Ukraine Has an Array of New Western Weapons. What Advantages Could They Offer in a Counteroffensive?

A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)
A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)
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Ukraine Has an Array of New Western Weapons. What Advantages Could They Offer in a Counteroffensive?

A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)
A Ukrainian serviceman of 28th brigade shoots a Maxim gun towards Russian positions at the frontline in Donetsk region, Ukraine, Wednesday, June 21, 2023. (AP)

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine’s military was largely reliant on Soviet-era weaponry, from tanks to artillery to fighter jets.

While that arsenal helped Ukraine fend off an assault on the capital of Kyiv and prevent a total rout in the early weeks of the war, billions of dollars in military assistance has since poured into the country, including more modern Western-made weapons.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive, now in its early stages, could offer a glimpse of whether and to what extent the newer weapons systems have strengthened Kyiv’s ability to stand up to Russia.

Analysts are cautiously optimistic.

"Ukraine is in a much better position to be able to conduct a combined arms warfare than where they were in the beginning of Russia’s full-scale reinvasion of Ukraine," George Barros, a Russia analyst for the Center for Strategic International Studies said.

Here’s a look at some of the Western weapons sent to Ukraine and what advantages they might offer.

Striking targets

One sophisticated US-made rocket launcher sent to Ukraine has received a lot of attention — and for good reason: High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems gave Kyiv's forces the ability to hit targets farther away and with much greater accuracy than Soviet-designed ones.

In the fall counteroffensive, the HIMARS — which currently give troops the capability to strike a target up to 80 kilometers (50 miles) away and then quickly move on — were used to destroy bridges near the southern city of Kherson, cutting Russian troops off from one another and their supply routes.

Ukraine has since clamored for longer-range missiles that can also be launched by the HIMARS and could reach up to 300 kilometers (190 miles) away. But the U.S. and its allies have been reluctant to provide them.

However, Washington agreed in February to send Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, which have a range of 150 kilometers (90 miles) when fired by HIMARS, and the UK announced the delivery of Storm Shadow cruise missiles — with a range of 550 kilometers (340 miles).

Both weapons already have been spotted in combat, extending Ukraine’s reach.

Air defense

Throughout the war, Russia has rained missiles down on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure almost daily.

To defend against those barrages, the West has sent Ukraine the Patriot and the Avenger air defense systems.

At $4 million per round, Patriot missiles are meant to shield against larger ballistic missile attacks, leaving simpler weapons to deal with the cheap, slow-flying Iranian exploding drones often used by the Russians.

Even with these new air defense systems, Ukraine has struggled to protect its territory against daily Russian attacks.

Russia has relied on long-range ballistic and cruise missiles to strike targets deep in Ukraine, avoiding a risk to its warplanes after losing many of them in the initial stages of the invasion. Moscow’s failure to win control of Ukrainian airspace was one of the biggest surprises of the war.

Ukraine also has kept its much smaller air force made of Soviet-made Sukhoi and Mig-29 jets away from the front line and used them to launch missiles from large distances to minimize losses.

Ukraine long has pushed for Western jets, but their delivery isn’t expected any time soon.

"Ukraine would be a lot in a better position for a more decisive victory and success on a shorter timeline if we took these decisions a lot faster," Barros said.

Artillery

Long known as the "King of Battle," artillery systems are key in any war — but especially the one in Ukraine. Russian troops have dug themselves in throughout the south and east of the country. Driving them out will require significant artillery.

Artillery can take out buildings and enemy weapons from reasonable distances and cause such chaos that opposing troops are forced to withdraw. Ukrainian forces are making heavy use of artillery in the battles around Zaporizhzhia, where the beginnings of the counteroffensive are unfolding.

Ukraine had plenty of artillery to begin with — but now it has American M777s and German Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, both of which are more accurate and powerful than what it started the war with.

Tanks and armored vehicles

Ukraine needs the "punching force" of tanks and other fighting vehicles if it's going to break through Russian lines, Barros said.

Tanks delivered thus far — which include multiple models of German Leopards and the British Challengers — are more sophisticated than the Soviet-designed T-64 and T-72 tanks Ukraine relied on at the start of the invasion.

They also have far better armor and can strike more accurately than Russia's tanks, according to Craig Cartier, a retired Soviet Union analyst for the US with more than three decades of experience.

The US, meanwhile, has sent Bradley fighting vehicles, which offer better protection for troops they carry and have better firepower compared to Soviet-era armored vehicles that Ukraine has used.

All of these vehicles can inflict high casualties and destroy other weapons systems, making them invaluable for a counteroffensive.

Training

Perhaps most crucial to Ukraine’s success, however, has been the Ukrainians themselves. Both Barros and Cartier said the experience and training of Ukrainian troops, not just the weapons provided by the West, has made them a lethal force.

The Ukrainians "have demonstrated the ability to not only master the equipment and tactics, but to be able to do things nobody else has been able to do, as demonstrated by their (air defense) wizardry," Cartier said.

In the UK and Germany, in addition to other neighboring countries, Ukrainian forces have been trained on infantry tactics and on certain specialized equipment, such as the Challenger-2 tanks.

It's impossible to know how the counteroffensive will unfold, Barros said.

"What I will say is every single time that the Ukrainians have had an opportunity to demonstrate their fortitude and resolve on the battlefield, they’ve always outperformed expectations," he said.



ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.