Egypt & Israel: Cold Peace or Enduring Understanding?

On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)
On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)
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Egypt & Israel: Cold Peace or Enduring Understanding?

On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)
On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty (AFP)

When Egyptian soldiers crossed the Suez Canal, and their Syrian counterparts stormed the Golan Heights on the afternoon of October 6, 1973, perhaps they did not foresee the intricate calculations and unprecedented transformations that would follow the military clashes.

Nevertheless, to varying degrees, these events shaped the course of politics and diplomacy, ushering the region into a new era known as the “post-October” period, where Arab destinies intersected with the strategies of major powers.

Around half a century has passed since the “last of the battles” between Egypt and Israel, during which nearly 45 years of peace have prevailed between the two countries.

Some describe this peace as “cold” since it remains limited to official relations without extending to popular normalization.

The “psychological barrier” towards Israel persists, untouched by the years of peace, yet others view the resilience of the Cairo-Tel Aviv peace amid internal transformations and regional storms as a success in its own right.

On March 26, 1979, under the sponsorship of then US President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed a peace treaty.

However, bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel continue to remain confined to official aspects, whether in diplomacy or security, while economic relations have taken an upward trajectory over the past two decades.

The US has sought to encourage both countries to enhance cooperation beyond the political stalemate and Egyptian popular resistance to normalization.

This was achieved through the 2004 Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreement in Egypt, allowing duty-free access to the US market for goods produced with at least 10.5% Israeli inputs.

Despite some business leaders attempting to break the “silence barrier” in relations between the two countries, the volume of trade between them has remained limited, totaling $270 million annually in the past year.

Israel exports goods worth $150 million to Egypt, while importing $115 million, according to official Israeli statistics from the Ministries of Industry and Trade, and Economics.

Updated Egyptian data on this matter remains unavailable.

In addition to “limited” economic cooperation, relations between the two nations have managed to overcome a series of crises, some of which were related to security incidents, such as border skirmishes.

The most recent incident was in June last year and resulted in the deaths of 3 Israeli soldiers and one Egyptian security personnel.

A statement from the Egyptian army stated that they were “pursuing smugglers on the border with Israel.”

This incident was not the first of its kind. In October 1985, the “Ras Burqa” operation occurred, executed by the Egyptian soldier Suleiman Khater, resulting in the deaths of seven Israelis in a border area between the two countries.

In November 2004, Egypt protested the killing of three Egyptian Central Security Forces personnel after an Israeli tank fired a shell across the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

In August 2011, an Israeli airstrike along the Egyptian border south of Rafah led to the deaths of five Egyptian border guards, for which Israel later issued a formal apology.

Relations between the two countries have also endured regional conflicts, including the wars in Lebanon (1982 and 2006), the Palestinian uprisings (1987 and 2000), and repeated Israeli aggressions on the Gaza Strip.

Egypt has managed to utilize its communication with Tel Aviv to halt these aggressions on several occasions, marking Egyptian success on both regional and international fronts.

Despite changes in Egypt’s government system and shifts in Israel’s leadership, relations between the two nations have maintained a degree of stability.

However, this has not succeeded in altering the popular stance in Egypt, which remains opposed to normalization with Israel.

This sentiment reached its peak following the events of January 25, 2011, when enraged protesters entered an annexed apartment of the Israeli embassy, removed the Israeli flag from the top of the building.

Additionally, Egypt terminated a long-term agreement through which it supplied natural gas to Israel after the pipeline crossing the border was subjected to frequent acts of sabotage.

Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, a professor of political science and former dean of the “Arab Research Institute,” attributes the resilience of the peace relationship between Egypt and Israel to the former’s commitment to its international obligations.

He also highlights what he refers to as “political realism,” considering regional and international circumstances.

In statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ahmed points out that the relationship between the two parties indeed appears to be a “cold peace.”

According to Ahmed, this peace has remained confined to official frameworks, with the minimum necessary for security and diplomatic arrangements being upheld.

However, it has never transitioned into a “warm peace,” at least not at the popular level.

On the other hand, Ahmed believes that Egyptian popular rejection of normalization with Israel “remains strong” and describes it as a “remarkable stance.”

This reflects the commitment of the Arab regime not to normalize relations until the Palestinian issue is resolved.

Ahmed points out that Egyptian authorities have “never attempted at any stage since signing the peace agreement with Israel to pressure unions and parties to change their positions or attempt to brainwash their citizens into accepting normalization with Israel.”



Jamal Mustafa to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Couldn’t Provide Bribe Demanded by Judge, So I Was Jailed for Another 10 Years

Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
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Jamal Mustafa to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Couldn’t Provide Bribe Demanded by Judge, So I Was Jailed for Another 10 Years

Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.
Saddam Hussein and Jamal Mustafa Sultan.

In the final installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Jamal Mustafa Sultan, a former Iraqi official and Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, delves into his arrest, the collapse of hopes for resistance against US forces, and the turmoil that followed the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Mustafa faced a harsh journey during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. He traveled to rally tribal leaders to defend Baghdad, only to return and find the city occupied. Declared a fugitive, his face appeared on the US “most-wanted” playing cards.

Mustafa fled to Syria but was denied asylum and sent back to Iraq, where he was arrested. Accused of leading resistance and car bombings, the court found no evidence to convict him.

In 2011, a judge offered him release in exchange for a bribe, which Mustafa could not afford. His proposal to sell family land to pay was rejected, leaving him imprisoned for another decade. He was eventually freed over lack of evidence.

A US soldier watches the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad on April 7, 2003. (Reuters)

After his release, Mustafa went to Erbil, where Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani invited him for a meeting. Barzani welcomed him warmly and asked how he could help. Mustafa requested assistance in obtaining a passport, praising Barzani’s generosity.

