Syrian Kurds Frustrated with Damascus Over Exclusion from Transitional Govt Formation

Syrian Kurds celebrate in Qamishli the agreement between the Syrian administration and the SDF (Archive - Reuters).
Syrian Kurds celebrate in Qamishli the agreement between the Syrian administration and the SDF (Archive - Reuters).
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Syrian Kurds Frustrated with Damascus Over Exclusion from Transitional Govt Formation

Syrian Kurds celebrate in Qamishli the agreement between the Syrian administration and the SDF (Archive - Reuters).
Syrian Kurds celebrate in Qamishli the agreement between the Syrian administration and the SDF (Archive - Reuters).

Discontent among Syria’s Kurds has been evident following their exclusion from consultations regarding the formation of the transitional government, which is set to be announced by Damascus within hours. The Kurdish National Council (KNC) has confirmed its decision to boycott the government’s inauguration ceremony, despite receiving an official invitation to attend.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, KNC spokesperson Faisal Youssef stated that the new administration in Damascus “did not engage with us regarding the formation of this government, nor did it consult us in selecting its members or portfolios.”
He emphasized that Kurdish political forces are the sole representatives and defenders of Kurdish rights, adding: “We are not interested in merely attending the announcement ceremony; our concern is ensuring our people’s demands are constitutionally recognized.”
Youssef further clarified that the Kurdish bloc was not offered participation in the upcoming government. Expressing his disappointment, he said: “We had hoped the new administration would acknowledge the demands of the Kurdish people, who constitute the country’s second-largest ethnic group, and grant them their rights as partners in building a new Syria.”
The constitutional declaration grants President Ahmad Al-Sharaa sweeping powers to manage the transitional phase but fails to meet the aspirations of minorities, including Kurds and Christians. These groups fear the reproduction of an authoritarian regime, as the declaration sets the transitional period at five years and grants the president control over legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, despite nominally upholding the principle of “separation of powers.”
Zaid Sefouk, from the Independent Kurdistan Movement, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Al-Sharaa government “lacks legitimacy from the people, was formed through unilateral decision-making, and represents a single political faction. It will not be capable of governing Syria or overcoming the destruction left behind by the ousted Ba’athist regime.”
Previously, Al-Sharaa had signed a so-called historic agreement with Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The agreement stipulated the integration of the civil and military institutions of the Autonomous Administration, which is controlled by the SDF in northeastern Syria, into the structures of the central government. It also placed border crossings, Qamishli Airport, and oil, gas, and energy fields in Deir ez-Zor under the central administration in Damascus.
The agreement allows technical committees time to negotiate the details until early next year, providing the SDF an opportunity to push for its demands.
Sources familiar with the government formation have indicated that ministerial positions will be assigned to Kurdish figures. However, when asked about these individuals or political blocs expected to participate, Faisal Youssef denied any contact between the new administration and the Kurdish political movement or any party regarding government participation.
He said: “There has been no discussion with us about the basis on which any Kurdish representatives would join, their level of representation for Kurdish regions, or how our national demands would be met within the framework of state institutions.”
Since its establishment in mid-2014, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria has governed civil councils across four provinces: Hasakah, Raqqa, parts of Deir ez-Zor, and the city of Ain al-Arab (Kobani) in eastern Aleppo. This region holds 90% of Syria’s oil and gas reserves.

 



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.