Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
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Dynamic Force Employment is the Future of America’s Middle East Presence

The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP
The US aircraft carrier "USS Dwight Eisenhower" crosses the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf on November 26, 2023. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SECOND CLASS RUSKIN NAVAL / AP

Few things grab the attention of Arab leaders who are friendly to Washington more than America’s military presence in the region. Even the slightest drawdown greatly worries and often drives them to assume the worst about US intentions.

A calm assessment of America’s changing geopolitical priorities, followed by an understanding of how the United States has sought to adjust its military posture in the region, should ease the worries of Arab partners, or at least some of them.

While it is true that the United States has reached fatigue in the Middle East given its costly interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the more powerful driver behind reducing military investments in the region is the US strategic prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and European theaters.

Checking China and countering Russia requires more resources than previously allocated to each respective theater, and given that US resources are limited, they must be brought in from other places. By any objective account, the United States had an oversized presence in the Middle East, which made the region a natural candidate for a reduced US military footprint.

The view of US abandonment of the Middle East has needlessly dominated policy and emotions in the region. It remains baseless. So long as the region contains strategic natural resources including high percentages of oil and gas, and so long as the export of those resources is crucial for the wellbeing of the international economy, the United States will care about the region and devote resources to maintain stability in that vital part of the world. The question now is how the United States can preserve its interests, strengthen its partnerships, and commit to its stabilizing mission in the region with fewer resources at its disposal.

There’s no doubt that Washington has struggled with this question at the policy level – the conflict between Israel and Hamas is just the latest example of the limitations of US Middle East policy. But what’s encouraging is that the US Department of Defense has stepped up and proposed some creative ideas regarding the future of America’s military presence in the region. Enter dynamic force employment.

The concept of dynamic force employment was officially introduced in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Implemented in the Middle East more than anywhere else lately, it seeks to reduce routine deployments to provide flexibility and make peacetime force movements more agile without compromising on combat readiness. Current commander of US Air Forces Central Command, Lt. Gen. Greg Guillot, argued that “dynamic force employment deployments demonstrate the ability to move combat capability into theater just in time for when it is required, not just in case it might be needed.”

Dynamic force employment also better protects US forces from Iran’s threat of missiles and unmanned aerial systems. In his posture statement on March 15, 2022, former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie correctly noted that “distributing forces more broadly outside of the most significant Iranian threat ranges not only enhances survivability but also demonstrates an increased capability to rapidly mass combat effects...”

And that’s precisely what CENTCOM has demonstrated in its approach to the region over the past few weeks and months. We’ve seen the United States deploy additional military assets including aircraft carriers, warships, and fighter aircraft to respond to the rising threat of Iran’s threat network. These resources had to come from other regions including Europe and even from military bases in the United States.

Dynamic force employment shouldn’t suggest that the United States has switched to a strategy of offshore balancing or that it is about to gradually give up its forward-deployed military presence in the Middle East. An effective posture that contributes to the missions of deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation must have an element of forward deployment.

To deter Iran, the United States must have assets in theater to affect the decision-making calculus of the leadership in Tehran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. To be sure, US deterrence against Iran has been contested. But it would be even less effective without immediate and powerful American means of punishment in theater that could prevent Iran from quickly establishing facts on the ground in a crisis.

To reassure partners, the United States needs visible and permanent military power in the region. Regional partners feel a lot more reassured by the constant basing of American troops and equipment on their soil because it reflects a certain level of US commitment to their security. Also, to effectively conduct security cooperation, the United States needs troops and trained personnel in the region to advise and assist their counterparts. The entire enterprise of security cooperation is about building trust and personal relationships, and you simply cannot do that remotely.

How much forward presence is necessary to effectively pursue all three of these missions is always hard to know. One also has to recognize that when it comes to posture, there is an inherent tension between deterrence, reassurance, and security cooperation.

While security cooperation doesn’t need a large US footprint – it needs the right kind of personnel in the right places more than anything else – partners will always prefer a robust and sizable presence. With respect to deterrence, it is virtually impossible to know how much US firepower is enough to be effective because the concept itself is incredibly hard to measure and evaluate (it also depends on several other variables including credibility and consistency) and because Iran consistently operates below the threshold of war.

Dynamic force employment is supposed to smartly balance between all three missions by keeping a forward-deployed presence while putting a bigger premium on maintaining access, investing in adaptability, and building resilience. This is particularly challenging because regional partners could decide to reduce US access if they see that Washington is further drawing down its physical presence.

Access becomes even more important to the United States as tensions with Iran grow and the likelihood of war increases. The first few moments of a potential confrontation or even military crisis between the United States and Iran require a high degree of US operational flexibility, which can only be enabled by access.

In the end, any US discussion of posture, be it in the Middle East or elsewhere, should be informed first and foremost by strategy. Strategy drives posture, not the other way around. There is no point in debating numbers of American troops and capabilities in the Middle East if Washington doesn't have a clear idea of what objectives it wants those troops and capabilities to achieve.

But even when that moment of clarity in US Middle East strategy comes, Washington should always remember that the regional partners get a vote. Without their access and permission, the United States can do very little in the Middle East.



