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Asharq Al-Awsat Reviews the Palestinian Factions in Gaza

Al-Qassam Brigades during a military parade in Gaza last July (AFP)
Al-Qassam Brigades during a military parade in Gaza last July (AFP)
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Asharq Al-Awsat Reviews the Palestinian Factions in Gaza

Al-Qassam Brigades during a military parade in Gaza last July (AFP)
Al-Qassam Brigades during a military parade in Gaza last July (AFP)

The October 7 operation was an unexpected blow to Israel, uncovering the significant shortcomings in the Israeli political leadership, military, and intelligence systems.
It was not only due to the element of surprise, which Hamas effectively utilized, but also because of the advanced military capabilities of the seven leading brigades in the region, particularly the Qassam Brigades, Hamas's armed wing.
The Qassam Brigades stands out as the most prominent and well-equipped military force in all Palestinian territories, known for their fierce combativeness and high level of training.
Asharq Al-Awsat provides a detailed overview of the various militant Palestinian factions active in Gaza.
- Al-Qassam Brigades (Majd)
The Qassam Brigades, initially named "Majd," were founded in early 1988 and quickly became the most significant military force in the Gaza Strip and all Palestinian territories.
The name Majd remained associated with their secretive security apparatus aimed at tracking down Israeli intelligence collaborators.
Hamas chief in Gaza Yahya Sinwar was among the founders of Majd.
Since its inception, the Qassam Brigades have undergone several phases of evolution.
They gained significant notoriety in the early 1990s for carrying out bombing operations inside Israel.
Yahya Ayyash, one of its leading figures in the West Bank, became a symbol of the movement until his assassination in Gaza in 1996.
During the Second Intifada, the Brigades continued their bombing operations and successfully kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006, leading to a prisoner exchange deal with Israel in 2011.
In 2007, the Qassam took military control of the Gaza Strip after clashes with Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces.
- 30,000 fighters
Throughout the years of the Intifada, the Brigades experimented with launching primitive rockets at Israel, which Palestinian officials described as 'futile.'
However, in early 2009, they surprised Israel by launching 'Grad' rockets capable of reaching distances of about 50 kilometers.
The Qassam Brigades are estimated to have about 30,000 fighters, known for their hierarchical organization, elite forces, and specialized units for tunnels, military production, and intelligence.
The tunnels have been a significant concern for the Israeli military. In 2014, the Brigades managed to hide two Israeli soldiers after capturing them in Gaza. Their fate remains unknown.
The Qassam Brigades first used Iranian-made Fajr missiles to strike Tel Aviv in 2012 as a response to the assassination of their senior leader, Ahmed Jabari.
They have since developed drones and numerous missiles that continue to surprise Israel in subsequent conflicts, including the 2014 war and the 2021 "Sword of Jerusalem" battle.
Prominent leaders of the Qassam Brigades, such as Yahya Ayyash, Imad Aqel, Salah Shehadeh, and Ahmed Jabari, have been assassinated by Israel.
Al-Qassam's leader and Israel's number one wanted, Mohammed Deif, survived numerous assassination attempts over the past 30 years.
- Al-Quds Brigades (Force #2)
The Islamic Jihad's military wing, the al-Quds Brigades, is the second most powerful force in the Palestinian territories.
It was founded during the Second Intifada in 2000 and has close ties to Iran and Hezbollah.
The group has approximately 11,000 fighters and a variety of light, medium, and long-range missiles. It plays a significant role in the region, though it lacks the extensive tunnel network and impact of the Qassam Brigades.
Al-Quds Brigades have consistently challenged the Israeli defense system over the years, especially in the escalating rounds of conflict in Gaza, during which Hamas often refrained from participating.
Over the years, Israel has assassinated several leaders of al-Quds Brigades in the Strip and the West Bank. Among the most notable were Muqled Hamid, Bashir al-Dabash, Aziz al-Shami, Khaled Dahdouh, Majed Harazin, Baha Abu al-Ata, Khaled Mansour, and others from Gaza and the West Bank.
In recent years, particularly in the West Bank, the movement has gained prominence through the "Jenin Brigades," one of the al-Quds Brigades' most important military formations in the northern West Bank.
The battalion carried out a series of armed attacks, with many of its leaders being assassinated, including Mohammad Zubaidi recently.
- Al-Nasser Brigades
The al-Nasser Salahadin Brigades is the armed wing of the Popular Resistance Committees in Palestine, founded by Jamal Abu Samhadana, who was assassinated in 2006 during the onset of the Second Intifada in 2000.
They are considered the third-largest force, comprising about 5,000 fighters and possessing dozens of rockets and mortar shells.
The brigades executed its first operation in late 2000, detonating large explosive devices on an Israeli tank at the Netzarim junction, killing two Israeli soldiers.
They received support from Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad Movement and have participated in several operations, including raids on Gaza settlements before the withdrawal, killing numerous Israelis.
Israel has assassinated many of its leaders, including Kamal al-Nairab and Zuhair al-Qaisi, successors to Abu Samhadana.
- Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the Fatah movement's military wing, has become the fourth most vital force after being the leading military power during the early stages of the Intifada.
During that period, they carried out a series of major attacks against Israelis, including operations within Israeli cities.
Previously known under several names, including "The Storm," they participated in numerous operations inside and outside Palestine.
Currently, the Brigades consist of about 2,000 fighters with light and medium weapons and locally made rockets with a range of about 16 km from the Gaza border.
During the Second Intifada, they carried out various operations in the West Bank and Gaza.
Many of their leaders were assassinated by Israel, and their presence has significantly declined after President Mahmoud Abbas officially disbanded them in 2007, integrating their members into security forces.
Israel assassinated some of its members who recently re-emerged in Jenin and Nablus.
- The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades
The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades are the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
It was named in honor of the slain general secretary of the organization, Abu Ali Mustafa, in 2001, who was assassinated by Israel in his office in Ramallah during a helicopter strike.
The group is currently considered the fifth force, with hundreds of fighters based in Gaza and the West Bank. They are equipped with light and medium weaponry and locally manufactured missiles.
The group executed several attacks, most notably in response to the assassination of their general secretary. They assassinated the former Israeli Tourism Minister, Rehavam Ze'evi, in 2001 in a hotel in West Jerusalem.
In 2002, the current general secretary of the Brigades, Ahmad Saadat, was arrested along with other leaders on charges of planning and participating in the assassination.
Palestinian security forces initially held them before being transferred to Jericho Central Prison.

