Shalgham: Gaddafi Believed Saddam Paid Price for His Actions, Squandered Iraq’s Resources

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Shalgham: Gaddafi Believed Saddam Paid Price for His Actions, Squandered Iraq’s Resources

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the former Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, notable politician, and renowned Libyan writer, held significant positions within the Libyan government alongside Muammar Gaddafi.

He transitioned from being responsible for media affairs in the Revolutionary Leadership Council to serving as his country’s ambassador to Rome for an extended period.

Later, he assumed the role of Foreign Minister, ultimately representing Libya at the UN in the period leading up to the fall of the Gaddafi regime.

Shalgham remained close to Gaddafi, defending him until the surge of protests against his regime erupted. During this time, Shalgham publicly declared his refusal to suppress the protests through force.

Moreover, the former top diplomat had conceded to international UN resolution number 1970, imposing sanctions on Libya, a decision he described as contributing to the dismantling of the “fascist regime” in Tripoli.

In excerpts from a forthcoming memoir titled “Years of My Life: Memoirs,” Shalgham delves into various stages of his relationship and proximity to Gaddafi, the former Libyan leader.

Shalgham does not conceal his admiration for Gaddafi’s persona and addresses two events that he asserts had the most significant impact on Gaddafi.

The first event is US-led airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in response to the 1988 bombing of the US plane over the Scottish town of Lockerbie.

The second event is the US invasion of Iraq, which heightened Gaddafi’s concerns that the aftermath of the invasion might extend to other Arab regimes, with the aim of forcibly altering them.

Shalgham also conveys Gaddafi’s opinion on the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, quoting Gaddafi as saying that Saddam was more interested in his personal glory than in Iraq’s reputation.

Shalgham’s recollections provide an insightful glimpse into the dynamics of these critical historical moments and sheds light on the perspectives of both Shalgham and Gaddafi.

The memoir is set to be published by Dar Al-Farjani.

Say what you will about Gaddafi; you are free to critique his personality through speech, political commentary, or ideological discourse. However, it is undeniable that he was a first-rate reader and a meticulous student of what he read, carefully selecting his books.

He delved into Niccolò Machiavelli’s “The Prince” early on and kept it as a constant companion throughout his life. Similarly, he engaged with Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” and Mao Zedong’s “The Little Red Book,” in addition to Ibn Khaldun’s “Muqaddimah.” He also explored works of both ancient and modern history.

In his own “Green Book,” Gaddafi did not directly quote or rely on these texts or anyone else for that matter in its composition. Instead, he conceived the idea of creating a book to encapsulate his thoughts, titling it “The Third Universal Theory” in green ink, amid the backdrop of the events he experienced.

In 1982, Eng. Ibrahim Ali informed Shalgham that Gaddafi intended to establish an extensive library within the leadership and sought his collaboration in selecting titles. When Shalgham met with Ali, he sought specific topics that Gaddafi wished to explore.

Shalgham expressed his belief that Gaddafi likely did not have the time to read complete volumes, so it would be prudent to select books dealing with contemporary subjects, especially in social, political, religious, philosophical, and economic realms.

Shalgham also did not neglect historical works, given Gaddafi’s passion and deep dive into history.

The former minister then commenced with compiling indices of modern Arabic publications and selected a multitude of titles spanning various subjects.

Afterwards, Shalgham presented these selections to Ali who conveyed his gratitude and appreciation. He then initiated communication with relevant sources to acquire the requested books.

The library became a favored retreat for Gaddafi, where he spent extended periods of time.

Within its walls, he received guests, conducted meetings, and seized moments to read various books.

Shalgham recalls numerous instances when Gaddafi engaged him in conversations about certain Arab books and authors, particularly highlighting Moroccan scholar Abdullah al-Arwi, who authored several works, as well as Tunisian thinker Abdelmajid Sharfi and Iraqi intellectual Ali al-Wardi, among others.

In Shalgham’s estimation, Gaddafi experienced moments of cultural restlessness. He displayed a proclivity for reading and exploring modern Arab and foreign intellectual publications.

However, the rigors of politics and both domestic and foreign crises often disrupted his ability to dedicate time to reading.

Despite this, Gaddafi, the intellectual, differed from the revolutionary and politician. He exhibited a strong sense of democracy and openness in his intellectual conversations and debates. He was keen on absorbing any piece of information he had not encountered before, often recording it in his memoir.

There were occasions when Shalgham was summoned for political matters, finding him initially agitated and emotional. Yet, as soon as the discourse veered into a realm of thought or literature, particularly poetry and philosophy, Gaddafi transformed into a calm, engaged conversationalist, often evolving into an inquirer.

Gaddafi, Saddam & Iraq’s Invasion

Following the US invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam and his Baathist regime, Gaddafi grappled with a range of emotions and concerns.

He wasn't remorseful for Saddam and his regime, but his question was whether what occurred would be an exceptional US strike or if it would pave the way for a policy of forcibly changing regimes. During the Arab Summit held in Damascus in 2008, Gaddafi addressed the gathering by stating: “The US invaded Iraq, executed its president, and we watched. The turn will come to all of you.”

Amid the tumultuous events in Iraq, Shalgham met with Gaddafi. He had his hand on his cheek, pondering numerous questions about the stances of Arab and foreign nations in light of the unfolding situation in Iraq.

During Shalgham’s conversation with Gaddafi, the Libyan leader remarked: “Saddam didn't work for Iraq, but rather harnessed his country's resources for his personal glory.”

“He engaged in futile battles with the Kurds and with Iran, and his invasion of Kuwait cost the lives of hundreds of Iraqis and squandered the immense resources of Iraq,” Gaddafi continued.

