A Door of Hope, Death in Libya

 Families of Egyptian migrants held captive and missing in Libya (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Families of Egyptian migrants held captive and missing in Libya (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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A Door of Hope, Death in Libya

 Families of Egyptian migrants held captive and missing in Libya (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Families of Egyptian migrants held captive and missing in Libya (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In October 2022, a phone call from Italy reached me, the voice on the other end filled with worry and trepidation.

“My brother Adham traveled to Libya, and we have lost contact with him. We don't know if he is alive or dead,” disclosed Osama Abdel Tawab Amin, an Egyptian.

Amin proceeded to recount the events surrounding his 14-year-old brother Adham, who embarked on a journey from Egypt to Libya with the intention of reaching the eastern city of Benghazi.

Adham, a native of the Asyut governorate in southern Egypt, had become part of a group of numerous minors from various Arab and African countries who hoped to reach Europe.

Driven by the aspiration to migrate to Europe from a tender age, these underage children willingly subject themselves to the grip of human traffickers.

Departing from their villages, they embark on a hazardous expedition, fraught with the potential outcomes of imprisonment, arrival on European shores, or, tragically, repatriation to their home countries.

This time, however, the outcome was ominous as it led those minors to their “final resting place.”

Spanning from the Nile Delta to Sidi Barrani near the Libyan border and reaching into other countries, including Sudan and Chad, this investigation aims to document extensive human trafficking operations affecting minors.

Starting in early 2021, there has been a notable increase in reports from Egyptian, African, and Syrian families concerning their children’s journey to Libya and the subsequent loss of communication.

Desperate to reunite with their children, these families have been actively seeking assistance and have shared distressing accounts of their children falling prey to the deceitful tactics employed by human traffickers.

The somber reality of this tragedy came to light at the rear entrance of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, offering a panoramic view of the Nile in Cairo.

It was in this location that Asharq Al-Awsat captured a significant collection of grievances submitted by individuals.

Furthermore, members of the Egyptian parliament have been presented with additional reports, each intertwined with a distressing combination of fear and despair.

In mid-March 2022, the Libyan Coast Guard issued a statement regarding the tragic sinking of a boat in the Mediterranean Sea.

The incident occurred off the coast of “Wadi Umm al-Shaush,” situated near the eastern Libyan city of Tobruk.

Among the migrants on board were around 18 young Egyptians.

Despite extensive search efforts conducted over several days, the family of Amr Sayed Anwar, a 15-year-old Egyptian boy hailing from a village in the Dakahlia governorate north of Cairo, received the devastating news that their son was among the victims of this tragic drowning incident.

After approximately a month had passed since the incident, I contacted Anwar’s father, who resides in a village near the town of El-Senbellawein, one of the administrative centers in the Dakahlia governorate.

The man, who is around fifty years old and works as a daily laborer on a farm, expressed that the authorities in Libya had not located his son’s body.

He sorrowfully stated: “I have lost my son forever.”

The grieving father’s intense emotional state prevented me from inquiring about the details of his son’s journey to Libya, but he erupted in anger when the term “broker” was mentioned.

“I paid 30,000 Egyptian pounds and he ended up traveling with 22 others, some older than him. They went to a broker in Marsa Matruh. After reaching Libya, the broker demanded an additional 70,000 pounds to continue the journey to Italy,” recalled the father angrily.

Upon being provided with the broker’s contact information by Anwar’s father, it became apparent to me that the “broker market” functions akin to any other market, governed by the dynamics of supply and demand, as well as the art of negotiation and bargaining.

In this market, each region within Libya carries a specific price that prospective migrants must pay, determined by its proximity or distance from the Egyptian borders.

It turned out that the broker referred to me by the father of the deceased child enjoys a wide reputation among those aspiring to engage in clandestine migration from several rural governorates in the Nile Delta, despite him residing in the Sidi Barrani area, located 570 kilometers northwest of Cairo.

The broker did not respond to any requests for an interview regarding his activities in facilitating border-crossing for migrants.