Four years later, Israeli forces raided the prison, detaining them and later sentencing them to life imprisonment.
- National Resistance Brigades
The National Resistance Brigades are the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. They have operated under various names before the Intifada.
The Brigades are the sixth most formidable force, with hundreds of fighters. They are armed with light and medium weapons and locally made missiles.
Over the years, and particularly during the Second Intifada, the National Brigades have carried out a series of attacks, killing several Israelis. Many of its leaders and members have also been killed.
- The al-Mujahideen Brigades
The Al-Mujahideen Brigades are a military group initially emerging from the Fatah movement before declaring their complete separation.
Comprising hundreds of fighters, the Brigades are equipped with light and medium weaponry, as well as rockets capable of reaching Israeli cities such as Ashkelon and Sderot.
Since the outset of the Intifada, the al-Mujahideen have executed a series of attacks, during which Israeli forces have killed some of their leaders.

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Features

Can Sudan's Health Sector Rise from the Rubble?

Entrance to the Trauma and Emergency Complex at Omdurman Hospital (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Entrance to the Trauma and Emergency Complex at Omdurman Hospital (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Can Sudan's Health Sector Rise from the Rubble?

Entrance to the Trauma and Emergency Complex at Omdurman Hospital (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Entrance to the Trauma and Emergency Complex at Omdurman Hospital (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Between hospitals that have reopened after being destroyed and looted, and facilities still struggling with shortages of electricity, equipment, medicines, and staff, two contrasting pictures of Sudan's health system are emerging after more than three years of devastating war.

