The recent declassification of historical British government records, dating from the period following the “October War,” has provided insight into the communication between the conservative government of that era and the US administration as they grappled with the consequences of the conflict.
These documents indicate that former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reached an “informal understanding” with the Soviet Union to “restrain” the supply of weapons being sent to the warring parties.
While Kissinger’s initial focus was on achieving a ceasefire, the British noted that both the Americans and the Soviets had not considered who would oversee the enforcement of the ceasefire, particularly on the Egyptian front, where the situation was “highly complex.”
While secret proceedings primarily addressed the ceasefire and peace conference efforts, which were not favored by Kissinger, a significant portion of them revolved around the Arab oil embargo on Western nations following the October War in 1973 .
This development prompted the British to begin preparations for imposing fuel rationing, as revealed in the documents.
The documents also unveil that the then conservative government expressed concerns about a pro-Israel lobby in the British media.
They perceived that supporters of Israel in the UK were portraying its stance on the Middle East conflict incorrectly by depicting it as succumbing to Arab pressures.
Notably, during Edward Heath’s government in power during the October War, it was observed that unquestioning endorsement of Israel’s perspective without criticism did not serve the interests of either the UK or Britain’s economy.
There was a belief that public support for Israel as a “victim” in the eyes of the Arab world would diminish if British economic interests suffered due to its policies.
On Tuesday, October 23, 1973, Heath’s government held a meeting at 10 Downing Street that addressed aspects of the Arab-Israeli war.
The classified meeting minutes revealed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, informed his colleagues that he had “met with the US Secretary of State the previous evening when Kissinger had stopped in London on his way back to Washington after visiting Moscow and Tel Aviv.”
It was evident from discussions between the Russians and the Americans that while they were focused on achieving a ceasefire, they had not given much thought to who would oversee it.
In the event of a ceasefire being achieved on the Syrian front, it was deemed that there wouldn't be significant operational difficulties in maintaining it, given the interconnected Israeli control in the Golan Heights.
On the southern front, however, the situation was extremely complex, as Egyptian forces east of the Suez Canal had lost their supply lines from the west.
Therefore, a ceasefire there was considered inherently fragile.
The British Foreign Secretary advised Kissinger to arrange with the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, to strengthen the UN’s ceasefire monitoring mechanism and deploy it immediately to oversee the ceasefire and assist in dealing with on-ground challenges.
The minutes also report that Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home stated in the meeting that preliminary reports on discussions that took place in Cairo the previous day (on November 7) between President Sadat and Kissinger indicate that they agreed to pursue arrangements whereby the way would be opened for the Egyptian Third Army under the supervision of UN observers, a prisoner exchange would occur, and within 10 to 15 days, a peace conference would commence.
Kissinger’s then advisor relayed these proposals to Israel.
The intention was for the peace conference to involve Waldheim, the conflicting parties, the US, and the Soviet Union.
According to the minutes report, it was learned that the Egyptians prefer a somewhat broader conference, as they do not wish for the Soviet Union to be their sole advisor.