He emphasized that there was “no benefit in engaging in political clashes with anyone over what happened. Saddam paid the price for his reckless actions.”

This event deeply shook Gaddafi and prompted him to reexamine his policies and orientations, according to Shalgham.

For the first time, Shalgham heard from Gaddafi a phrase that he had carefully crafted in an intense question that echoed through the walls of the past, casting a massive stone into a lake where tributaries had flowed for years, filled with verbal, political, and military confrontation with the US.

“I don't know what led us to enter into a fierce and prolonged animosity and conflict with the US,” wondered Gaddafi.

Of course, Shalgham did not voice the answer he knew. Gaddafi understood more than anyone else the driving force that led him to engage in battles, both near and far, with the US, regardless of its Republican or Democratic leadership changes.



India and Pakistan Don’t Fight Wars Like Other Countries. Here’s Why 

This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)
This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)
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India and Pakistan Don’t Fight Wars Like Other Countries. Here’s Why 

This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)
This photograph taken on May 9, 2025 shows the Neelum River flowing through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (AFP)

India and Pakistan have fought three full-scale wars since they gained independence from Britain in 1947. They’ve also had dozens of skirmishes and conflicts, including one atop a glacier dubbed the coldest and highest-altitude battlefield in the world.

The latest escalation follows a deadly gun attack on tourists that India blames Pakistan for — Islamabad denies any connection. But they don’t fight wars like other countries.

The dominant factor is their nuclear weapons arsenal, a distinct way of deterring major attacks and a guarantee that fighting doesn’t get out of hand, even when the situation is spiraling.

Here’s how — and why — India and Pakistan fight the way they do:

Their nuclear arsenals can destroy each other “Pakistan and India have enough nuclear weapons to wipe the other side out several times over,” says security analyst Syed Mohammed Ali, who is based in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. “Their nuclear weapons create a scenario for mutually assured destruction.”

Both countries have “deliberately developed” the size and range of their stockpile to remind the other about the guarantee of mutually assured destruction, he adds.

Neither country discloses their nuclear capabilities but each is thought to have between 170 and 180 warheads that are short-, long- and medium-range. Both countries have different delivery systems — ways of launching and propelling these weapons to their targets.

The arsenals are a defensive move to prevent and deter further fighting, because “neither side can afford to initiate such a war or hope to achieve anything from it,” Ali says.

It might not look this way to the outsider, but nuclear weapons are a reminder to the other side that they can't take things too far.

But the secrecy around their arsenals means that it's unclear if Pakistan or India can survive a first nuclear strike and retaliate, something called “second-strike capability.”

This capacity stops an opponent from attempting to win a nuclear war through a first strike by preventing aggression that could lead to nuclear escalation.

Without this capability, there is, in theory, nothing to stop one side from launching a warhead at the other.

Kashmir at the crux of the dispute India and Pakistan have each laid claim to Kashmir since 1947, when both gained independence, and border skirmishes have created instability in the region for decades. Each country controls a part of Kashmir, which is divided by a heavily militarized border.

The two archrivals have also fought two of their three wars over Kashmir — a disputed Himalayan region divided between the them where armed insurgents resist Indian rule. Many Muslim Kashmiris support the rebels’ goal of uniting the territory, either under Pakistani rule or as an independent country.

Border flare-ups and militant attacks in India-controlled Kashmir have prompted New Delhi to take an increasingly tough position on Islamabad, accusing it of “terrorism.”

In the latest conflict, India punished Pakistan by hitting what it said were sites used by Pakistan-backed militants linked to a gun massacre last month.

A conventional military imbalance India is one of the biggest defense spenders in the world, with $74.4 billion in 2025, according to the Military Balance report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It’s also one of the world’s largest arms importers.

Pakistan is no slouch, spending $10 billion last year, but it can never match India’s deep pockets. India also has more than double the number of active armed forces personnel than Pakistan does.

While India’s armed forces are traditionally focused on Pakistan, it has another nuclear neighbor to contend with, China, and it is increasingly concerned with maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Those are two factors that Pakistan doesn’t have to consider in its security paradigm.

Pakistan's long and narrow shape, together with the outsized role of the military in foreign policy, makes it easier to move the armed forces around and prioritize defense.

A pattern of escalation and defusing Neither Pakistan or India are in a hurry to announce their military moves against the other and, as seen in the current flare-up of hostilities, it can take a while for confirmation of strikes and retaliation to surface.

But both launch operations into territories and airspace controlled by the other. Sometimes these are intended to damage checkpoints, installations, or sites allegedly used by militants.

They are also aimed at embarrassing or provoking — forcing leaders to bow to public pressure and respond, with the potential for miscalculation.

Many of these activities originate along the Line of Control, which divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan. It's largely inaccessible to the media and public, making it hard to independently verify claims of an attack or retaliation.

Such incidents raise international alarm, because both countries have nuclear capabilities, forcing attention back to India and Pakistan and, eventually, their competing claims over Kashmir.

The fear of nuclear war has put the two countries at the top of the agenda, competing with the papal conclave, US President Donald Trump’s policies, and the Sean “Diddy” Combs trial in the news cycle.

No desire for conquest, influence or resources Pakistan and India’s battles and skirmishes are away from the public eye.

Strikes and retaliation are late at night or early in the morning and, with the exception of the drone attacks on Thursday, they mostly take place away from densely populated urban centers. It shows that neither country has the desire to significantly harm the other’s population. Attacks are either described as surgical or limited.

Neither country is motivated by competition for resources. Pakistan has huge mineral wealth, but India isn't interested in these and, while there are stark ideological differences between Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, they don’t seek control or influence over the other.

Other than Kashmir, they have no interest in claiming the other’s territory or exercising dominance.