Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
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Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP

Few things grab the attention of Arab leaders who are friendly to Washington more than America’s military presence in the region. Even the slightest drawdown greatly worries and often drives them to assume the worst about US intentions.

A calm assessment of America’s changing geopolitical priorities, followed by an understanding of how the United States has sought to adjust its military posture in the region, should ease the worries of Arab partners, or at least some of them.

While it is true that the United States has reached fatigue in the Middle East given its costly interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the more powerful driver behind reducing military investments in the region is the US strategic prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.

Checking China and countering Russia requires more resources than previously allocated to each respective theater, and given that US resources are limited, they must be brought in from other places. By any objective account, the United States had an oversized presence in the Middle East, which made the region a natural candidate for a reduced US military footprint.

The view of US abandonment of the Middle East has needlessly dominated policy and emotions in the region. It remains baseless. So long as the region contains strategic natural resources including high percentages of oil and gas, and so long as the export of those resources is crucial for the wellbeing of the international economy, the United States will care about the region and devote resources to maintain stability in that vital part of the world. The question now is how the United States can preserve its interests, strengthen its partnerships, and commit to its stabilizing mission in the region with fewer resources at its disposal.

There’s no doubt that Washington has struggled with this question at the policy level – the conflict between Israel and Hamas is just the latest example of the limitations of US Middle East policy. But what’s encouraging is that the US Department of Defense has stepped up and proposed some creative ideas regarding the future of America’s military presence in the region. Enter dynamic force employment.

The concept of dynamic force employment was officially introduced in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Implemented in the Middle East more than anywhere else lately, it seeks to reduce routine deployments to provide flexibility and make peacetime force movements more agile without compromising on combat readiness. Current commander of US Air Forces Central Command, Lt. Gen. Greg Guillot, argued that “dynamic force employment deployments demonstrate the ability to move combat capability into theater just in time for when it is required, not just in case it might be needed.”

Dynamic force employment also better protects US forces from Iran’s threat of missiles and unmanned aerial systems. In his posture statement on March 15, 2022, former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie correctly noted that “distributing forces more broadly outside of the most significant Iranian threat ranges not only enhances survivability but also demonstrates an increased capability to rapidly mass combat effects...”

And that’s precisely what CENTCOM has demonstrated in its approach to the region over the past few weeks and months. We’ve seen the United States deploy additional military assets including aircraft carriers, warships, and fighter aircraft to respond to the rising threat of Iran’s threat network. These resources had to come from other regions including Europe and even from military bases in the United States.

Dynamic force employment shouldn’t suggest that the United States has switched to a strategy of offshore balancing or that it is about to gradually give up its forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East. An effective posture that contributes to the missions of deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation must have an element of forward deployment.

To deter Iran, the United States must have assets in theater to affect the decision-making calculus of the leadership in Tehran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. To be sure, US deterrence against Iran has been contested. But it would be even less effective without immediate and powerful American means of punishment in theater that could prevent Iran from quickly establishing facts on the ground in a crisis.

To reassure partners, the United States needs visible and permanent military power in the region. Regional partners feel a lot more reassured by the constant basing of American troops and equipment on their soil because it reflects a certain level of US commitment to their security. Also, to effectively conduct security cooperation, the United States needs troops and trained personnel in the region to advise and assist their counterparts. The entire enterprise of security cooperation is about building trust and personal relationships, and you simply cannot do that remotely.

How much forward presence is necessary to effectively pursue all three of these missions is always hard to know. One also has to recognize that when it comes to posture, there is an inherent tension between deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation.

While security cooperation doesn’t need a large US footprint – it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else – partners will always prefer a robust and sizable presence. With respect to deterrence, it is virtually impossible to know how much US firepower is enough to be effective because the concept itself is incredibly hard to measure and evaluate (it also depends on several other variables including credibility and consistency) and because Iran consistently operates below the threshold of war.

Dynamic force employment is supposed to smartly balance between all three missions by keeping a forward-deployed presence while putting a bigger premium on maintaining access, investing in adaptability, and building resilience. This is particularly challenging because regional partners could decide to reduce US access if they see that Washington is further drawing down its physical presence.

Access becomes even more important to the United States as tensions with Iran grow and the likelihood of war increases. The first few moments of a potential confrontation or even military crisis between the United States and Iran require a high degree of US operational flexibility, which can only be enabled by access.

In the end, any US discussion of posture, be it in the Middle East or elsewhere, should be informed first and foremost by strategy. Strategy drives posture, not the other way around. There is no point in debating numbers of American troops and capabilities in the Middle East if Washington doesn't have a clear idea of what objectives it wants those troops and capabilities to achieve.

But even when that moment of clarity in US Middle East strategy comes, Washington should always remember that the regional partners get a vote. Without their access and permission, the United States can do very little in the Middle East.



Hezbollah’s Drones: A Key Gamble in the War with Israel

A photo released by Israeli media shows damage to Netanyahu’s house window
A photo released by Israeli media shows damage to Netanyahu’s house window
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Hezbollah’s Drones: A Key Gamble in the War with Israel

A photo released by Israeli media shows damage to Netanyahu’s house window
A photo released by Israeli media shows damage to Netanyahu’s house window

Drones have become Hezbollah's main weapon in its war with Israel. Their importance lies not just in hitting targets, but in some drones’ ability to avoid detection by radar and the Iron Dome defense system.

In contrast, Israel has successfully intercepted most missiles before they reach their targets, according to the Israeli military.

From September 17 to late October, 76 drone launches were recorded, with over 170 drones of different sizes, some reaching up to 145 kilometers into southern Tel Aviv's outskirts.

Israeli media reported that more than 1,200 explosive drones have entered Israel since Hezbollah’s northern offensive last year. The Israeli security forces are still struggling to respond to this “deadly threat.”

Hezbollah has a large fleet of drones, with various types for different tasks. Military expert Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou explains that all of Hezbollah’s drones are Iranian-made, designed for long distances.

They were brought into Lebanon in parts, then assembled and modified to suit the needs of their operations near Israel.

Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah uses three types of drones.

The first type is the small Hudhud reconnaissance drone, measuring 3.5 meters long with a 5-meter wingspan. It flies at low altitudes, up to 100 kilometers, which allows it to reach Tel Aviv.

The Hudhud is equipped with cameras and data storage and can be programmed to fly over target sites and return to its base in Lebanon. It can also be controlled remotely to adjust its mission.

Helou added that these drones are launched from special airports in Jezzine (southern Lebanon) and Hermel (northern Bekaa), as well as similar facilities in Syria. The drones are wheeled and require runways for takeoff and landing.

This week, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that many drones, especially those used for intelligence, managed to reach Haifa and even go beyond without being detected by Israel’s alert systems while crossing from Lebanon.

The Israeli Air Force did not attempt to intercept them.

Israeli research centers believe the Hudhud drones, recently used to monitor sites in Israel, are among the newest models. These electric drones are silent, have no thermal signature, and can fly up to 70 kilometers per hour.

They can take off and land vertically without a runway and are equipped with high-quality cameras that transmit live footage. Their small size and short radar waves make them hard to detect and track.

Hezbollah has previously released videos showing Hudhud drones filming strategic locations in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and other areas, adding them to a “target bank” for attack drones.