Rapid Support Forces Ban Sudanese Exports to Egypt

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Rapid Support Forces Ban Sudanese Exports to Egypt

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, headed by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, announced on Saturday a ban on Sudanese exports to Egypt in response to what he said was Cairo’s meddling in the country’s affairs.

Earlier this week, Hemedti accused Egypt of carrying out air raids against his forces. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry vehemently denied the claim.

The ban will be effective in Sudanese regions held by the RSF.

Observers viewed the development as a significant turn in relations between the two neighbors.

Leading member of the RSF in the Blue Nile region Abu Shoutal warned merchants against sending any products to Egypt, saying they will be held to account if they do.

If the merchants send even one unit of their products, they will be punished. “Our exports should be sent to all of our neighbors, except for Egypt,” he demanded.

“Any truck headed to Egypt through the al-Dabba crossing should be dealt with as an enemy,” he added.

Sudanese exports to Egypt include agriculture and animal products, such as peanuts, corn, sesame, gum Arabic, camels and cattle. They are primarily produced in regions held by the RSF, such as Darfur and Kordofan.

The RSF controls regions bordering Egypt and through which exports are sent.

The ban will complicate exports to the northern neighbor. Journalist and civil activist Rasha Awad told Asharq Al-Awsat that the ban was a significant development in relations between Sudan and Egypt.

She warned of its dangerous repercussions and that it may lead to an open confrontation between the RSF and Egypt.

Moreover, she said the ban could pave the way for the Sudanese conflict to transform into a regional war in which even Ethiopia may become involved.

Awad wondered, however, whether the RSF could provide a suitable substitute to merchants. “Who will buy the banned products and is there a safe alternative to the Egyptian markets?”

She also wondered whether the ban would be used as an excuse to escalate the war in Sudan, adding that the coming days will have the answer.

Analyst Mohammed Latif said relations between Sudan and Egypt will not be the same after the ban.

Meanwhile, RSF supporters posted footage of trucks loaded with goods and cattle they claim were turned back from the border with Egypt despite a ban by Hemedti against posting photos or videos of his forces.



Report: Hamas Tried to Convince Iran to Join Oct. 7 Attack

Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)
Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)
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Report: Hamas Tried to Convince Iran to Join Oct. 7 Attack

Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)
Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar. (AFP file photo)

The minutes of 10 meetings among Hamas’s top leaders showed that the Palestinian armed group had avoided escalation several times since 2021 as it sought Iran’s support to launch a large assault on Israel, The New York Times reported on Saturday.

A report by Ronen Bergman, Adam Rasgon and Patrick Kingsley, said that for more than two years, Hamas leader Yahya al-Sinwar huddled with his top commanders and plotted what they hoped would be the most devastating and destabilizing attack on Israel in the group’s four-decade history.

The documents, which represent a breakthrough in understanding Hamas, also show extensive efforts to deceive Israel about its intentions as the group laid the groundwork for a bold assault and a regional conflagration that Sinwar hoped would cause Israel to “collapse.”

The documents consist of minutes from 10 secret planning meetings of a small group of Hamas political and military leaders in the run-up to the attack, on Oct. 7, 2023. The minutes include 30 pages of previously undisclosed details about the way Hamas’s leadership works and the preparations that went into its attack.

The documents, which were verified by The New York Times, lay out the main strategies and assessments of the leadership group.

Hamas initially planned to carry out the attack, which it code-named “the big project,” in the fall of 2022. But it delayed executing the plan as it tried to persuade Iran and Hezbollah to participate.

Also, as they prepared arguments aimed at Hezbollah, the Hamas leaders said that Israel’s “internal situation” — an apparent reference to turmoil over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s contentious plans to overhaul the judiciary — was among the reasons they were “compelled to move toward a strategic battle.”

In July 2023, Hamas dispatched a top official to Lebanon, where he met with a senior Iranian commander and requested help with striking sensitive sites at the start of the assault.

The senior Iranian commander told Hamas that Tehran and Hezbollah were supportive in principle, but needed more time to prepare; the minutes do not say how detailed a plan was presented by Hamas to its allies.

The documents also say that Hamas planned to discuss the attack in more detail at a subsequent meeting with Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader at the time, but do not clarify whether the discussion happened.

Hamas felt assured of its allies’ general support, but concluded it might need to go ahead without their full involvement — in part to stop Israel from deploying an advanced new air-defense system before the assault took place.