In Khartoum, major referral hospitals have begun gradually resuming operations as residents return and fighting recedes from large parts of the capital. Elsewhere, however, the picture is much bleaker in Darfur, Kordofan, and other areas, where ongoing fighting, funding shortages, and difficulties accessing facilities continue to deny large segments of the population access to healthcare.

Data from the World Health Organization indicates that around 37 percent of health facilities in Sudan are not functioning, while around 21 million people need medical services, amid shortages of medicines and rising costs of accessing treatment.

At the same time, the organization is monitoring improvements in some states as early recovery efforts and the rehabilitation of facilities begin. This contradiction makes the question more complex: "Has Sudan's health system actually begun to recover, or is what is happening merely a partial restoration of services in areas where the war has receded?"

Hospitals Recovering

At Omdurman Teaching Hospital, one of the capital's largest referral hospitals, signs of a return to activity are evident. Its Director General, Abdel Moneim Ali Al-Qasim, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the hospital suffered extensive wartime destruction affecting its infrastructure, equipment, electrical networks, cables, and generators. In 2024, rehabilitation began on the emergency department to allow it to receive patients, while other parts of the hospital remained destroyed.

With support from the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre and its national partner, Kafaat Organization, the hospital received a 730-kilovolt-ampere generator in July 2025, along with intensive care, emergency, and laboratory equipment. Al-Qasim said the support was worth around $1 million.

According to Al-Qasim, the stabilization of the electricity supply had a direct impact on services. The waiting time for laboratory test results fell from four to six hours to around one hour and 15 minutes. Around 500 surgical procedures were performed during the first month of the support, before the number rose to between 1,000 and 1,500 procedures per month, averaging between 40 and 50 procedures a day.

The hospital currently receives around 600 patients a day. Eleven of its 15 intensive care beds are now operational, while the remaining four are being prepared for service.

The hospital also received an integrated oxygen production unit and opened a prosthetics center with a production capacity of up to 50 prosthetic limbs per month during a single shift. That capacity can be doubled by operating two shifts.

But the return of activity does not mean the problems are over. According to its director, the hospital still suffers from a shortage of wards and a need for fuel, in addition to unstable electricity. The return of residents is also increasing pressure on facilities that have resumed operations.

Buildings Have Returned... But Shortages Remain

The same picture is repeated at Bahri Teaching Hospital, which was rebuilt and reopened after suffering extensive destruction during the war. Its Director General, Ahmed Al-Bashir, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the hospital, with a capacity of 640 beds and 20 operating rooms, still needs intensive care equipment to increase its capacity to handle cases around the clock, as well as a backup power source.

The hospital also needs to complete its sewage system and connect it to the public network, or provide tankers to dispose of wastewater. Meanwhile, the administration is seeking to convert the emergency complex into a continuing vocational training center to make up for some of the staff the hospital lost during the war.

These details reveal one of the major challenges of rebuilding the health system: repairing a building and reopening its doors does not necessarily mean restoring its full capacity to provide services.

A Bleaker Picture Outside Major Hospitals

A short distance from the major referral hospitals that have begun to resume operations, the picture can be very different, even within Khartoum State itself. In Fattasha, west of Omdurman, Eman waited for three days while her son suffered from a high fever and worsening cough because the nearest health facility could not provide the services he needed.

Eman said in testimony published by the United Nations Children's Fund, UNICEF, in December 2025 that the area's only health center had just one health worker and offered no vaccination, nutrition, medicines, pharmacy, or laboratory services. The mother had no choice but to wait for a UNICEF-supported mobile clinic that visits the area twice a month. Despite the time that has passed since that testimony, the same hardship continues, revealing the wide gap between the return of major hospitals in the heart of the capital and those on the outskirts of the state.