Mustafa shared that Saddam respected Barzani, once calling him a “tough but honorable opponent.” He also revealed that, before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Barzani had assured Saddam that Kurdish forces would not fight the Iraqi army.

Recalling the lead-up to the war, Mustafa said Saddam tasked him with reconnecting with tribal leaders to encourage them to resist the invasion.

He delivered personal messages from Saddam, along with financial support, to help tribes host Iraqi soldiers stationed nearby. Mustafa later traveled to the Anbar province to rally tribes and bring them to defend Baghdad.

This account offers a rare glimpse into the behind-the-scenes efforts to resist the US invasion and the complex relationships that shaped Iraq’s history.

As the US invasion loomed, Mustafa met with thousands of tribal leaders to rally support for Baghdad’s defense.

“During the war, I met with over 4,500 tribal sheikhs from across Iraq,” he said. But when he returned to Baghdad after a trip to Anbar, everything had changed. “The city had fallen, and everything was in chaos.”

Mustafa tried to locate his associates but found no one. On April 11, 2003, he sent his driver to search for allies.

By chance, his brother, Lt. Gen. Kamal Mustafa, located him. “He told me we needed to leave Baghdad. I hadn’t planned to leave, but he convinced me it was the logical choice—we had no weapons, no men, and no resources. Staying would only mean capture.”

The brothers fled to Ramadi, where tribal leaders offered them refuge, and from there, they attempted to seek asylum in Syria. After just two days, Syrian authorities sent them back to Iraq.

Back in Baghdad, Mustafa and Khalid Najm, Iraq’s last intelligence chief, stayed with a university friend, Dr. Hafidh Al-Dulaimi. While there, Al-Dulaimi’s nephew suggested surrendering to Ahmed Chalabi’s forces, but Mustafa refused.

Saddam Hussein meets with top members of his regime. (Getty Images)

Shortly after, armed men stormed the house. “They came with tanks and masks,” Mustafa recalled. He and Najm were arrested on April 21, 2003—a day he will never forget.

Mustafa shared his experiences in US detention after his capture. “The interrogations were relentless, often involving psychological and physical pressure,” he added.

“They focused on weapons of mass destruction—’did Iraq have them, and where were they?’ Everyone faced the same questions. They also asked about US pilot Michael Scott Speicher, whose plane was shot down during the Gulf War. Though his remains were later found, the Americans kept questioning us, believing more was being hidden.”

Life in the detention center was highly controlled. Detainees were grouped in blocks of seven and given 30 minutes of outdoor time. Sultan recalled a chilling moment when Ahmed Hussein, Saddam’s office chief, told him during exercise: “The president has been captured.”

“We had clung to hope that Saddam’s freedom could lead to Iraq’s liberation,” Mustafa said. “His arrest shattered that hope and signaled the occupation’s permanence.”

He also described mysterious construction in the prison. “We saw carpenters working constantly. Eventually, they built a wooden barrier, blocking the corridor from view. We could only guess what it was for.”

When asked if Saddam had led the resistance before his capture, Mustafa confirmed: “Yes, the resistance began after the war. It wasn’t planned in advance because, at that time, the focus was purely military—army against army.”

“After the occupation, a new phase started. Battles unfolded in stages, and Saddam was leading the resistance during this one. He was the hope of the resistance, of the Iraqi people, and of Arabs and Muslims,” Mustafa revealed.

His remarks offer a glimpse into the post-invasion dynamics and the symbolic role Saddam played during Iraq’s turbulent transition.

Mustafa also recounted the difficulty of reaching his family after his arrest.

“After my capture, I lost all contact with my family. I didn’t have any phone numbers for my brothers, friends, or colleagues. Even if I had, phone lines had been disrupted—many exchanges had been bombed, and communication in Iraq was severely impacted,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Mustafa recalled an encounter with the International Red Cross during his detention.

Saddam Hussein and his daughter Hala. (Courtesy of the family)

“The Red Cross offered me the chance to write a message to my family, as is their usual practice. But I was at a loss—who could I write to? I had no idea where my brothers or family were. I didn’t know anything about their whereabouts.”

Then, Mustafa had an idea. “I thought of Ammo Baba, a well-known football coach in Iraq. I didn’t know his address, but I remembered the address of the Police Club, where I had been president. I decided to write the letter there, addressed to Ammo Baba, asking him to pass it on to my family.”

Mustafa’s story highlights the communication challenges and isolation faced by detainees during the Iraq War.

He then described the prolonged separation from his family following his arrest. “I had no hopes of hearing from my family when I sent my letter through Ammo Baba,” Mustafa said.

“The situation was too difficult. After two and a half to three months, I received a response from Ammo Baba. He sent his regards, inquired about my health, and included a message from Yassin, a coach who worked with me. Along with the letter, they sent me sportswear—a shirt and shorts.”

Mustafa’s communication with his family may have been limited, but the letter served as a lifeline.

“A couple of years later, I received the first message from my wife, Hala, after two years in detention.”

Jamal Mustafa Sultan with his children.

When asked if he had been separated from his family for 18 years, Mustafa confirmed: “Yes, I hadn’t seen them or my children for 18 and a half years.”

“There were no visits or conversations, except for a brief period when we were held by the Americans. During that time, they allowed us five minutes a week to speak with our families. I would split the time—two and a half minutes with my mother and siblings, and the rest with my wife and daughters,” he said.

However, he revealed that after 2010, communication was cut off entirely.

“When we were transferred to Iraqi custody, they stopped allowing any contact. I was careful not to make calls with the Iraqis, as I feared enemies or foreign agents could record them,” explained Mustafa.

Mustafa’s story underscores the isolation he endured and the limited means of contact with his loved ones during years of detention.