Observers: Rapid Support Forces Control the Ground, Sudanese Army the Skies

Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)
Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)
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Observers: Rapid Support Forces Control the Ground, Sudanese Army the Skies

Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)
Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)

Nearly a month since the outbreak of war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), neither side has been able to achieve a decisive victory to end the battle.

According to witnesses, while the RSF has control on the ground, the army controls the sky, and each side has asserted that they can defeat the other and assume sole authority over the conflict zone.

Amid these allegations, a fierce psychological war is taking place through various media platforms. However, most of the propaganda is being exposed as false by “young activists” who are working to uncover fabricated information that is creating confusion among the people.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to several journalists, most of whom agreed that the RSF controls the ground, contrary to claims by the army’s war propaganda.

In northern Khartoum, a journalist said the RSF were still holding areas under their control and were expanding their deployment.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a journalist working for a prominent satellite channel, said: “There has been no real change on the ground since the first days of the war.”

“The RSF still control the area extending from Al-Mek Nimr Bridge to the South, including the outskirts of the oil refinery in Qarri, about 50 kilometers from the city center,” he added.

In southern Khartoum, a female journalist said the RSF still control most of the areas, especially Al-Sittine Street, the airport neighborhood, the buildings of the Security and Intelligence Service, and part of the General Command of the Army. She added that the forces took almost complete control over the neighborhoods of Khartoum 2, Al-Sahafat, and Jabrat.

“There are no real battles between the RSF and army. Skirmishes only take place here and there, but they do not change the situation,” she noted.

The army has acknowledged – based on previous statements by its commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan - that the RSF control the presidential palace, the cabinet, central Khartoum, and a number of other locations.

Since the eruption of the fighting on April 15, army warplanes regularly attacks the sites and control centers of the RSF in spite the military’s announcement that it had destroyed them and cut off the lines of supply and communication.

The journalists interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat expressed their surprise at the continuation of the fighting throughout this period, and the failure of the two parties to find a solution.

While they stressed that a successful settlement in favor of any of the two parties was no longer “possible”, they called them to return to reason and reach a settlement through the Jeddah negotiations in order to protect the country’s remaining people and resources.



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
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Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.