Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
TT

Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP

Few things grab the attention of Arab leaders who are friendly to Washington more than America’s military presence in the region. Even the slightest drawdown greatly worries and often drives them to assume the worst about US intentions.

A calm assessment of America’s changing geopolitical priorities, followed by an understanding of how the United States has sought to adjust its military posture in the region, should ease the worries of Arab partners, or at least some of them.

While it is true that the United States has reached fatigue in the Middle East given its costly interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the more powerful driver behind reducing military investments in the region is the US strategic prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.

Checking China and countering Russia requires more resources than previously allocated to each respective theater, and given that US resources are limited, they must be brought in from other places. By any objective account, the United States had an oversized presence in the Middle East, which made the region a natural candidate for a reduced US military footprint.

The view of US abandonment of the Middle East has needlessly dominated policy and emotions in the region. It remains baseless. So long as the region contains strategic natural resources including high percentages of oil and gas, and so long as the export of those resources is crucial for the wellbeing of the international economy, the United States will care about the region and devote resources to maintain stability in that vital part of the world. The question now is how the United States can preserve its interests, strengthen its partnerships, and commit to its stabilizing mission in the region with fewer resources at its disposal.

There’s no doubt that Washington has struggled with this question at the policy level – the conflict between Israel and Hamas is just the latest example of the limitations of US Middle East policy. But what’s encouraging is that the US Department of Defense has stepped up and proposed some creative ideas regarding the future of America’s military presence in the region. Enter dynamic force employment.

The concept of dynamic force employment was officially introduced in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Implemented in the Middle East more than anywhere else lately, it seeks to reduce routine deployments to provide flexibility and make peacetime force movements more agile without compromising on combat readiness. Current commander of US Air Forces Central Command, Lt. Gen. Greg Guillot, argued that “dynamic force employment deployments demonstrate the ability to move combat capability into theater just in time for when it is required, not just in case it might be needed.”

Dynamic force employment also better protects US forces from Iran’s threat of missiles and unmanned aerial systems. In his posture statement on March 15, 2022, former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie correctly noted that “distributing forces more broadly outside of the most significant Iranian threat ranges not only enhances survivability but also demonstrates an increased capability to rapidly mass combat effects...”

And that’s precisely what CENTCOM has demonstrated in its approach to the region over the past few weeks and months. We’ve seen the United States deploy additional military assets including aircraft carriers, warships, and fighter aircraft to respond to the rising threat of Iran’s threat network. These resources had to come from other regions including Europe and even from military bases in the United States.

Dynamic force employment shouldn’t suggest that the United States has switched to a strategy of offshore balancing or that it is about to gradually give up its forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East. An effective posture that contributes to the missions of deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation must have an element of forward deployment.

To deter Iran, the United States must have assets in theater to affect the decision-making calculus of the leadership in Tehran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. To be sure, US deterrence against Iran has been contested. But it would be even less effective without immediate and powerful American means of punishment in theater that could prevent Iran from quickly establishing facts on the ground in a crisis.

To reassure partners, the United States needs visible and permanent military power in the region. Regional partners feel a lot more reassured by the constant basing of American troops and equipment on their soil because it reflects a certain level of US commitment to their security. Also, to effectively conduct security cooperation, the United States needs troops and trained personnel in the region to advise and assist their counterparts. The entire enterprise of security cooperation is about building trust and personal relationships, and you simply cannot do that remotely.

How much forward presence is necessary to effectively pursue all three of these missions is always hard to know. One also has to recognize that when it comes to posture, there is an inherent tension between deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation.

While security cooperation doesn’t need a large US footprint – it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else – partners will always prefer a robust and sizable presence. With respect to deterrence, it is virtually impossible to know how much US firepower is enough to be effective because the concept itself is incredibly hard to measure and evaluate (it also depends on several other variables including credibility and consistency) and because Iran consistently operates below the threshold of war.

Dynamic force employment is supposed to smartly balance between all three missions by keeping a forward-deployed presence while putting a bigger premium on maintaining access, investing in adaptability, and building resilience. This is particularly challenging because regional partners could decide to reduce US access if they see that Washington is further drawing down its physical presence.

Access becomes even more important to the United States as tensions with Iran grow and the likelihood of war increases. The first few moments of a potential confrontation or even military crisis between the United States and Iran require a high degree of US operational flexibility, which can only be enabled by access.

In the end, any US discussion of posture, be it in the Middle East or elsewhere, should be informed first and foremost by strategy. Strategy drives posture, not the other way around. There is no point in debating numbers of American troops and capabilities in the Middle East if Washington doesn't have a clear idea of what objectives it wants those troops and capabilities to achieve.

But even when that moment of clarity in US Middle East strategy comes, Washington should always remember that the regional partners get a vote. Without their access and permission, the United States can do very little in the Middle East.



