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Saudi Arabia in 2024: Positive Expectations Underpinned by Political Will and Economic Capacities

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)
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Saudi Arabia in 2024: Positive Expectations Underpinned by Political Will and Economic Capacities

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the South Korean President attend a session of the Future Investment Initiative (SPA)

In an increasingly uncertain world, constants remain our main reference for forecasting the near future. These constants, the factors upon which projections about the future are based, can be summarized into three factors: The first is political will, the primary determinant of the direction a state will take and the objectives it sets.

The second is economic capacity, which enables states to execute their political will and allows them to turn plans into tangible reality.

As for the third factor, it is global changes, which can either positively or negatively affect the implementation of these plans. This is the major cause for uncertainty regarding the future, and state policies play a crucial role in determining it. When applying this perspective to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one can anticipate what the next year might look like.

Saudi Arabia 2023

Starting with political will, domestically, the Kingdom continues to pursue its ambitious Vision 2030 - a pursuit reinforced by the fact that it has achieved targets ahead of schedule. Many of these initiatives have certainly started to bear fruit, especially those that began early in restructuring some of the state's sectors.

The Kingdom did not stop at the programs it launched with the inception of its Vision. It pursued many projects and initiatives in sectors such as tourism, entertainment, and sports. In the latter, the implications of the state's determination to transform plans into reality are particularly evident. In just a few years, the Saudi football league has stolen the spotlight from globally followed football leagues, with the world turning its attention to the Kingdom after the sports sector was restricted and the role of the private sector in the sports system was invigorated.

Since the Vision is comprehensive and encompasses all vital sectors, the interconnections of its different projects and their mutual reinforcement of one another have become evident. For example, recognizing the need for logistical support in the tourism sector, the Public Investment Fund launched Riyadh Air to help the Kingdom reach tourism targets.

This principle of interconnectedness applies to many intersections within the Vision. The progress made in these various sectors is further enhanced by the direct oversight of the Kingdom's senior leadership over national strategies, which ensures the integration and staves off redundancies.

Political will in the Kingdom also has obvious implications for its foreign relations with other countries. For years, the Kingdom has built bridges of communication with the world under the banner of shared interests and the exchange of values. 2022 concluded with the visit of the Chinese President to Riyadh, and these high-level visits continued into 2023, with the Kingdom hosting several major summits, such as the Saudi-African Summit, the Gulf-ASEAN Summit, the Saudi-Caribbean Summit, the Arab Summit, and the Islamic Summit.

The objectives of these summits vary and include political, economic, and cultural aspects. However, the Kingdom takes the same approach to all countries with shared interests and mutual benefits.

The Kingdom also participated in global summits, notably the G20 Summit in India and the Summit for a New Financing Pact in Paris. The impact of these efforts and international visits became apparent when the Kingdom won the bid to host Expo 2030 by attaining the majority of votes from countries and leveraging its strong global relationships.

Economic capacity

The second factor is economic capacity, which may be represented by the state budget for the next year. The Kingdom has continued to expand spending, setting a budget of over 1.2 trillion Riyals, while making conservative revenue projections. The deficit in the state's general budget did not exceed 2 percent, and the government continues to spend on various sectors without making any significant changes, thereby ensuring the continuity of the state's strategies for these sectors and their alignment with the shifts all around us.

While oil revenues decreased due to OPEC's proactive policy to maintain market stability, non-oil revenues continued to increase, reaching 441 billion riyals - about 37 percent of the state's revenues, up from approximately 32.5 percent in 2018.

The Kingdom's capacity to keep up this spending reflects two things: first, it is confident that its economy is solid, and it can sustain this expansionary spending without increasing public debt relative to GDP or depleting its reserves; second, its commitment to pursuing the programs of Vision 2030 and its reassurance about their positive outcomes for the national economy.

