‘Londonistan’: British Controversy over ‘Dialogue with Extremists’

Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
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‘Londonistan’: British Controversy over ‘Dialogue with Extremists’

Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)
Omar Bakri, accompanied by Abu Hamza al-Masri, delivers a speech at a conference held by a radical Islamic group. (Getty Images)

Over the years, these two men in the picture above have symbolized the transformation of the British capital into a stronghold for Islamic extremists in the 1990s. The first one, Abu Hamza al-Masri (on the right in the picture), is currently serving a life sentence in the US after being convicted of terrorism.

As for the other man, a Syrian called Omar Bakri, he too was imprisoned for years in Lebanon on terrorism charges. He was released from prison in March of last year.

Before these two men found themselves behind bars, they, along with others, formed, for nearly two decades, a face to what critics call “Londonistan.”

While there are those who would argue that this characterization is not entirely accurate and that London is, in fact, a successful British experiment in coexistence among different religions and cultures, what appears to be certain is that since the 1990s, the British capital has transformed into a hub where a wide mix of supporters of political Islam and groups self-described as “jihadist,” yet classified as terrorist or extremist by many governments, have become active.

This phenomenon began in the Arab world and later spread to Western countries themselves.

However, how did London transform into “Londonistan”? Was the British government aware of this shift towards radicalism taking place within its borders? Did it host Islamists as a tool to manipulate them in its dealings with Middle Eastern affairs, as some suggest? Or was it unaware of the severity of its extremist “guests” until later, after they had become entrenched and started engaging in acts of violence and terrorism in both their home countries and Western nations?

The issue is being brought to the forefront by Asharq Al-Awsat, which is releasing a series of formerly classified British government documents now accessible in the National Archives in London.

These documents unveil an internal debate that took place within the British government concerning the approach to dealing with Islamists in the early 1990s.

A faction within the government advocated dialogue with them, including the extremists, on the premise that engaging in conversation could potentially resolve any conflicts between the two sides, particularly as there was believed to be “no inherent clash between Western interests and Islam,” according to proponents of this viewpoint.

Conversely, another faction raised objections to this logic and contended that there was a deliberate effort by certain British officials to downplay the existing disparities with extremist Islamists.

They emphasized the need of considering Sudan and Iran as models when engaging with political Islamist factions, indicating that the ascension of Islamists to power would likely result in their refusal to relinquish it later on, as exemplified by the regime of President Omar al-Bashir following his military coup in Khartoum in 1989, and similarly by the Iranian Islamists led by Ayatollah Khomeini after toppling the Shah’s regime in Tehran in 1979.

This debate among British officials emerged in response to the civil strife that ensued in Algeria after the annulment of elections in January 1992, which the Islamists were on the verge of winning.

British authorities observed that supporters of the “Islamic Salvation Front,” the party that had been outlawed by Algerian authorities following the annulment of the elections, were beginning to seek visas to enter the United Kingdom, presumably with the intention of seeking political asylum. The UK embassy in Algeria was unsure of how to navigate this situation and therefore sought guidance from the Foreign Office in London.

Of particular note was the response from the Foreign Office, which indicated that only the British Home Secretary had the authority to prohibit specific individuals from entering the UK.

Additionally, any bans would need to be applied to individuals by name rather than organizations, as the Islamic Salvation Front was only banned in Algeria and not in Britain, at the time.

Internal British discussions also revealed that the London government instructed the embassy in Algeria not to share information derived from visa applications submitted by supporters of the group with European authorities.

However, the embassy was allowed to inform Europeans whether an individual had been accepted or rejected, on the condition that the information provided to European countries did not stem from the visa application documents themselves regarding the person's affiliation with the Islamic Salvation Front.

Impact of Islamic fundamentalism on British politics

The visa controversy sparked a larger debate about the boundaries of engagement with Islamists and their different factions. This discussion was captured in documents that recorded correspondence between British officials, responding to the findings of a workshop that tackled the subject. However, specific details about the workshop itself are not clarified in the documents.

The initial document that captured this debate was a cable from the UK’s Ambassador to Algeria Christopher Battiscombe (1990-1994) to Mark Elliott, the Deputy Foreign Office Undersecretary (later serving as an ambassador to Israel and Norway), dated November 3, 1992.

The cable from Battiscombe prompted an extensive reply from Basil Eastwood, the then Director of the Research and Analysis Department at the Foreign Office. Eastwood penned a two-page letter to Mark Elliott, a Foreign Office official, on November 9, with the subject line: Political Islam.

In response to the discussions surrounding political Islam and the handling of extremists, Eastwood issued an “apology.”

This apology was prompted by the exchanges between Battiscombe in Algeria and the Foreign Office in London. On November 10, 1992, Elliott sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Algeria.

Amid the debate surrounding political Islam, British government documents reveal a discussion about arranging a meeting with an Algerian Islamist leader who had fled his country following the annulment of elections and became a representative of the Islamic Salvation Front in exile.

The controversy surrounding such a meeting, requested by Anwar Haddam, one of the elected deputies of the Islamic Salvation Front in the canceled 1992 elections, stems from the fact that the party was banned in Algeria on the grounds of its involvement in terrorism.

A meeting between a representative of a “terrorist” party and the British government could potentially trigger a crisis with the Algerian government, which held Britain accountable for hosting extremist Islamists and opening its doors to them.