The gap becomes even clearer outside Khartoum. At Al-Thawra Health Center in New Halfa locality, Kassala State, Noor, who is pregnant with her eighth child, says she previously had to buy the iron supplements prescribed by doctors during pregnancy. At times, however, she stopped taking them because she could not afford them.

In testimony published by UNICEF in July 2025, Noor said that the free provision of medicines had become a major relief for the family after the cost of treatment had prevented her from obtaining the medication.

At the same center, Aisha, a mother who received medicines for her children, said that receiving treatment for free represented significant assistance given the economic circumstances facing families.

In White Nile State, families face another problem: distance. In January 2026, UNICEF documented the journey of Zahra and her nine-month-old daughter, Amina, to obtain vaccinations.

Zahra takes around two hours to reach the nearest health facility from her home. Previously, she had been forced to travel to the city of Al-Jabalain in search of the service.

In the same area, another mother named Amina arrived with her two-year-old daughter, Aisha, after the child developed severe diarrhea and vomiting and became so weak that she could no longer walk. After being admitted to a stabilization center and receiving treatment and therapeutic milk, the girl began to regain her strength.

El Fasher... Giving Birth Under a Tree

The hardship reaches its most severe levels in areas affected by war and displacement. Amani, a displaced mother from North Darfur, recounted how she was forced to move with her family to escape fighting in El Fasher while she was in the final months of pregnancy.

In testimony published by UNICEF in August 2025, she said the family went days without food or water or anyone to help them. During their displacement journey between Sharika and Tawila, she went into labor, with no hospital or health workers nearby.

Amani gave birth to her daughter by the roadside, under a tree and on a small mat, with the help of her mother and some local residents. She said that during the delivery she did not know whether she would live or die, or what would happen to her children if she died.

After giving birth, she was too weak to carry her newborn or continue the journey. She was forced to stop for about a week before she was able to reach Tawila with her family.

Her experience represents the exact opposite of the picture presented by hospitals resuming activity in Khartoum. In areas affected by war, the issue is not simply the quality of services or the availability of equipment, but whether a health facility exists at all.

Disagreement Over the Definition of "Collapse"

These disparities lie at the heart of the disagreement over how to characterize the condition of the sector. Médecins Sans Frontières has warned that cuts to aid funding are pushing more health facilities to close and depriving millions of Sudanese of essential care.

The organization says the Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan, which amounts to $2.87 billion, had received only around 41 percent of the required funding as of August 11.

Sudanese Health Minister Haitham Mohamed Ibrahim, however, believes the Médecins Sans Frontières report focuses largely on the organization's activities and working conditions. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that it "does not by itself reflect the reality of the health sector in the country."

Omdurman Hospital Director Abdel Moneim Al-Qasim likewise rejects describing the system as "on the verge of collapse." He says the sector is indeed suffering from a major shortage of resources, but has begun to recover gradually as a result of efforts by the state and national, regional, and international organizations.

Bahri Hospital Director Ahmed Al-Bashir agrees that "the description of collapse is inaccurate," while acknowledging at the same time the need to expand support for referral hospitals and provide specialized equipment and medical specialties.

Health workers inside Omdurman Teaching Hospital (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Cancer Patient Searches for Medicine

For patients, recovery is not measured solely by the number of hospitals that have reopened, but by whether they can find the treatment they need when they reach them. In July 2026, Naela Hamad, who has cervical cancer, was receiving chemotherapy at Khartoum Oncology Hospital, known as "Al-Dhura," while her daughter, Ithar Al-Sir, was searching outside the hospital for a medicine needed alongside the treatment that was not available there.

Ithar said in testimony documented by Reuters that the family found the medicine outside the hospital for around 180,000 Sudanese pounds, or about $45 at the time, at the prevailing market price. Her mother needs it with each chemotherapy dose every 21 days.

The costs do not end with the medicine. She said she also pays 40,000 pounds for the bed where her mother receives her dose, asking how the family can afford these expenses when there is no work or income.

Naela says the family had previously struggled to afford food and is now struggling to obtain both food and medicine, while her home was destroyed and she was forced to stay with neighbors.

