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Can Sudan Survive?

Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
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Can Sudan Survive?

Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP
Displaced people fleeing from Wad Madani in Sudan's Jazira state. AFP

The year 2023 began on a seemingly optimistic note for Sudan. Its leading generals, Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Hemedti of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had endorsed a framework agreement to create a civilian transitional government. Tragically, at year end, Sudan faces de facto division like Libya. Its capital is destroyed, ethnic killing rages, 5.5 million Sudanese are displaced and 18 million are experiencing acute hunger.

This is a far cry from what the Sudanese people, the United States and others envisioned following the April 2019 ouster of President Bashir and subsequent formation of a predominantly civilian transitional government. What went wrong? The kleptocratic state created by Bashir proved powerful and enduring despite his ouster. Civilian political actors became increasingly fractious and failed to connect with the women and youth who led the 2018-19 revolution. When the transitional government tried to transition some control of the economy from military hands, Generals Burhan and Hemedti staged a coup in October 2021.

Post-coup, the United Nations, African Union and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) jointly tried to facilitate a new accommodation between civilian political actors and the generals. The United States supported this effort. The process led to an agreement to establish a new civilian transitional government in April 2023. However, the contentious issue of integration of the RSF and SAF into one army remained unresolved and spoilers took advantage.

On April 15, fighting broke out between SAF and RSF in and around the capital, Khartoum. It quickly spread. At year’s end, the RSF controls four of the five states of Darfur in the west and significant portions of Kordofan in the south as well as much of greater Khartoum. The SAF dominates most areas east of the White Nile. Sudan is de facto divided.

The world has not ignored this new crisis in Sudan. The United States and Saudi Arabia quickly organized negotiations in Jeddah seeking a ceasefire and humanitarian access to displaced Sudanese. Despite the generals’ promises of a ceasefire, fighting continued. Negotiations were suspended. Other external actors also tried their hand at mediation. However, Burhan’s rump government rejected African Union efforts citing the AU’s post-coup suspension of Sudan as evidence of bias. Burhan rejected the IGAD quartet effort claiming its Kenyan leadership favored the RSF. He also stymied any role for the UN’s mission in Sudan. Egypt convened a meeting of neighboring states but that effort failed to stop the fighting. The most horrendous result of the expanding conflict was the slaughter of ethnic Masalit by the RSF and its nomadic tribal allies. Such killing and raping continues to spread unchecked or uncheckable by RSF leadership.

In October 2023, the United States and Saudi Arabia resumed the Jeddah talks and soon secured SAF and RSF agreement to discuss confidence building measures toward establishing a permanent ceasefire. However, the Sudanese generals quickly reverted to their maximalist demands of the other and the fighting continued. IGAD convened an extraordinary summit on December 3 and reportedly generals Burhan and Hemedti agreed to meet within 15 days to discuss a 30-day ceasefire. No sooner had Burhan returned from the summit than his Foreign Ministry began undermining the summit’s outcome. Peace efforts seem to be deadlocked.

Despite recent RSF territorial gains, the fighting also seems headed for deadlock. Can the SAF or RSF decisively defeat the other? While the generals may still believe so, Sudan’s history suggests otherwise. Its prior 38 years of civil war resulted in the country’s partition, not military victory.

Is further division of Sudan what anyone – Sudanese or outside party - really wants? Whose interests are served by such an outcome? Certainly not the interests of the majority of Sudanese who will continue to suffer and die if fighting continues. Certainly not the interests of the United States and Europe which want the ethnic killing to stop, humanitarian relief to flow and democratic governance in Sudan. And hopefully not Sudan’s neighbors who either fear a spillover of insecurity or want to invest in Sudan’s vast mineral, agricultural and commercial potential. Can investments really be secure if two armed camps continue to fight?

For the fighting and current de facto division to end, compromises need to be made among all parties’ interests. Where to begin? Probably not with Sudan’s generals who are still seeking military victory and offering no plausible path to peace. Perhaps begin with those who are enabling the continued fighting. Recently appointed UN Secretary General Special Envoy Ramtane Lamamra has the experience and gravitas necessary to engage all parties connected to the conflict to stop the fighting and open space for a political solution. The imminent appointment of an IGAD special envoy could also help, provided there is unity of effort with Lamamra. Perhaps a non-official “track two” effort could also be helpful in finding a formula that satisfies enough of each parties’ interests to end the fighting and find a political path to re-unify Sudan. However, true national unification will require the support of the vast majority of the Sudanese people. That means the civilian political and grassroots movements, which are becoming increasingly unified, need to be at the center of any formula for lasting peace and stability. Since independence, Sudan mostly experienced military rule and it became a brittle state. Cobbling together another military-dominated government and hoping for a different outcome is futile.

Might the United States and Europe support such an interests-based approach entailing many compromises? Might they be better able to achieve the security, humanitarian and governance objectives of the Sudanese people by doing so? Could they support deals cut by Sudan’s generals and civilian leaders with the country’s regional partners? In other words, could they compromise some of their interests if those fueling and fighting the war are willing to do the same?

Sudan’s survival depends on ending the fighting. That requires adroit diplomacy, facilitated by a trusted, disinterested party, to secure compromises of both Sudanese and external interests.

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.