knowledge of the designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist entities and no role in freezing their assets.

It said such decisions are not sent to the presidency and that it only reviews and endorses laws approved by parliament and presidential decrees.

The statement added that decisions by the cabinet, the committee that freezes terrorist assets, and anti money laundering directives are not referred to the presidency for approval and that it learned of the designation only through social media, prompting the clarification.

The listing appeared in the 17 November 2025 edition of the official Gazette, which cited the government’s counterterrorism obligations under a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Authorities then moved to roll back the designation after a statement and a document from the Central Bank of Iraq confirmed that Baghdad’s approval had been limited to entities and individuals tied to ISIS and Al-Qaeda only.

Tension inside the Coordination Framework

Political figures and legal experts said the central bank operates as an independent institution and does not fall under direct government control.

But they said a corrective step taken by outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, including public clarification and an urgent investigation, escalated the dispute inside the Coordination Framework as negotiations over the next premier intensify.

Although the alliance issued no unified position, parties and factions close to it accused the government of making a deliberate move meant to signal alignment with the demands of the administration of President Donald Trump.

They made the accusation as presidential envoy Mark Savaya was expected in Baghdad after a similar visit by Washington’s envoy to Syria and Lebanon.

Sudani, who faces mounting pressure within his coalition and was even removed from an internal WhatsApp group by some Coordination Framework leaders according to political sources, issued a brief statement saying there would be no compromise on Iraq’s support for what he called peoples’ rights and sacrifices, a veiled reference to Hezbollah and the Houthis.

Former deputy prime minister Bahaa Araji, a political ally of Sudani, defended him. He said the incident was a technical error in a decision issued by a committee tied to the central bank which he described as an independent institution not subject to government will.

He said on X that the mistake would be corrected and that the investigation would prevent opportunists from exploiting it politically.

Impact on government formation

The episode unfolded as the Coordination Framework attempts to settle on a nominee for prime minister, amid clear divisions over whether to keep Sudani for a second term or replace him.

The uproar over what is now known as the central bank error has further complicated the alliance’s internal bargaining and opened the door to unexpected scenarios, political sources said.

At the same time, Shiite armed factions escalated their criticism. Ali al-Asadi, head of the political bureau of Harakat al-Nujaba, said listing the two groups as terrorists was an act of betrayal.

He also claimed Iraq had nominated US President Donald Trump for the Nobel Prize, which he called an insult to sacrifices. He said such a government does not represent the Iraqi people and posted a hashtag calling the move a death sentence for a second term.

The incident, which began as an administrative oversight and morphed into a political crisis, underscored the fragility of the balance Baghdad tries to maintain between its ties with the United States, its main financial and military partner, and its relations with groups aligned with Iran.


Trump’s Phase Two Remarks Revive Questions Over Gaza Article 17

Palestinians fill water containers at the Nuseirat camp for displaced families in central Gaza (AFP)
Palestinians fill water containers at the Nuseirat camp for displaced families in central Gaza (AFP)
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Trump’s Phase Two Remarks Revive Questions Over Gaza Article 17

Palestinians fill water containers at the Nuseirat camp for displaced families in central Gaza (AFP)
Palestinians fill water containers at the Nuseirat camp for displaced families in central Gaza (AFP)

A brief and cryptic remark by US President Donald Trump about modifying phase two of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, offered without any details, has stirred questions over how the accord will be executed.

Analysts say the comment points to a possible change in implementing the deal’s provisions rather than adjusting its core terms.

Instead of moving toward an Israeli withdrawal from the enclave, where Israel controls about 55% of the territory, and the disarmament of Hamas, they expect Washington to pivot to article 17, which allows for unilateral application of the peace plan without adhering to its sequencing.

They said phase two will be difficult to reach while key issues remain unresolved, including forming a peace council, establishing a Gaza administrative committee and deploying a stabilization force.

Article 17 of the ceasefire agreement, which took effect on October 10, states that if Hamas delays or rejects the proposal, the measures listed above, including an expanded aid operation, will be carried out in areas free of terrorism that the Israeli army hands over to the international stabilization force.

The peace document signed in October by Hamas and Israel covered only the provisions of what is known as phase one.

This includes an initial truce, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, conditions for exchanging detainees and prisoners and facilitating humanitarian aid. No formal agreement has been reached on phase two, which relates to governing Gaza after the war.

Trump said on Thursday that phase two of his Gaza peace plan will be modified very soon, amid growing concern over its stalled implementation. He did not specify what the changes would entail.

Saeed Okasha, an Israeli affairs analyst at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said Trump may be considering an adjustment anchored in article 17 to prevent the agreement from collapsing.

He said the article opens the way for dividing Gaza into an old Gaza and a new Gaza, an idea recently circulated by US envoy Steve Witkoff in several meetings last month.

Okasha said the amendment remains possible since the agreement was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council last month.

He said article 17 could be reactivated on grounds that Hamas has not met requirements for disarmament or other commitments, adding that such a shift could create a situation of neither war nor peace.

Ayman Al-Raqab, a Palestinian political analyst, said the lack of clarity over Trump’s intended changes has fueled concerns that any adjustment may entrench a division of Gaza at a time when Israel seeks to maintain a long term presence in the enclave. He said this aligns with proposals characterizing a new Gaza and an old Gaza.

Amid the uncertainty, the Axios news site reported that Trump plans to announce the start of phase two and unveil the new governance structure for Gaza before December 25. The site quoted two US officials as saying the formation of the international force and the governing body is in its final stages.

They expect Trump to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu before the end of December to discuss the steps.

Al-Raqab said phase two still faces hurdles, including the absence of a peace council and a technocratic government, the lack of a police force to assume its duties and the pending formation of a stabilization force. He said no major moves are likely before January.

Okasha said he sees no immediate prospect other than Israel expanding the areas it controls in the enclave to about 60% as long as implementation of the agreement remains stalled, though without a major escalation similar to what Israel is carrying out in southern Lebanon.

Several days ago, the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth reported on an Israeli plan to resettle about two million Palestinians in new areas under Israeli control east of the Yellow Line and to empty areas held by Hamas of all civilians while pursuing Hamas members there over time.

British newspaper The Telegraph also quoted Western diplomats as saying the US plan for Gaza carries the risk of dividing the enclave permanently, entrenching the presence of Israeli forces in the devastated strip.

About a week ago, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty underscored during a meeting in Barcelona with European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas the importance of preserving the territorial unity of Palestine, including the West Bank and Gaza, and rejected any measures that would entrench separation or undermine prospects for a two state solution.

Abdelatty reiterated that position on Wednesday, saying, “There is no place for talk of dividing Gaza. Gaza is an integrated territorial unit and is an inseparable part of the future Palestinian state together with the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. These are binding international legitimacy resolutions and certainly must be upheld.”

He said consultations continue with relevant parties on forming a Gaza administrative committee made up of technocrats to manage affairs on the ground.

Okasha said Egyptian efforts will continue to prevent any division of Gaza or any amendment that would undermine the agreement, adding that various scenarios remain possible as developments unfold around Trump’s plan.