Reuters quoted Mona Abdel Rahman, head of pharmacy at Khartoum Oncology Hospital, as saying that some patients' doses had been delayed by two weeks or more after the free provision of some medicines stopped because they could not afford to buy them themselves.

The economic crisis is also affecting diagnostic services. Medical laboratory specialist Al-Tayeb Youssef told Asharq Al-Awsat that the rise in the price of the dollar has directly affected the sector, given laboratories' reliance on imported reagents and supplies purchased in foreign currency.

He added that many laboratory owners who returned to Khartoum had been forced to start "from scratch" after losing their premises and equipment and having to face the costs of maintenance, rent, and purchasing equipment again.

The high costs have prompted some laboratory owners to purchase equipment through partnerships and pool it at a single location rather than having each laboratory maintain its own equipment. This is viewed as a temporary solution that helps keep services running.

Expensive Medicine and Factories on the Road to Recovery

The situation in the pharmaceutical market is not very different. Pharmacist Mahmoud Al-Naeem told Asharq Al-Awsat that rising prices and complaints from citizens have worsened since the war, as a result of the destruction of several local pharmaceutical factories, disruptions to external supply chains, and the reliance on imports requiring foreign currency.

He noted that the National Medicines and Poisons Board has begun encouraging the registration of new pharmaceutical products and companies, considering that increased competition could help lower prices.

Some factories in Khartoum have begun returning to production, although they are operating below full capacity. This opens the door to gradual relief if local production and supply chains stabilize.

Epidemics... A Risk That Has Not Gone Away

Alongside destruction, funding shortages, and the high cost of treatment, the health system faces the threat of epidemic diseases. The director of Omdurman Hospital says rates of watery diarrhea, malaria, and dengue fever among the cases treated at the hospital have declined, with epidemic-control campaigns continuing and an isolation center established to handle cases of cholera, dengue fever, and other diseases.

The director of Bahri Hospital says malaria, as an endemic disease in Sudan, cannot be tackled by hospitals alone. It requires coordination among the federal health system, states, localities, and communities, from awareness, prevention, and vector control to diagnosis and treatment.

These risks remain more severe in areas affected by displacement and fighting, where disease and malnutrition coincide with weak water and sanitation services and difficulties accessing health facilities.

Thus, the current picture may not show a sector that has completely collapsed, but neither does it show a health system that has overcome the effects of the war. In Khartoum, hospitals have returned to service, surgeries and intensive care and laboratory services have resumed, and rehabilitation and oxygen production projects have begun. In Kassala and White Nile, there are examples of facilities that have regained their ability to provide free services or services closer to local populations.

But Eman is still waiting for the mobile clinic to treat her son, Zahra still travels two hours to reach a health center, Amani gave birth to her daughter under a tree while fleeing the war, and Naela reached one of the capital's largest cancer treatment centers only to find that the medicine she needed was unavailable.

Features

A Look at How Tariffs Have Shaped India-US Ties under Trump

(FILES) This aerial view shows shipping containers stacked at the Port of Baltimore on April 10, 2025, in Baltimore, Maryland. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)
(FILES) This aerial view shows shipping containers stacked at the Port of Baltimore on April 10, 2025, in Baltimore, Maryland. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)
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A Look at How Tariffs Have Shaped India-US Ties under Trump

(FILES) This aerial view shows shipping containers stacked at the Port of Baltimore on April 10, 2025, in Baltimore, Maryland. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)
(FILES) This aerial view shows shipping containers stacked at the Port of Baltimore on April 10, 2025, in Baltimore, Maryland. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)

A sweeping US sanctions and ‌tariff bill has emerged as the latest flashpoint between New Delhi and Washington, adding pressure to ties already strained by US tariffs on Indian goods and Washington's close engagement with India's neighbor Pakistan, Reuters said.

Here is a look at the twists and turns that have shaped India-US ties through President Donald Trump's second term.

