Observers: Rapid Support Forces Control the Ground, Sudanese Army the Skies

Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)
Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)
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Observers: Rapid Support Forces Control the Ground, Sudanese Army the Skies

Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)
Smoke rises from burning aircraft inside Khartoum Airport during clashes between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the army in Khartoum, Sudan April 17, 2023. (Reuters)

Nearly a month since the outbreak of war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), neither side has been able to achieve a decisive victory to end the battle.

According to witnesses, while the RSF has control on the ground, the army controls the sky, and each side has asserted that they can defeat the other and assume sole authority over the conflict zone.

Amid these allegations, a fierce psychological war is taking place through various media platforms. However, most of the propaganda is being exposed as false by “young activists” who are working to uncover fabricated information that is creating confusion among the people.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to several journalists, most of whom agreed that the RSF controls the ground, contrary to claims by the army’s war propaganda.

In northern Khartoum, a journalist said the RSF were still holding areas under their control and were expanding their deployment.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a journalist working for a prominent satellite channel, said: “There has been no real change on the ground since the first days of the war.”

“The RSF still control the area extending from Al-Mek Nimr Bridge to the South, including the outskirts of the oil refinery in Qarri, about 50 kilometers from the city center,” he added.

In southern Khartoum, a female journalist said the RSF still control most of the areas, especially Al-Sittine Street, the airport neighborhood, the buildings of the Security and Intelligence Service, and part of the General Command of the Army. She added that the forces took almost complete control over the neighborhoods of Khartoum 2, Al-Sahafat, and Jabrat.

“There are no real battles between the RSF and army. Skirmishes only take place here and there, but they do not change the situation,” she noted.

The army has acknowledged – based on previous statements by its commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan - that the RSF control the presidential palace, the cabinet, central Khartoum, and a number of other locations.

Since the eruption of the fighting on April 15, army warplanes regularly attacks the sites and control centers of the RSF in spite the military’s announcement that it had destroyed them and cut off the lines of supply and communication.

The journalists interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat expressed their surprise at the continuation of the fighting throughout this period, and the failure of the two parties to find a solution.

While they stressed that a successful settlement in favor of any of the two parties was no longer “possible”, they called them to return to reason and reach a settlement through the Jeddah negotiations in order to protect the country’s remaining people and resources.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.