In Iran, Snap Checkpoints and University Purges Mark the First Anniversary of Mahsa Amini Protests 

A graffiti against the government which is painted over in black is seen on the wall at a park in Tehran, Iran, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023. (AP)
A graffiti against the government which is painted over in black is seen on the wall at a park in Tehran, Iran, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023. (AP)
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In Iran, Snap Checkpoints and University Purges Mark the First Anniversary of Mahsa Amini Protests 

A graffiti against the government which is painted over in black is seen on the wall at a park in Tehran, Iran, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023. (AP)
A graffiti against the government which is painted over in black is seen on the wall at a park in Tehran, Iran, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023. (AP)

Snap checkpoints. Internet disruptions. University purges.

Iran's theocracy is trying hard to both ignore the upcoming anniversary of nationwide protests over the country's mandatory headscarf law and tamp down on any possibility of more unrest.

Yet the Sept. 16 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini still reverberates across Iran. Some women are choosing to go without the headscarf, or hijab, despite an increasing crackdown by authorities.

Graffiti, likely against Iran's government, is rapidly painted over in black by Tehran's municipal workers. University professors have been fired over their apparent support for demonstrators.

International pressure remains high on Iran, even as the administration tries to deescalate tensions with other nations in the region and the West after years of confrontation.

“The weaponization of ‘public morals’ to deny women and girls their freedom of expression is deeply disempowering and will entrench and expand gender discrimination and marginalization,” independent United Nations experts warned earlier this month.

The demonstrations over Amini's death that erupted after her arrest a year ago by the country's morality police, allegedly over the hijab, represented one of the largest challenges to Iran's theocracy since the 1979 revolution. A security force crackdown that followed saw over 500 people killed and more than 22,000 people detained.

Iran's government, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have blamed the West for fomenting the unrest, without offering evidence to support the allegation. However, the protests found fuel in the widespread economic pain that Iran's 80 million people have faced since the collapse of Iran's nuclear deal with world powers after then-President Donald Trump in 2018 unilaterally pulled America from the accord.

As Western sanctions came back, Iran currency — the rial — cratered, decimating people's lifesavings. Prices of food and other essentials skyrocketed as inflation gripped the nation, in part due to worldwide pressures following the coronavirus pandemic and the launch of Russia's war on Ukraine. Unemployment officially stands at 8% overall, though one out of every five young Iranians is out of work.

Videos of the demonstrations last year showed many young people taking part in the protests, leading authorities to apparently focus more closely on Iran's universities in recent weeks. There's historic precedence for the concerns: In 1999, student-led protests swept Tehran and at least three people were killed while 1,200 were detained as demonstrations rapidly spread to other cities.

Though university campuses have largely remained one of the few safe places for students to demonstrate, even campuses have felt the latest crackdown. Over the past year, the Union Council of Iranian Students has said that hundreds of students faced disciplinary panels at their universities over the protests.

During the same period, at least 110 university professors and lecturers have been fired or temporarily suspended, according to a report by the reformist newspaper Etemad. The firings have been primarily focused at schools in Tehran, including Tehran Azad University, Tehran University and Tehran Medical University.

Etemad said those who were dismissed fell into two groups: teachers concerned by the election of hard-line President Ebrahim Raisi and those who supported the protests that followed Amini's death.

But there were firings at other schools as well.

At Tehran’s Sharif University of Technology, outspoken artificial intelligence and bioinformatics professor Ali Sharifi Zarchi, who backed his students taking part in the protests and later faced interrogation by Iranian security forces, was among those laid off.

A petition urging the university to overturn his firing was signed by 15,000 people.

“Putting pressure on professors and students is a black stain on the proud history of #Tehran_University and it must be stopped,” Zarchi wrote online before his dismissal.

University teachers who were dismissed also included Hossein Alaei, a former commander in the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard and vice defense minister, and Reza Salehi Amiri, a former culture minister. Alaei had once, a decade ago, compared Khamenei to Iran's former shah, while Amiri was a former official in the administration of the relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani.

Rouhani, whose government reached the nuclear deal with world powers in 2015, has criticized the university firings.

“Destroying the prestige of the universities and their professors ... is a loss for the students, science and the country,” Rouhani said, according to a report by the online news site Jamaran.

The head of Tehran University, Mohammad Moghimi, had tried to defend the dismissals, describing professors as facing “ethics problems.” Some hard-liners also have tried to insist the firings weren't political, though the hard-line newspaper Kayhan directly linked the dismissals to the demonstrations.

“It is not logical to allow someone to propagate against the system under the direction of foreigners,” the newspaper wrote.

Those on the streets of Tehran say the governments' move will likely make the situation worse.

“They want to insert their own people in the university in hope of stopping the protest, but we students will show our objections in a way that they cannot imagine,” said Shima, a 21-year-old university student. “They failed to prevent last year's protests since nobody can predict earthquakes.”

Authorities “are fighting against windmills using wooden swords,” added Farnaz, a 27-year-old university student. Both women gave just their first name for fear of reprisals.

The government has been trying to stay publicly quiet about the anniversary. Raisi never said Amini's name during a recent news conference with journalists — who also only tangentially referred to the demonstrations. State-run and semiofficial media in Iran as well have avoided mentioning the anniversary, which typically signals pressure from the government.

But privately, activists report a rise in the number of people being questioned and detained by security forces, including an uncle of Amini.

Saleh Nikbakht, a lawyer for Amini's family, faces a court case accusing him of spreading “propaganda” over his interviews with foreign media.

More police officers have been noticed on Tehran's streets in recent days, including snap checkpoints for those riding on motorcycles in the country's capital. Internet access has been noticeably disrupted over recent days, according to the advocacy group NetBlocks.

And abroad, Iranian state media reported that someone set tires ablaze in front of the Iranian Embassy in Paris over the weekend. Demonstrations marking the anniversary on Saturday are planned in multiple cities abroad.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.