In the midst of Britain’s deliberations on handling and integrating radical Islamists, as well as analyzing the “confessions” of those involved in terrorist bombings to determine whether they were extracted under torture or not, Algeria stood as an indisputable witness to a protracted and violent period, commencing in the early 1990s, ultimately being known as the “Black Decade.”
Daily, news of bombings and assassinations carried out by armed groups against security forces, particularly targeting intellectuals, journalists, and unionists perceived as supporting the Algerian government, continued to unfold.
Supporters of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), the Islamic party on the verge of winning power before the cancellation of elections in January 1992, were responsible for much of the violence, as was the case with the bombing of Houari Boumediene Airport in the Algerian capital in August of that year.
However, there were also other armed groups that adopted far more extremist positions than the ISF and carried out some of the most heinous acts of violence witnessed during that era.
One prominent group at the time was the Armed Islamic Group, which later succeeded in unifying a portion of the ISF and other factions under its banner within the framework of what was known as the “Unity Meeting” in 1994.
Amid the near-daily assassinations and bombings, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of a “civil war.”
There was also a growing impression that radical Islamists could succeed in seizing power and overthrowing the government, which was supported by the military and assumed control following the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid at that time.
That was largely the image that Algeria projected at the time, at least in many international media outlets.
However, it was a false image, as confirmed by the British Ambassador to Algeria, Christopher Battiscombe.
The ambassador acknowledged, in correspondence with the Foreign Office in London (preserved in the British National Archives), that Algeria was indeed witnessing bloody violence but also spoke of the “ordinary life” being experienced in the Algerian capital.
He added that the “civil war” being discussed was still “very much distant” from the reality on the ground.
In addition to the security situation, the ambassador’s correspondences also reveal that the British appeared to be “reserved” in the face of French pressure to provide financial assistance to the Algerian government.
As is well-known, the Algerian authorities were in desperate need of such aid at the time, whether for financing their war against armed groups or for launching projects that could satisfy segments of the population who might be swayed by Islamists in light of the deteriorating conditions in the country.
On March 1, 1993, Battiscombe wrote a letter to the Middle East and North Africa Department at the Foreign Office in London, stating that the ambassador largely agreed with what was stated in a previous letter from the department regarding the security situation in Algeria.
In the correspondence, Battiscombe stated that the level of terrorist events has largely remained unchanged over the past 12 months, with a steady stream of minor attacks, assassinations of policemen, and bombings in public places.
According to Battiscombe, the attacks were occasionally punctuated by significant incidents such as the airport bombing in August, the ambush in which 5 policemen were killed in December, the killing of 4 other policemen in a gun attack in the capital, and the failed assassination attempt against the then Minister of Defense.
Battiscombe highly doubted whether Algerian authorities can ever put an end to such incidents, much more than the British security forces can prevent terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Army in the UK.
However, while the security situation in Algeria seemed to be heading towards complete chaos, it now appears to me that the terrorists will not succeed in turning Algeria into an ungovernable country or forcing the government to make a radical change in its course, noted Battiscombe.
The ambassador added that despite the continued curfews and the presence of checkpoints guarded by visibly concerned police officers, he believed that most visitors to the Algerian capital are surprised by the generally normal life there.
“We are certainly still far away from the civil war that is often written about in Western media analyses,” wrote Battiscombe.
As for French pressure to provide financial assistance to the Algerian government, it is worth noting here that the European Currency Unit (ECU) was the currency unit used in Europe at that time before the adoption of the “Euro” and the transformation of the European Group into the EU.
The Fourth Protocol of the European Group (covering the period from 1992 to 1996) called for a more generous treatment towards Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.
The protocol increased the European Group’s spending by 28% compared to the Third Protocol and provided funding for projects carried out by Algeria and its partners in the Arab Maghreb Union.
The Fourth Protocol also allowed Algeria to access larger loans and draw on allocations of 70 million European currency units, compared to 54 million units in the Third Protocol. This move coincided with a parallel effort by the World Bank, which increased its assistance to Algeria as part of an economic reform program.
The actual reason for the British reservations regarding the French initiative to provide European financial assistance to Algeria remained unclear.
However, it is known that at that time, radical Islamists accused European countries that supported the Algerian government of backing “military rule” in their country.
Extremists also issued threats of retaliation against countries that provided aid to the Algerian authorities, which may have raised concerns among some nations that feared their assistance to Algeria could lead to extremist attacks on their interests or citizens.
