Putin’s Visit to Beijing Underscores China’s Economic and Diplomatic Support for Russia 

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 5, 2019. (Reuters)
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 5, 2019. (Reuters)
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Putin’s Visit to Beijing Underscores China’s Economic and Diplomatic Support for Russia 

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 5, 2019. (Reuters)
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, June 5, 2019. (Reuters)

Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to meet this week with Chinese leaders in Beijing on a visit that underscores China’s support for Moscow during its war in Ukraine.

The two countries have forged an informal alliance against the United States and other democratic nations that is now complicated by the Israel-Hamas war. China has sought to balance its ties with Israel with its economic relations with Iran and Syria, which are strongly backed by Russia.

Putin’s visit is also a show of support for Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road initiative to build infrastructure and expand China’s overseas influence.

Putin gave an interview to Chinese state media praising the massive but loosely linked BRI projects.

“Yes, we see that some people consider it an attempt by the People’s Republic of China to put someone under its thumb, but we see otherwise, we just see desire for cooperation,” he said in the interview with state broadcaster CCTV, according to a transcript released by the Kremlin on Monday.

The Russian leader will be among the highest profile guests at a gathering marking the 10th anniversary of Xi's announcement of the BRI policy, which has laden countries such as Zambia and Sri Lanka with heavy debt after they signed contracts with Chinese companies to build roads, airports and other public works they could not otherwise afford.

Putin's visit has not been officially confirmed, but Chinese officials have suggested he will arrive late Monday.

Asked by reporters Friday about a visit to China, Putin said it would encompass talks on Belt and Road-related projects, which he said Moscow wants to link with efforts by an economic alliance of ex-Soviet Union nations mostly located in Central Asia to “achieve common development goals.”

He also downplayed the impact of China's economic influence in a region that Russia has long considered its backyard and where it has worked to maintain political and military clout.

“We don’t have any contradictions here, on the contrary, there is a certain synergy,” Putin said.

Putin said he and Xi will also discuss growing economic and financial ties between Moscow and Beijing.

Beijing and Moscow have financial ties in energy, high-tech and financial industries. China has also grown in importance as an export destination for Moscow.

Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said that from China's view, “Russia is a safe neighbor that is friendly, that is a source of cheap raw materials, that’s a support for Chinese initiatives on the global stage and that’s also a source of military technologies, some of those that China doesn’t have.”

“For Russia, China is its lifeline, economic lifeline in its brutal repression against Ukraine,” Gabuev told The Associated Press.

“It’s the major market for Russian commodities, it’s a country that provides its currency and payment system to settle Russia’s trade with the outside world — with China itself, but also with many other countries, and is also the major source of sophisticated technological imports, including dual-use goods that go into the Russian military machine.”

Gabuev said that while Moscow and Beijing will be unlikely to forge a full-fledged military alliance, their defense cooperation will grow.

“I don’t expect that Russia and China will create a military alliance,” Gabuev said. “Both countries are self-sufficient in terms of security and they benefit from partnering, but neither really requires a security guarantee from the other. And they preach strategic autonomy.”

“There will be no military alliance, but there will be closer military cooperation, more interoperability, more cooperation on projecting force together, including in places like the Arctic and more joint effort to develop a missile defense that makes the US nuclear planning and planning of the US and its allies in Asia and in Europe more complicated,” he added.

China and the former Soviet Union were Cold War rivals for influence among left-leaning states, but have since partnered in the economic, military and diplomatic spheres. Just weeks before Russia's invasion of Ukraine last February, Putin met with Xi in Beijing and the sides signed an agreement pledging a “no-limits” relationship. Beijing's attempts to present itself as a neutral peace broker in Russia's war on Ukraine have been widely dismissed by the international community.

Xi visited Moscow in March as part of a flurry of exchanges between the countries. China has condemned international sanctions imposed on Russia, but hasn't directly addressed an arrest warrant issued for Putin by the International Criminal Court on charges of alleged involvement in the abductions of thousands of children from Ukraine.



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.