FEBRUARY 2025

Trump announced a new tariffs system whereby the US would charge the same tariff rates as India charged.

The countries also agreed to work toward a limited trade deal and set a target of doubling their bilateral trade to $500 billion ‌by 2030.

APRIL ‌2025

New Delhi and Washington finalized the terms of ‌reference for ⁠bilateral trade talks.

The ⁠US imposed a 26% tariff on several Indian imports but paused it for 90 days soon after, instead maintaining a 10% duty on all imports.

JULY 2025

Trump announced a 25% tariff on all Indian goods that he then raised to 50% in August, citing New Delhi's continued purchases of Russian oil.

New Delhi termed the tariff "unfair" and vowed ⁠to defend its national interests.

FEBRUARY 2026

Trump announced a trade ‌deal that would cut US tariffs ‌on Indian goods to 18% in exchange for India halting Russian oil purchases ‌and lowering trade barriers.

The countries also released an interim framework ‌for their trade deal.

Later, the US Supreme Court struck down Washington's emergency tariffs, after which Trump announced a temporary 10% duty on India and other countries for 150 days.

JULY 2026

On the expiry of the 150-day period, Trump ‌announced a fresh 10% tariff on imports from India, saying it was among several economies that had not ⁠curbed imports ⁠made with forced labor.

India said about 45% of its exports to the US constituted products exempted from the duty, adding it remained engaged with Washington on their bilateral trade pact.

SEPTEMBER 2026

The US House of Representatives passed a sanctions and tariff bill intended to increase economic pressure on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine and to expand sanctions on Iran.

The legislation also authorized Trump to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries including India to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas.

New Delhi said it had warned Washington that such moves could impact ties, adding it would work with trade and industry bodies to deal with the bill's implications.

Features

Syria’s New Army: Renaming Units or Institutional Restructuring?

A military parade during a graduation ceremony for personnel of the Syrian army’s 56th Division on June 1, 2025. (Defense Ministry)
A military parade during a graduation ceremony for personnel of the Syrian army’s 56th Division on June 1, 2025. (Defense Ministry)
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Syria’s New Army: Renaming Units or Institutional Restructuring?

A military parade during a graduation ceremony for personnel of the Syrian army’s 56th Division on June 1, 2025. (Defense Ministry)
A military parade during a graduation ceremony for personnel of the Syrian army’s 56th Division on June 1, 2025. (Defense Ministry)

Syria's drive to build a national army has entered its most difficult phase: dismantling the armed factions that were formally absorbed into the Defense Ministry after the fall of Bashar al-Assad but retained their commanders, local loyalties, and financial networks.

The first stage of the process grouped more than 100 former factions into about 22 army divisions, according to Syrian reporting. That created a formal chain of command without fully eliminating the organizations that had fought the war. In practice, some units remained closely tied to their former leaders, strongholds, and economic interests.

Damascus is now reassigning commanders and fighters, changing deployments, and placing divisions under a proposed five-corps structure divided by region. The objective is to prevent former factions from operating as power blocs inside the army and to make military decisions answerable to the state.

That arrangement, however, did not end factionalism. It was the first stage of a difficult integration process.

The factions adopted new labels, including divisions and brigades, within the ministry's new structure, but did not fully shed their old organizations or the networks of influence and loyalty they had built during the war.

In many cases, they remained tied to their former strongholds, loyal to their commanders and connected to economic, administrative, and social networks.

The process, therefore, resembled the grouping of factions under one umbrella more than the creation of a unified institutional army.

Dismantling factional blocs

Damascus later moved into a clearer second phase of rebuilding the military: reorganizing units, combining them into new formations, and dismantling factional blocs from within.

This more sensitive phase seeks to break up the power blocs inherited by the new army. Personnel have been reassigned across formations to limit groups’ ability to retain their old structures or to recreate separate centers of influence within the military.

Sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said this was among the most difficult stages of restructuring the army.