Some European Firms Retreat from Israel-Linked Finance amid War Pressure

 An Israeli national flag flies over a city highway during rush hour, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 4, 2024. (Reuters)
An Israeli national flag flies over a city highway during rush hour, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 4, 2024. (Reuters)
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Some European Firms Retreat from Israel-Linked Finance amid War Pressure

 An Israeli national flag flies over a city highway during rush hour, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 4, 2024. (Reuters)
An Israeli national flag flies over a city highway during rush hour, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 4, 2024. (Reuters)

Several of Europe's biggest financial firms have cut back their links to Israeli companies or those with ties to the country, a Reuters analysis of filings shows, as pressure mounts from activists and governments to end the war in Gaza.

While banks and insurers are often vocal about their environmental and governance aims, they are less forthcoming about disclosing their potential exposure to war.

UniCredit put Israel on a "forbidden" list as the conflict escalated in October last year, said a source familiar with the matter, confirming a study by Dutch NGO PAX.

While in line with the Italian bank's defense-sector policy of not directly financing arms exports to any country involved in conflict, it goes beyond Italy's guidelines on arms exports to Israel.

UniCredit declined to comment on its move and the Israeli finance ministry also declined to comment.

Meanwhile, Norwegian asset manager Storebrand and French insurer AXA have sold shares of some Israeli firms, including banks.

Although corporate filings offer only a glimpse into such exposures, they show companies have been readjusting.

"We don't know whether this represents the beginning of a shift in the industry, one that recognizes the power banks have in choosing where to allocate capital, and where not," said Martin Rohner, executive director at the Global Alliance for Banking on Values, which focuses on sustainable financing.

"Investing in the production and trade of weapons is fundamentally opposed to the principles of sustainable development," Rohner added.

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich told a press briefing last week that although there are challenges to Israel's economy, firms are still raising money. "I sit with foreign investors and they believe in our economy," he said.

Reuters has reported that Israel's investor base has narrowed since it entered Gaza last year in response to attacks by Hamas, and it is feeling the effects of rising borrowing costs.

The potential wider effects can be seen in the approach taken by Storebrand, which a filing showed divested a holding worth about $24 million in Palantir, citing the risk of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.

US group Palantir, which provides technology to Israel's military, did not respond to a request for comment.

Storebrand's annual investment review said that, as of the end of 2023, it had excluded 24 firms, including Israeli companies, across its portfolios in relation to the occupation of Palestinian territories.

The International Court of Justice, the United Nations' highest court, ruled in January of plausible risk of irreparable harm to Palestinian rights to be protected from genocide.

The same court said in July that Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories including the settlements is illegal.

Israel has rejected the rulings, which combined with growing pressure from activists and governments, are nevertheless having an impact on investment decisions.

AXA, one of Europe's largest insurers, British bank Barclays and German insurer Allianz have increasingly been targeted by campaigners.

"Increasing demand for greater transparency and scrutiny can only mean that financial institutions will intensify and broaden their self-assessment of their commercial associations with arms-related businesses or states," said David Kinley, professor and chair of human rights law at the Sydney law school.

The Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) has exited six Israeli companies, selling holdings which amounted to about 3 million euros ($3.26 million), including some of Israel's largest banks, a spokesperson told Reuters.

Earlier this year, the 15-billion-euro Irish fund said that the risk profile of such investments were no longer within its investment parameters.

And Norway's $1.8 trillion wealth fund, the world's biggest, may divest shares of companies that aid Israel's operations in the occupied Palestinian territories which violate its ethics standards for businesses.

WAR EXPOSURE

Investments in Israeli banks are also under scrutiny.

The UN included them in 2020 in a list of companies with ties to settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories as part of its mission to review the implications on Palestinian rights.

A study by research firm Profundo, commissioned by corporate watchdog Ekō, shows that AXA sold almost all of its holdings in Israeli banks stocks earlier this year, retaining only a marginal stake in Bank Leumi.

Reuters verified the data with LSEG. A representative for Bank Leumi did not respond to a request for comment.

A spokesperson for AXA declined to comment on whether AXA had cut its holdings, adding that it is not invested in the banks targeted by activists. The UN list is among the criteria AXA takes into account for investment decisions, they added.

'A CLEAR LINE'

Foreign direct investment into Israel fell by 29% in 2023 to its lowest since 2016, UN Trade and Development data shows.

While UNCTAD 2024 figures are not available, credit ratings agencies have flagged the war's unpredictable impact on investment in Israel as a concern.

Although the US remains Israel's biggest military and financial backer, Spain, Ireland and Norway have recognized a Palestinian state, French President Emmanuel Macron has called for an arms export halt and Britain has suspended some licenses.

When it comes to international politics, "it should be down to the governments to take a clear line," said Richard Portes, professor of economics at London Business School, adding: "To put the burden on the private firms, where does this end?"

In an example of how activists are targeting companies directly, Barclays came under pressure from a campaign in Britain, prompting it to withdraw sponsorship from summer music festivals, while the Financial Times reported in August that it considered pulling out of an Israeli government bond sale.

Barclays said in a statement that it remained "fully committed" to its role as a primary dealer and that such activities fluctuated each quarter. The bank fell out of the top five dealers of Israeli bonds in the second and third quarters, after ranking third in 2023.