When Tanks Become Toys for Sudanese Children

Displaced children from Khartoum in eastern Sudan (AFP)
Displaced children from Khartoum in eastern Sudan (AFP)
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When Tanks Become Toys for Sudanese Children

Displaced children from Khartoum in eastern Sudan (AFP)
Displaced children from Khartoum in eastern Sudan (AFP)

In worn-torn Sudan, children’s favorite games have become imitating the sound of warplanes as they pass over their heads, and the crashes of shells exploding around them. So you see them popping balloons, and shouting: “Shell... Shell... Rocket... Let’s go inside before it kills us.”

War turned into a terrifying game in the hands of Sudanese children.

Weapons are a substitute for candy

Children no longer ask their parents for candies, a ball, or even a bicycle. Rather, they want a fighter plane, guns, or a four-wheel-drive armed vehicle...

The scenes of blood flowing before their eyes, the corpses lying on the sides of the roads, and the terrifying sounds of war have all changed their notion of enjoyment.

Five-year-old Mohammad did not ask his father for “chocolate” as usual, but rather he told him to buy a “tank.”

Shocked, the father said: “It is impossible; because tanks are owned by the army only to defend the people.”

The child replied innocently: “Then ask the army to give us one and we will return it to them after the end of the war.”

As for Khadija Hussein’s three sons, their games turned into “imitating the Rapid Support Forces.”

They see these fighters roaming the streets, day and night, carrying their weapons, or riding armed cars.

Old children’s games, or football, do no longer interest Sudan’s kids. Their favorite pastime is now imitating war scenes.

Violence takes over the childhood

Khadija told Asharq Al-Awsat: “My children were kind and gentle. War turned them into violent kids, who fight and can destroy anything, even the furniture in the house.”

Nahid Jabrallah, director of Sima Center, which specializes in combating violence against women and children, said: “Even if the child does not suffer a direct physical injury, the war may cause him a psychological disability, and may make him violent, or lead him into isolation. The psychological impact on children becomes clearer in refugee shelters.”

She added that the presence of children in war zones and fighting harms their psychological stability, while the conditions in displacement centers exacerbate their problems, causing them to suffer psychological distress and a state of panic and terror.

Children in Sudan use the names of war figures to call each other. Those include Al-Burhan and Hemedti. Some of them have become known by these names among their friends in different neighborhoods.



How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
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How Assassinations Reshaped Hamas’ Decision-Making Mechanism

Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)
Palestinians carry the coffin of Ismail Barhoum, a member of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip, on March 24, 2025 (AP)

Hamas is facing major challenges in its efforts to reorganize after Israel assassinated several high-ranking figures from its political bureau, both in and outside the Gaza Strip, including key figures in the political, military, and governance wings of the movement.

During the 58-day truce—collapsed in March—Hamas leaders in Gaza had begun restructuring the organization by appointing new officials to key positions. There was a move to quickly hold internal elections to confirm Khalil al-Hayya as head of the political bureau in Gaza, a decision that was agreed upon due to his previous role as deputy to Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in clashes with Israeli forces in Rafah in October 2024.

Administrative Vacuum

Al-Hayya, based in Qatar and shuttling between Egypt, Türkiye, and other countries as he leads Hamas’ delegation in ceasefire talks, tried to work closely with figures in Gaza such as political bureau members Mohammed al-Jamassi, Yasser Harb, Ismail Barhoum, and Issam al-Daalis to reorganize the movement’s internal operations. However, many of these individuals were later assassinated by Israel following the resumption of its military campaign.

As a result, Hamas is now grappling with a leadership vacuum inside Gaza, particularly as Israel continues targeting its on-ground operatives. This leadership disruption has contributed to delays in salary disbursement for government employees, although some political and military members received partial payments—up to 60%—on the second day of Eid al-Fitr.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the salary delays are partly due to the leadership void and the difficulties in decision-making, as many of those responsible for finances and internal affairs have been assassinated. The sources confirmed that the wave of assassinations has significantly impacted the group’s internal administration in Gaza.

How Hamas Operates Now

Leadership in Gaza traditionally handled central and strategic files within Hamas’ political bureau, meaning that the assassinations in the Strip had a ripple effect across the broader organization. With the deaths of top leaders like Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and his successor Yahya Sinwar in Gaza three months later, Hamas formed a temporary governing body known as the “Leadership Council” to oversee the movement’s affairs.

Due to the inability to hold internal elections to select a new political bureau chief and deputy, the Leadership Council—comprising regional heads—was empowered to make collective decisions. While the traditional structure relied on consensus among bureau members with deference to the president, vice president, and heads of the West Bank and external wings, the council now makes urgent decisions, consulting other bureau members only when necessary.

The council includes political bureau members from Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad, with decisions taken by consensus among those who can be reached—communication challenges within Gaza often complicate this.

The de facto head of the Leadership Council is Mohammed Darwish, chair of Hamas’ Shura Council, following the assassination of Osama al-Muzaini in an Israeli airstrike on his Gaza City apartment in October 2023. The precise number of council members remains unclear, but sources estimate it includes between 5 and 7 individuals, while the political bureau consists of over 20 positions. Israel has assassinated around 15 Hamas political bureau members in Gaza alone, in addition to leaders abroad like Saleh al-Arouri and Haniyeh.

Decision-Making Process

According to Hamas sources, for security reasons and the ongoing threat of Israeli targeting, decisions are now made through the Leadership Council without reverting to the Gaza leadership unless in urgent cases.

The sources noted that the council briefly assumed this role during the war, particularly just before the last ceasefire in late January. While some normalcy returned during the lull, renewed assassinations and resumed fighting pushed Hamas back into emergency decision-making mode.

Nevertheless, the sources stress that there are “clear red lines”—such as ceasefire negotiations—that require consulting all political bureau members, especially those still in Gaza, and military leaders from the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing. Among these is Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, who now leads Qassam after Israel assassinated Mohammed Deif and his deputy Marwan Issa.

Hamas sources say Mohammed Sinwar plays a central role in strategic decision-making, especially in military operations and negotiations over Israeli hostages. Still, neither he, nor al-Hayya, nor Darwish can make critical decisions unilaterally; all major moves require consensus between the council, political bureau, and Qassam’s military command.

The sources acknowledge communication difficulties between Gaza and the outside world due to ongoing security threats and Israeli surveillance, sometimes delaying responses to mediators and stalling negotiations.

However, they emphasized that these delays have had limited impact lately, as Israel continues to reject international proposals, diminishing the effect of Hamas’ internal constraints on the overall diplomatic process.