The challenge was no longer simply to bring factions into an entity called the army, but to "clip the factions' wings inside that army." Some factions that became Defense Ministry divisions after Assad's fall retained their organizational cohesion and regional character.

Loyalty to commanders also endured to varying degrees, alongside financial, administrative, and social networks built over more than a decade.

An unfinished transition

The process has not reached its final goal. Some army divisions still retain elements of their previous structures, while plans continue to redistribute them, appoint new commanders, and change their deployment areas and missions.

The Syrian army is therefore caught between two models: the limited administrative absorption of factions that followed Assad's fall, and an institutional army in which factional and regional loyalties disappear and the chain of command and military decisions are tied to the Syrian state.

An informed source told Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Syrian state is completing the compulsory integration of all factions and weakening the sources of power they enjoyed in recent years."

The source said the step was essential because Damascus could not establish a unified army or a stable state without it.

The source, who asked not to be named, said the recent dismantling of military blocs included Jaysh al-Islam, which was folded into the 70th Division, as well as the Sultan Suleiman Shah group, commonly known as al-Amshat, the Hamza Division and Ahrar al-Sharqiya.

Similar moves had already affected Ahrar al-Sham and the Levant Front, the source said. Those cohesive factions held economic and regional interests, but President Ahmed al-Sharaa's administration had gradually and quietly dismantled them, reducing their weight within the army.

Factions inside the state

The central task now is to restructure the security and military institutions after the factions joined them, and then dismantle factional structures within the Syrian state.

Some factions remain in the army, but most formations that belonged to the former Syrian National Army have been dismantled, the source said. The Syrian Free Army, a former key US ally based at al-Tanf near the Jordanian border, is also being dismantled, according to the source.

The source said al-Sharaa's administration was fully coordinating with Türkiye and the United States to break up factions within the new army.

Figures such as Abu Amsha, Hatem Abu Shaqra, and Saif Bakour Bolad were Turkish allies, and officials had once expected that sidelining them might prompt Ankara to object. The opposite occurred, the source said, with Türkiye now supporting the dismantling of groups it had previously backed.

HTS in the new structure

Despite efforts to integrate the factions and build a cohesive military, the source said the final structure of the army and security services was intended to keep officers and commanders from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, as well as prominent former Nusra Front commanders, in key command and decision-making posts.

The source said defected officers and leaders of dissolved factions who were appointed to new positions would ultimately report to an HTS figure.

The source described the approach as logical during a sensitive period in which the state faced major internal and external challenges. Political action required a solid core and internal cohesion, the source said, arguing that institutions would remain vulnerable to infiltration and internal rivalry unless the authorities could rely on pivotal military and security decisions.

The commanders' account

Colonel Abdul Muti al-Halabi, a commander in the new Syrian army who was formerly among the Nusra Front's senior ranks, told Asharq Al-Awsat that dismantling the factions was "not aimed at anyone" but was "an existential necessity for building a real military institution."

Keeping factions together as cohesive blocs inside the army would preserve multiple loyalties within the institution, threatening military and security decisions and leaving the state fragile, he said.

"We cannot build a national army if every group continues to regard itself as an independent entity with its own economy and loyalties," Halabi said, adding that the state was reassigning commanders and personnel.

Halabi disputed reports that corps commanders were being selected exclusively from HTS. He said HTS was the first group to dissolve itself and merge into the state, and that it had more organizational, security and administrative experience than other factions. It had governed Idlib, managed complex security operations and developed the ability to control territory and institutions, he said.

"If we kept the previous arrangement, regional sensitivities and old loyalties would return," Halabi said. "At this stage, we want a unified, solid leadership that is not subject to rival pressures, with everyone taking part without discrimination."

Five corps and expected changes

Rashid Hourani, a military affairs specialist at the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new structure would probably retain a five-corps model, although commanders, troop composition, deployment areas and operational duties could change.

The previous phase had shown the need to make the formations more mobile in responding to internal and external threats, he said. The next structure could therefore change commanders and adapt each corps' methods to its assigned mission.