Global changes

The third factor is global changes, which can either pose risks or create opportunities for the Kingdom. These changes could be geopolitical, such as the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, which affects the stability of oil prices, or changes in the course of Israel’s assault on Gaza, which impacts the entire region, or the Houthi attacks disrupting maritime navigation in the Red Sea.

These changes may also be reflected in the global economy. Global economic growth remains slow due to factors such as inflation, the austere monetary policies adopted by central banks to curb it, and the aftermath of the pandemic, which has had an impact on global supply chains.

Saudi Arabia 2024

The forecasts for the Saudi economy in the next year are generally positive. Fitch predicted that the Saudi economy would grow between 2.6 and 3.3 percent, while Moody's expects growth of around 4.6 percent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised its growth projections for the Kingdom to 4 percent in a short period. The preliminary budget statement from the Ministry of Finance has said that real GDP is expected to grow by 4.4 percent.

These forecasts are driven by several factors, including the events of 2023 and the policies being pursued by the Kingdom. Despite reducing its oil production, the Kingdom's revenues increased this year. This increase was driven by rising non-oil revenues, and these revenues are expected to continue to rise next year, as they have over the past five years.

This increase is due to the increasing role of the private sector, which has been invigorated by various government measures and programs tied to Vision 2030. This approach taken by the Saudi government is to mitigate potential risks in global oil markets. That is among the major axes of Vision 2030, which aims to diversify revenue sources in order to ensure sustainable growth and development in the Kingdom.

The developments seen in 2023 reflect a number of projections. For example, it would not be surprising if Saudi Arabia launched several projects related to its hosting of Expo 2030. These could include determining the location of the event, holding activities such as conferences tied to the Expo, like exhibitions, and strategic plans, and possibly establishing a governmental body tasked with overseeing this major event.

Moreover, we can also expect changes in the Saudi sports sector next year. Given that Saudi Arabia began privatizing clubs by transferring the ownership of four clubs to the Public Investment Fund, this trend could continue next year, with more clubs being transferred to major Saudi companies.

An increase in pace at the Ministry of Sports can also be anticipated in preparation for the expected announcement of its successful bid to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup. This preparation might involve submitting a proposal that includes constructing new stadiums and infrastructure to ensure that the Kingdom provides fans with a distinguished experience and that the sports sector meets the high aspirations that have been set for it.

With Saudi Arabia hosting Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup, many infrastructure projects are anticipated. These include ongoing large-scale infrastructure projects in Riyadh, such as King Salman Airport, the Qiddiya Project, King Salman Park, and other significant initiatives. Other cities in the Kingdom that may play an important role, especially in organizing the World Cup, are also expected to see major projects.

Those following the progress being made on Vision 2030 projects can see that it started with several ambitious projects like NEOM, Red Sea, Amaala, and Qiddiya. It began with the launch of numerous projects in Riyadh at the start of Vision 2030, and then we saw other projects in other cities, such as Jeddah Central, Rua Al Medina, and the Sudah and Abha Airport projects.

This might indicate that more projects will be seen in other cities across the Kingdom, whether broad infrastructure projects or sight-specific ones, like agricultural projects suited to cities and their geography and environment. This means that the next year will see the persistence, God willing, of Vision 2030, and the expansion of its initiatives to more Saudi cities that align with their cultural and geographical characteristics.

Flexibility of the Kingdom

The Kingdom has shown itself to be flexible through how it has dealt with economic and political events in recent years. It was not significantly affected by the inflation generated by the pandemic, unlike other countries, and it managed to stave off the negative repercussions of global geopolitical conflicts. Rather, it launched global initiatives aimed at addressing the ramifications of these developments, as it had with its initiatives for global supply chains.

It is not surprising that this approach will continue next year, with precautions being taken to avoid any changes that could negatively impact its economic and strategic interests. The Kingdom will leverage the robustness of its economy and global relationships to find solutions that ensure prosperity, all while maintaining its national project aimed at elevating its strategic and vital sectors.

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Features

Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.

Features

What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.

Features

Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.