However, he later interacted with us when we identified ourselves as concerned parents seeking to migrate their children.

During the initial conversation, I asked him for assistance in smuggling three young boys to Libya, to which he did not object. He promptly inquired: “Which region do they want to go to?”

Abu Mazen, the broker operating under an alias, wasted no time and did not allow me much room to answer.

His mannerisms seemed to blend Egyptian and Libyan influences.

Without hesitation, he promptly stated the exact sum required and confidently asserted his ability to facilitate the transportation of any number of individuals across the Egyptian border into Libya.

In an attempt to reassure me, he even added: “I consider them my own children, I swear to God!”

Around ten days later, I contacted Abu Mazen, and it appeared that the sheer number of callers had caused him to forget our previous conversation. He asked for a recap of our discussion, and then I requested a meeting with him. With clear reluctance, he opted to schedule our meeting in Marsa Matruh a week later.

At the end of May 2022, during our conversation, Abu Mazen proposed a change of plans.

Instead of meeting in Marsa Matruh as initially planned, he suggested that it would be more convenient for both of us to meet in Alexandria. He explained that he would be visiting a relative there and offered the option for me to meet him in Alexandria if I preferred.

We met as planned at a seaside café in the Al-Asafira district of Alexandria, situated about 230 kilometers north of Cairo. Our discussion primarily focused on how young individuals are recruited and the various techniques employed to smuggle them out of the country.

I noticed that the sixty-year-old man spoke with ease, but when it came to the details, caution overcame him.

With a touch of boasting, Abu Mazen, whose phone never stopped ringing, began to showcase how he possessed a strong network of connections within Libya.

Suddenly, he said, “I don't exploit or deceive young people. They come to us seeking help to smuggle them into Libya, and we assist them, never leaving them except in the specific region they specify.”

During our time at the café, Abu Mazen took pride in the abundance of phone calls he received in less than an hour, highlighting the growing demand for his services.

He made a point of emphasizing that he does not overcharge like “others,” stating: “We hold ourselves accountable to God when it comes to people’s children.”

“I charge 20,000 pounds per person from the Barani border to Tripoli (approximately $650), and 15,000 pounds to Benghazi.”

“Others charge 40,000 or 50,000 pounds and abandon or sell them,” he added.

Abu Mazen further remarked: “Today, the Libyan dinar is valued at five Egyptian pounds,” referring to the exchange rate between the two currencies at that time (with the dollar equivalent to 5.12 dinars).

After my insistence, Abu Mazen enlightened me about the smuggling methods and said: “This has been my work for years, and I have my connections inside Libya, just ten hours away from the customs.”

With great caution, he mentioned that he brings young people from various provinces to the city of Marsa Matruh at a specific time before transporting them to Saloum.

From there, they would embark on foot through desert routes and trails, alongside the land border crossing that connects Egypt and Libya.

Despite my repeated inquiry about the age of the young individuals he helps smuggle, Abu Mazen displayed little concern for this matter.

He simply responded: “We’re in it for the money, their age is inconsequential to us.”

He chuckled and continued: “There is a significant demand for transporting young children. But what can we do? It's what their families desire!”

He clarified that the individuals who he smuggles have intentions to migrate from Libya to Europe, with the journey costing between 120,000 to 150,000 pounds.

Furthermore, he confidently stated: “Where would they go without me? My associates in Libya will handle everything!”



UN Resolution 1701 at the Heart of the Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire

An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)
An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)
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UN Resolution 1701 at the Heart of the Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire

An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)
An empty United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observation tower on the Israel-Lebanon border, near the southern Lebanese city of Al-Khiam, as seen from northern Israel, 26 November 2024, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. (EPA)

In 2006, after a bruising monthlong war between Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah armed group, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for a resolution to end the conflict and pave the way for lasting security along the border.

But while relative calm stood for nearly two decades, Resolution 1701’s terms were never fully enforced.

Now, figuring out how to finally enforce it is key to a US-brokered deal that brought a ceasefire Wednesday.