Legal Threats Close in on Israel's Netanyahu, Could Impact Ongoing Wars

The International Criminal Court (ICC) building is pictured on November 21, 2024 in The Hague. (Photo by Laurens van PUTTEN / ANP / AFP) / Netherlands OUT
The International Criminal Court (ICC) building is pictured on November 21, 2024 in The Hague. (Photo by Laurens van PUTTEN / ANP / AFP) / Netherlands OUT
TT

Legal Threats Close in on Israel's Netanyahu, Could Impact Ongoing Wars

The International Criminal Court (ICC) building is pictured on November 21, 2024 in The Hague. (Photo by Laurens van PUTTEN / ANP / AFP) / Netherlands OUT
The International Criminal Court (ICC) building is pictured on November 21, 2024 in The Hague. (Photo by Laurens van PUTTEN / ANP / AFP) / Netherlands OUT

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces legal perils at home and abroad that point to a turbulent future for the Israeli leader and could influence the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, analysts and officials say.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) stunned Israel on Thursday by issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former defense chief Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 13-month-old Gaza conflict. The bombshell came less than two weeks before Netanyahu is due to testify in a corruption trial that has dogged him for years and could end his political career if he is found guilty. He has denied any wrongdoing. While the domestic bribery trial has polarized public opinion, the prime minister has received widespread support from across the political spectrum following the ICC move, giving him a boost in troubled times.
Netanyahu has denounced the court's decision as antisemitic and denied charges that he and Gallant targeted Gazan civilians and deliberately starved them.
"Israelis get really annoyed if they think the world is against them and rally around their leader, even if he has faced a lot of criticism," said Yonatan Freeman, an international relations expert at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
"So anyone expecting that the ICC ruling will end this government, and what they see as a flawed (war) policy, is going to get the opposite," he added.
A senior diplomat said one initial consequence was that Israel might be less likely to reach a rapid ceasefire with Hezbollah in Lebanon or secure a deal to bring back hostages still held by Hamas in Gaza.
"This terrible decision has ... badly harmed the chances of a deal in Lebanon and future negotiations on the issue of the hostages," said Ofir Akunis, Israel's consul general in New York.
"Terrible damage has been done because these organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas ... have received backing from the ICC and thus they are likely to make the price higher because they have the support of the ICC," he told Reuters.
While Hamas welcomed the ICC decision, there has been no indication that either it or Hezbollah see this as a chance to put pressure on Israel, which has inflicted huge losses on both groups over the past year, as well as on civilian populations.
IN THE DOCK
The ICC warrants highlight the disconnect between the way the war is viewed here and how it is seen by many abroad, with Israelis focused on their own losses and convinced the nation's army has sought to minimize civilian casualties.
Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, said the ICC move would likely harden resolve and give the war cabinet license to hit Gaza and Lebanon harder still.
"There's a strong strand of Israeli feeling that runs deep, which says 'if we're being condemned for what we are doing, we might just as well go full gas'," he told Reuters.
While Netanyahu has received wide support at home over the ICC action, the same is not true of the domestic graft case, where he is accused of bribery, breach of trust and fraud.
The trial opened in 2020 and Netanyahu is finally scheduled to take the stand next month after the court rejected his latest request to delay testimony on the grounds that he had been too busy overseeing the war to prepare his defense.
He was due to give evidence last year but the date was put back because of the war. His critics have accused him of prolonging the Gaza conflict to delay judgment day and remain in power, which he denies. Always a divisive figure in Israel, public trust in Netanyahu fell sharply in the wake of the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas assault on southern Israel that caught his government off guard, cost around 1,200 lives.
Israel's subsequent campaign has killed more than 44,000 people and displaced nearly all Gaza's population at least once, triggering a humanitarian catastrophe, according to Gaza officials.
The prime minister has refused advice from the state attorney general to set up an independent commission into what went wrong and Israel's subsequent conduct of the war.
He is instead looking to establish an inquiry made up only of politicians, which critics say would not provide the sort of accountability demanded by the ICC.
Popular Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth said the failure to order an independent investigation had prodded the ICC into action. "Netanyahu preferred to take the risk of arrest warrants, just as long as he did not have to form such a commission," it wrote on Friday.
ARREST THREAT
The prime minister faces a difficult future living under the shadow of an ICC warrant, joining the ranks of only a few leaders to have suffered similar humiliation, including Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic.
It also means he risks arrest if he travels to any of the court's 124 signatory states, including most of Europe.
One place he can safely visit is the United States, which is not a member of the ICC, and Israeli leaders hope US President-elect Donald Trump will bring pressure to bear by imposing sanctions on ICC officials.
Mike Waltz, Trump's nominee for national security advisor, has already promised tough action: "You can expect a strong response to the antisemitic bias of the ICC & UN come January,” he wrote on X on Friday. In the meantime, Israeli officials are talking to their counterparts in Western capitals, urging them to ignore the arrest warrants, as Hungary has already promised to do.
However, the charges are not going to disappear soon, if at all, meaning fellow leaders will be increasingly reluctant to have relations with Netanyahu, said Yuval Shany, a senior fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute.
"In a very direct sense, there is going to be more isolation for the Israeli state going forward," he told Reuters.