Shalgham: Gaddafi Believed Saddam Paid Price for His Actions, Squandered Iraq’s Resources

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Shalgham: Gaddafi Believed Saddam Paid Price for His Actions, Squandered Iraq’s Resources

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, notable politician, and renowned Libyan writer, held significant positions within the Libyan government alongside Muammar Gaddafi.

He transitioned from being responsible for media affairs in the Revolutionary Leadership Council to serving as his country’s ambassador to Rome for an extended period.

Later, he assumed the role of Foreign Minister, ultimately representing Libya at the UN in the period leading up to the fall of the Gaddafi regime.

Shalgham remained close to Gaddafi, defending him until the surge of protests against his regime erupted. During this time, Shalgham publicly declared his refusal to suppress the protests through force.

Moreover, the former top diplomat had conceded to international UN resolution number 1970, imposing sanctions on Libya, a decision he described as contributing to the dismantling of the “fascist regime” in Tripoli.

In excerpts from a forthcoming memoir titled “Years of My Life: Memoirs,” Shalgham delves into various stages of his relationship and proximity to Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader.

Shalgham does not conceal his admiration for Gaddafi’s persona and addresses two events that he asserts had the most significant impact on Gaddafi.

The first event is US-led airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in response to the 1988 bombing of the US plane over the Scottish town of Lockerbie.

The second event is the US invasion of Iraq, which heightened Gaddafi’s concerns that the aftermath of the invasion might extend to other Arab regimes, with the aim of forcibly altering them.

Shalgham also conveys Gaddafi’s opinion on the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, quoting Gaddafi as saying that Saddam was more interested in his personal glory than in Iraq’s reputation.

Shalgham’s recollections provide an insightful glimpse into the dynamics of these critical historical moments and sheds light on the perspectives of both Shalgham and Gaddafi.

The memoir is set to be published by Dar Al-Farjani.

Say what you will about Gaddafi; you are free to critique his personality through speech, political commentary, or ideological discourse. However, it is undeniable that he was a first-rate reader and a meticulous student of what he read, carefully selecting his books.

He delved into Niccolò Machiavelli’s “The Prince” early on and kept it as a constant companion throughout his life. Similarly, he engaged with Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Mao Zedong’s “The Little Red Book,” in addition to Ibn Khaldun’s “Muqaddimah.” He also explored works of both ancient and modern history.

In his own “Green Book,” Gaddafi did not directly quote or rely on these texts or anyone else for that matter in its composition. Instead, he conceived the idea of creating a book to encapsulate his thoughts, titling it “The Third Universal Theory” in green ink, amid the backdrop of the events he experienced.

In 1982, Eng. Ibrahim Ali informed Shalgham that Gaddafi intended to establish an extensive library within the leadership and sought his collaboration in selecting titles. When Shalgham met with Ali, he sought specific topics that Gaddafi wished to explore.

Shalgham expressed his belief that Gaddafi likely did not have the time to read complete volumes, so it would be prudent to select books dealing with contemporary subjects, especially in social, political, religious, philosophical, and economic realms.

Shalgham also did not neglect historical works, given Gaddafi’s passion and deep dive into history.

The former minister then commenced with compiling indices of modern Arabic publications and selected a multitude of titles spanning various subjects.

Afterwards, Shalgham presented these selections to Ali who conveyed his gratitude and appreciation. He then initiated communication with relevant sources to acquire the requested books.

The library became a favored retreat for Gaddafi, where he spent extended periods of time.

Within its walls, he received guests, conducted meetings, and seized moments to read various books.

Shalgham recalls numerous instances when Gaddafi engaged him in conversations about certain Arab books and authors, particularly highlighting Moroccan scholar Abdullah al-Arwi, who authored several works, as well as Tunisian thinker Abdelmajid Sharfi and Iraqi intellectual Ali al-Wardi, among others.

In Shalgham’s estimation, Gaddafi experienced moments of cultural restlessness. He displayed a proclivity for reading and exploring modern Arab and foreign intellectual publications.

However, the rigors of politics and both domestic and foreign crises often disrupted his ability to dedicate time to reading.

Despite this, Gaddafi, the intellectual, differed from the revolutionary and politician. He exhibited a strong sense of democracy and openness in his intellectual conversations and debates. He was keen on absorbing any piece of information he had not encountered before, often recording it in his memoir.

There were occasions when Shalgham was summoned for political matters, finding him initially agitated and emotional. Yet, as soon as the discourse veered into a realm of thought or literature, particularly poetry and philosophy, Gaddafi transformed into a calm, engaged conversationalist, often evolving into an inquirer.

Gaddafi, Saddam & Iraq’s Invasion

Following the US invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam and his Baathist regime, Gaddafi grappled with a range of emotions and concerns.

He wasn't remorseful for Saddam and his regime, but his question was whether what occurred would be an exceptional US strike or if it would pave the way for a policy of forcibly changing regimes. During the Arab Summit held in Damascus in 2008, Gaddafi addressed the gathering by stating: “The US invaded Iraq, executed its president, and we watched. The turn will come to all of you.”

Amid the tumultuous events in Iraq, Shalgham met with Gaddafi. He had his hand on his cheek, pondering numerous questions about the stances of Arab and foreign nations in light of the unfolding situation in Iraq.

During Shalgham’s conversation with Gaddafi, the Libyan leader remarked: “Saddam didn't work for Iraq, but rather harnessed his country's resources for his personal glory.”

“He engaged in futile battles with the Kurds and with Iran, and his invasion of Kuwait cost the lives of hundreds of Iraqis and squandered the immense resources of Iraq,” Gaddafi continued.

He emphasized that there was “no benefit in engaging in political clashes with anyone over what happened. Saddam paid the price for his reckless actions.”

This event deeply shook Gaddafi and prompted him to reexamine his policies and orientations, according to Shalgham.

For the first time, Shalgham heard from Gaddafi a phrase that he had carefully crafted in an intense question that echoed through the walls of the past, casting a massive stone into a lake where tributaries had flowed for years, filled with verbal, political, and military confrontation with the US.

“I don't know what led us to enter into a fierce and prolonged animosity and conflict with the US,” wondered Gaddafi.

Of course, Shalgham did not voice the answer he knew. Gaddafi understood more than anyone else the driving force that led him to engage in battles, both near and far, with the US, regardless of its Republican or Democratic leadership changes.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.