Hourani said the reorganization was part of a broader effort to rebuild the Syrian army and develop its working methods for the state's next phase.

Syrian news outlets reported that the proposed arrangements would place the eastern corps under Brigadier General Ahmed Mohammed al-Jassem, known as Abu Mohammed Shoura, whose name had previously been associated with command of the 66th Division.

Other reports said Brigadier General Awad al-Jassem, known as Abu Qutaiba al-Shami and previously linked to the 60th Division, would command the northern region as its four divisions were reorganized.

Some sources named Brig. Gen. Haitham al-Ali, known as Abu Muslim Afes, as the prospective commander of the central corps. Other reports said the Damascus corps would be led by Brigadier General Omar Mohammed Jaftashi, known as Mukhtar al-Turki, who currently commands the Damascus Division.

Local platforms reported that Brig. Gen. Munir al-Sheikh, known as Abu Osama, would oversee the western region and the coast through a corps comprising four recently reorganized divisions.

The problem of more radical factions

Halabi said the state was dealing carefully with more radical factions and would distribute their personnel among the corps to prevent them from forming blocs inside the army.

"These factions have important combat experience, but they must operate within an institution, not with the mentality of a group or organization," he said. "They will therefore be distributed carefully among the corps so that they are absorbed into the new military structure."

The main challenge was to move from a factional mentality to a state mentality, Halabi said.

Hourani said foreign fighters, including Turkistanis and others, had joined the army, particularly the 84th Division, and were in principle subject to the same military rules and laws as other units.

"Foreign Islamist groups joined the army, particularly the 84th Division, and the rules that apply to all military units now apply to them," he said. "Any violations are handled under the military law in force."

Asked whether international demands could lead to further moves against radical factions inside military formations, Hourani said the issue would remain part of the army-building process and its effort to draw lessons from earlier phases. He said two main considerations governed the matter, but the source text did not specify them.

How the factions view restructuring

Hourani said factions that joined the Defense Ministry understood the difference between formations created during the campaign to overthrow Assad and the requirements of an army operating through state institutions.

The factions had largely accepted integration even though Western reports warned about the method and its effects, he said. Their shared objective had eased the task and allowed the army formation to proceed smoothly.

Hourani said the continued presence of some commanders associated with particular factions reflected the experience accumulated by HTS's military wing before Assad's fall.

HTS's military wing had developed substantially in training, organization and methods of warfare, and the leadership now wanted to use that experience, he said.

Syrian Turkish coordination and a US role

Hourani said Syrian-Turkish military coordination was public and included organization and training, as reflected in repeated visits by senior military officials from both countries.

He said Washington had accepted that cooperation. He also referred to US congressional scrutiny of the Syrian government's counterterrorism performance as part of the consideration of future security cooperation.

Türkiye's aims

Hourani said Türkiye's role in building the Syrian army served objectives tied to Turkish national security as well as Ankara's political and military position in Syria and the region.

He said the aims included building a unified Syrian army that would prevent separatist entities from threatening Türkiye, citing the former presence of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria.

He also cited Türkiye's desire to strengthen its political and military influence, draw on its experience training armed forces in African states and support a Syrian administration it had backed during the uprising.

Building an army rather than merely merging factions

Syria's military restructuring shows that Damascus faces a challenge that goes beyond merely placing former armed factions under the Defense Ministry. It must also end their ability to operate as independent blocs within the armed forces.

The first phase brought factions under the state umbrella. The current phase focuses on dismantling their internal structures, reassigning personnel and commanders, and adjusting deployments and missions to prevent regional and factional loyalties from re-emerging.

Military officials say the goal is a unified army for all Syrians. Questions remain, however, about the authority that figures drawn from HTS will retain, the doctrine of the new military and the limits of Turkish and international influence over its development.

The restructuring is ultimately a test of whether Syria's new state can move from an alliance of victorious factions to a military institution subordinate to the state. The process remains unfinished, and its outcome will help shape Syria's government and security.