Iran Steps up Internet Crackdown One Year After Mahsa Amini Death 

A woman speaks on a cell phone while a man next to her browses a phone along a street in Tehran on September 4, 2023. (AFP)
A woman speaks on a cell phone while a man next to her browses a phone along a street in Tehran on September 4, 2023. (AFP)
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Iran Steps up Internet Crackdown One Year After Mahsa Amini Death 

A woman speaks on a cell phone while a man next to her browses a phone along a street in Tehran on September 4, 2023. (AFP)
A woman speaks on a cell phone while a man next to her browses a phone along a street in Tehran on September 4, 2023. (AFP)

One year after young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini died in police custody while under arrest for improper hijab, Iran has stepped up internet restrictions to stop a resurgence of the widespread mass protests that swept the country last year.

Ahead of the Sept. 16 anniversary of Amini's death, days before her 22nd birthday, government opponents say Iran is conducting a wide-ranging crackdown to stifle possible dissent.

At least 22,000 were arrested in the protests and seven people executed. The demonstrations - the biggest and most widespread since the 1979 revolution - were sparked after images spread on social media of Amini lying unconscious in a hospital bed following her arrest.

Now Iran is doing everything it can to prevent the same thing happening again, rights groups and activists say.

As well as blocking thousands of websites, Iran regularly shuts down the internet altogether, or imposes "digital curfews" - stopping access in the evening when protests are more likely. It also blocks messaging apps and has criminalized virtual private networks (VPNs) used to get around the curbs.

Iran ranked third globally in the number of times it shut down the internet last year, according to digital rights group Access Now.

This included shutting down mobile networks, both nationally and in targeted areas, while also blocking access to Instagram and WhatsApp, the only two major platforms not already subject to outright bans, Access Now said.

"Internet shutdowns violate human rights," said Access Now policy and advocacy manager Marwa Fatafta. "They are a disproportionate and a draconian attack on human rights, implemented by governments in order to keep people in the dark, stop information flows, hide atrocities and human rights abuses, and consequently shield authorities from accountability."

Minorities targeted

Internet access has never been as bad in Iran, said Amir Rashidi, director of digital rights and security at Miaan, a Texas-based group that advocates for human rights in Iran.

That is true especially, he said, in regions where most belong to one of Iran's ethnic and religious minorities, which saw some of the most virulent protests and violent crackdowns.

These include Kurdistan in the west, where Amini lived and was buried, Khuzestan in the southwest, home to many Iranian Arabs, and the province of Sistan and Baluchistan in the southeast, where many belong to the Baluch ethnic minority.

Rights groups say police fired from rooftops near the main mosque in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan and Baluchistan, and killed up to 96 people as they protested after Friday prayers on Sept. 30 last year. But weekly protests have continued.

"Authorities have been shutting down the internet every week during Friday prayers in Sistan and Baluchistan and its capital Zahedan at a specific time for a year," Rashidi told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

Internet shutdowns have economic costs

Already struggling with international sanctions, high inflation and unemployment, internet shutdowns cost Iran an additional $773 million last year, digital privacy research group TOP10VPN estimated.

The impact is felt by small businesses across the country.

"We haven't had one day without the internet causing some sort of problem. It's impossible to have a normal life in these conditions," said Saeed Souzangar, who said he was struggling to keep his Tehran technology company afloat.

"I had to sell my house and my car just to keep the office lights on," he said.

VPNs are vital for Iranians to connect to social media and communications apps. A member of parliament said last month that around 80% of Iranians used VPNs to bypass censorship.

A 30-year-old web designer in Tehran said not having access to VPNs would have serious financial consequences. Without them, she is unable to work or study, she said.

"It would mean more isolation, more living in darkness," said the woman, who declined to be named.

'Militarizing the internet'

Despite the cost, Iranian authorities have called for yet tougher measures. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has the final word on all matters in Iran, in June called for the judiciary to crack down harder on online dissent.

Meanwhile, Communications Minister Issa Zarepour last month said the country had "twice" the internet access it needed. The ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Iran's hardline government introduced a bill to parliament in 2021 that would effectively hand over control of the internet to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which reports directly to the supreme leader, and criminalize the use of VPNs.

Facing opposition from some within parliament and a public backlash, the User Protection Bill has languished in the assembly, but opposition groups say hardliners have bypassed parliament and brought in most elements of the bill anyway.

An as-yet unpublished report by Miaan said the IRGC was seeking to gain absolute control over the internet in Iran.

"Infractions will be dealt with by the military and the internet will become untouchable," Rashidi said.

Internet freedom community

Despite the risks, some in Iran have tried to fight back. Rashidi said the internet crackdown had given rise to a digital rights community including tech specialists, journalists, lawyers and civil society members seeking to limit the changes.

"It's a real thing and they are doing real work," he said.

The internet freedom community is viewed as a threat by Iranian authorities as it endangered state control of what information is consumed by the public, said Simin Kargar, a fellow at Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab.

"We have had tech activists go to jail for teaching people about circumvention tools and privacy preservation online," Kargar said from Washington.

Security forces arrested prominent digital rights advocate Amir Mirmirani, better known by his online name Jadi, and several others in October for protesting internet shutdowns. Jadi said in February he had been released from prison.

The Thomson Reuters Foundation spoke to several activists inside Iran who spoke on condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisals.

They said authorities had been shutting down the internet and employing filters and surveillance, as well as slowing down internet speeds to suppress opposition narratives on social media and messaging applications.

But Iranian internet freedom activists have nevertheless gathered signatures for online petitions inside Iran to stop the Internet User Protection bill officially passing through parliament.

"I'm not optimistic that the government will loosen its internet restrictions, but if we don't fight, if we don't try, things will get even worse," said one activist.

"Even though the bill is being implemented for all intents and purposes, at least the one million signatures the petition gathered show the world that Iranians are vehemently against it," Rashidi said.

Another activist in Iran campaigning against restrictions said policies restricting internet access were to be expected given the country’s human rights record, but said it was disappointing the outside world did not seem to care.

"I wish someone out there would hear our voice and do something," said the source.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.