In late September, after nearly a year of low-level clashes, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah spiraled into all-out war and an Israeli ground invasion. As Israeli jets pound deep inside Lebanon and Hezbollah fires rockets deeper into northern Israel, UN and diplomatic officials again turned to the 2006 resolution in a bid to end the conflict.

Years of deeply divided politics and regionwide geopolitical hostilities have halted substantial progress on its implementation, yet the international community believes Resolution 1701 is still the brightest prospect for long-term stability between Israel and Lebanon.

Almost two decades after the last war between Israel and Hezbollah, the United States led shuttle diplomacy efforts between Lebanon and Israel to agree on a ceasefire proposal that renewed commitment to the resolution, this time with an implementation plan to try to reinvigorate the document.

What is UNSC Resolution 1701? In 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from most of southern Lebanon along a UN-demarcated “Blue Line” that separated the two countries and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in Syria. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeepers increased their presence along the line of withdrawal.

Resolution 1701 was supposed to complete Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and ensure Hezbollah would move north of the Litani River, keeping the area exclusively under the Lebanese military and UN peacekeepers.

Up to 15,000 UN peacekeepers would help to maintain calm, return displaced Lebanese and secure the area alongside the Lebanese military.

The goal was long-term security, with land borders eventually demarcated to resolve territorial disputes.

The resolution also reaffirmed previous ones that call for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon — Hezbollah among them.

“It was made for a certain situation and context,” Elias Hanna, a retired Lebanese army general, told The Associated Press. “But as time goes on, the essence of the resolution begins to hollow.”

Has Resolution 1701 been implemented? For years, Lebanon and Israel blamed each other for countless violations along the tense frontier. Israel said Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force and growing arsenal remained, and accused the group of using a local environmental organization to spy on troops.

Lebanon complained about Israeli military jets and naval ships entering Lebanese territory even when there was no active conflict.

“You had a role of the UNIFIL that slowly eroded like any other peacekeeping with time that has no clear mandate,” said Joseph Bahout, the director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy at the American University of Beirut. “They don’t have permission to inspect the area without coordinating with the Lebanese army.”

UNIFIL for years has urged Israel to withdraw from some territory north of the frontier, but to no avail. In the ongoing war, the peacekeeping mission has accused Israel, as well as Hezbollah, of obstructing and harming its forces and infrastructure.

Hezbollah’s power, meanwhile, has grown, both in its arsenal and as a political influence in the Lebanese state.

The Iran-backed group was essential in keeping Syrian President Bashar Assad in power when armed opposition groups tried to topple him, and it supports Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Yemen. It has an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, including precision-guided missiles pointed at Israel, and has introduced drones into its arsenal.

Hanna says Hezbollah “is something never seen before as a non-state actor” with political and military influence.

How do mediators hope to implement 1701 almost two decades later? Israel's security Cabinet approved the ceasefire agreement late Tuesday, according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office. The ceasefire began at 4 am local time Wednesday.

Efforts led by the US and France for the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah underscored that they still view the resolution as key. For almost a year, Washington has promoted various versions of a deal that would gradually lead to its full implementation.

International mediators hope that by boosting financial support for the Lebanese army — which was not a party in the Israel-Hezbollah war — Lebanon can deploy some 6,000 additional troops south of the Litani River to help enforce the resolution. Under the deal, an international monitoring committee headed by the United States would oversee implementation to ensure that Hezbollah and Israel’s withdrawals take place.

It is not entirely clear how the committee would work or how potential violations would be reported and dealt with.

The circumstances now are far more complicated than in 2006. Some are still skeptical of the resolution's viability given that the political realities and balance of power both regionally and within Lebanon have dramatically changed since then.

“You’re tying 1701 with a hundred things,” Bahout said. “A resolution is the reflection of a balance of power and political context.”

Now with the ceasefire in place, the hope is that Israel and Lebanon can begin negotiations to demarcate their land border and settle disputes over several points along the Blue Line for long-term security after decades of conflict and tension.