In a letter dated October 12, 1992, F.G. Martin from the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office wrote a message to Mr. Richmond, another official in the same department, referring to receiving a request to arrange a meeting with Haddam.



Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
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Will Israel’s Interceptors Outlast Iran’s Missiles?

The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)
The Israeli Iron Dome air defense system fires to intercept missiles during an Iranian attack over Tel Aviv, Israel, early Wednesday, June 18, 2025. (AP Photo/Leo Correa)

Israel has a world-leading missile interception system but its bank of interceptors is finite. Now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them.

On Thursday, The New York Times reporters spoke to current and former Israeli officials about the strengths and weaknesses of Israeli air defense.

Aside from a potentially game-changing US intervention that shapes the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, two factors will help decide the length of the Israel-Iran war: Israel’s reserve of missile interceptors and Iran’s stock of long-range missiles.

Since Iran started retaliating against Israel’s fire last week, Israel’s world-leading air defense system has intercepted most incoming Iranian ballistic missiles, giving the Israeli Air Force more time to strike Iran without incurring major losses at home.

But now, as the war drags on, Israel is firing interceptors faster than it can produce them. That has raised questions within the Israeli security establishment about whether the country will run low on air defense missiles before Iran uses up its ballistic arsenal, according to eight current and former officials.

Already, Israel’s military has had to conserve its use of interceptors and is giving greater priority to the defense of densely populated areas and strategic infrastructure, according to the officials. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak more freely.

Interceptors are “not grains of rice,” said Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, who commanded Israel’s air defense system until 2021 and still serves in the military reserve. “The number is finite.”

“If a missile is supposed to hit refineries in Haifa, it’s clear that it’s more important to intercept that missile than one that will hit the Negev desert,” General Kochav said.

Conserving Israel’s interceptors is “a challenge,” he added. “We can make it, but it’s a challenge.”

Asked for comment on the limits of its interceptor arsenal, the Israeli military said in a brief statement that it “is prepared and ready to handle any scenario and is operating defensively and offensively to remove threats to Israeli civilians.”

No Israeli official would divulge the number of interceptors left at Israel’s disposal; the revelation of such a closely guarded secret could give Iran a military advantage.

The answer will affect Israel’s ability to sustain a long-term, attritional war. The nature of the war will partly be decided by whether Trump decides to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear enrichment site at Fordo, in northern Iran, or whether Iran decides to give up its enrichment program to prevent such an intervention.

But the war’s endgame will also be shaped by how long both sides can sustain the damage to their economies, as well as the damage to national morale caused by a growing civilian death toll.

Israel relies on at least seven kinds of air defense. Most of them involve automated systems that use radar to detect incoming missiles and then provide officers with suggestions of how to intercept them.

Military officials have seconds to react to some short-range fire, but minutes to judge the response to long-range attacks. At times, the automated systems do not offer recommendations, leaving officers to make decisions on their own, General Kochav said.

The Arrow system intercepts long-range missiles at higher altitudes; the David’s Sling system intercepts them at lower altitudes; while the Iron Dome takes out shorter-range rockets, usually fired from Gaza, or the fragments of missiles already intercepted by other defense systems.

The United States has supplied at least two more defense systems, some of them fired from ships in the Mediterranean, and Israel is also trying out a new and relatively untested laser beam. Finally, fighter jets are deployed to shoot down slow-moving drones.

Some Israelis feel it is time to wrap up the war before Israel’s defenses are tested too severely.

At least 24 civilians have been killed by Iran’s strikes, and more than 800 have been injured. Some key infrastructure, including oil refineries in northern Israel, has been hit, along with civilian homes. A hospital in southern Israel was struck on Thursday morning.

Already high by Israeli standards, the death toll could rise sharply if the Israeli military is forced to limit its general use of interceptors in order to guarantee the long-term protection of a few strategic sites like the Dimona nuclear reactor in southern Israel or the military headquarters in Tel Aviv.

“Now that Israel has succeeded in striking most of its nuclear targets in Iran, Israel has a window of two or three days to declare the victory and end the war,” said Zohar Palti, a former senior officer in the Mossad, Israel’s spy agency.

“When planning how to defend Israel in future wars, no one envisaged a scenario in which we would be fighting on so many fronts and defending against so many rounds of ballistic missiles,” said Palti, who was for years involved in Israel’s defensive planning.

Others are confident that Israel will be able to solve the problem by destroying most of Iran’s missile launchers, preventing the Iranian military from using the stocks that it still has.

Iran has both fixed and mobile launchers, scattered across its territory, according to two Israeli officials. Some of its missiles are stored underground, where they are harder to destroy, while others are in aboveground caches, the officials said.

The Israeli military says it has destroyed more than a third of the launchers. Officials and experts say that has already limited the number of missiles that Iran can fire in a single attack.

US officials said Israel’s strikes against the launchers have decimated Iran’s ability to fire its missiles and hurt its ability to create large-scale barrages.

“The real issue is the number of launchers, more than the number of missiles,” said Asaf Cohen, a former Israeli commander who led the Iran department in Israel’s military intelligence directorate.

“The more of them that are hit, the harder it will be for them to launch barrages,” Cohen added. “If they realize they have a problem with launch capacity, they’ll shift to harassment: one or two missiles every so often, aimed at two different areas simultaneously.”

The New York Times