Drones Are The Predominant Weapon On The Future Battlefield

 A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone during battles in Bakhmut. (Reuters)
A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone during battles in Bakhmut. (Reuters)
TT

Drones Are The Predominant Weapon On The Future Battlefield

 A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone during battles in Bakhmut. (Reuters)
A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone during battles in Bakhmut. (Reuters)

Over the years, major wars have been characterized by the introduction of new doctrines, new tactics, and new technology. In 1453, the walls of Constantinople were breached by a gigantic cannon used by Sultan Mehmed II. Napoleon brought innovative new infantry tactics. In World War I, mustard gas and machine guns changed the battlefield. In World War II, it was aircraft carriers, blitzkrieg tactics and nuclear weapons.
Today, it is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), commonly known as the drone. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Gaza, drones have become an essential tool of modern warfare and whether used for surveillance, reconnaissance or attack, the skies over Kiev, Gaza, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Taiwan Straits are filled with these small, deadly sentinels.
Drones are the dream of every combatant, whether major armies or non-state actors, and three attributes stand out. First, they are cheap... and plentiful. A small observation drone can be purchased from Amazon for less than $100 and delivered overnight. While it might not kill tanks, it can provide real-time video of the enemy trench line across the field, a rooftop sniper position, or an ambush site around the corner.
More advanced drones can fly higher, farther and stay in the air longer, and this is the bane of the support troops. While wars are fought on the front line with infantry, tanks and aircraft, wars cannot be won without keeping those front lines fed, fueled, and resupplied. It requires massive supply chains of ammunition dumps, fuel depots, repair facilities along with fleets of trucks and thousands of support troops to replenish the millions of tons needed daily to keep a small army fighting.
Most of that supply chain is well away from the front lines and before the proliferation of drones, it could only be observed intermittently and without sufficient accuracy for an enemy to target with artillery or missiles. Now, the entire area of operations is a battlefield and there is nowhere to hide. Drones can patrol above roads, reconnoiter locations with likely logistics stockpiles and zoom over to an infrared heat signal at night to discover a hidden artillery unit or a moving tank column. The power of drones to see throughout the depths of the combat zone, effectively creating a transparent battlefield, is unprecedented.
Drones can not only see targets throughout the combat zone, but they can also attack those targets. In military parlance, the goal is to establish a “sensor-to-shooter link” that can find a target in time and accurately and destroy the target precisely. Drones can solve the “sensor” part of the equation by providing real-time and GPS-accurate information. But until recently, even if the drone sensor is timely and accurate, the tools to attack that target have been relatively blunt. Conventional artillery and rockets are notoriously imprecise and often require hundreds of rounds to destroy a target. As but one example, in Ukraine over 65,000 rounds are fired each day, double the number of shells the US can produce per month.
Drones help solve the “shooter” problem as well. With the advent of laser designated and GPS guided precision weapons, an individual or aircraft with the proper equipment can guide a round onto a target with sufficient accuracy as to achieve a one-round kill. Yet individuals and aircraft are limited by flight conditions, aircraft availability, ground conditions, limited field of view and a host of other challenges that impair the ability to see or engage a target. Drones are not only far better at seeing targets but can also engage a target in several ways. They can provide a video downlink with precise targeting data, provide laser designation to guide a precision round onto a target, carry and fire missiles in its own payload or perform as a “suicide drone” to attack a target directly.
To many, drones are changing the nature of war and will be the predominant weapon on the future battlefield. In an extreme, theorists picture a battlefield filled with technology but devoid of humans. Self-driving tanks will be guided by operators far from the battlefield, drones and autonomous aircraft will be guided by artificial intelligence and ChatGPT and victory will be defined by who has any machines left over at the end of the battle.
That may be one day, but it is not today. Nor will it be soon. For now, drones are seen as invulnerable and revolutionary, but as is so often, radical new technology is quickly overtaken by a better technology which either leaps ahead or neutralizes that new technology. In the case of current drone technology, armies have been exploiting its advantage, but counter drone technology is racing to take away those advantages. Drones are not invulnerable – they can be shot down, they need to be guided, they need data links to pass information to operators and they need clear pictures of the target. Those elements can be interrupted or negated, particularly the critical radio links which can be jammed, spoofed, or blocked.
Despite their vulnerabilities, drones are having a significant impact on every battlefield, whether the high-intensity war in Ukraine, the attacks on international shipping off the coast of Yemen or counterterrorism operations worldwide. Drones have proven to be versatile, inexpensive, and extraordinarily effective, particularly deep targets such as command posts and artillery positions, and high-value targets such as terrorists. Inevitably, counter drone tactics and technology will somewhat reduce their overall effectiveness, but even if their capabilities are diminished, drones will retain an important and permanent role on the modern battlefield.



Shot for Throwing Stones: Israeli Forces Killing West Bank Teens Weekly

Palestinian Sameh Shtayyeh, the father of 15-year-old Youssef Sameh Shtayyeh who was killed on April 23, by Israeli soldiers in the city of Nablus, hugs his son as they visit his grave at the cemetery in the village of Till, west of Nablus, in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian West Bank on May 12, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian Sameh Shtayyeh, the father of 15-year-old Youssef Sameh Shtayyeh who was killed on April 23, by Israeli soldiers in the city of Nablus, hugs his son as they visit his grave at the cemetery in the village of Till, west of Nablus, in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian West Bank on May 12, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Shot for Throwing Stones: Israeli Forces Killing West Bank Teens Weekly

Palestinian Sameh Shtayyeh, the father of 15-year-old Youssef Sameh Shtayyeh who was killed on April 23, by Israeli soldiers in the city of Nablus, hugs his son as they visit his grave at the cemetery in the village of Till, west of Nablus, in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian West Bank on May 12, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian Sameh Shtayyeh, the father of 15-year-old Youssef Sameh Shtayyeh who was killed on April 23, by Israeli soldiers in the city of Nablus, hugs his son as they visit his grave at the cemetery in the village of Till, west of Nablus, in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian West Bank on May 12, 2026. (AFP)

Youssef Shtayyeh came home from school on an April afternoon, dropped his bag in the hallway and headed straight back out to join his friends.

Minutes later, he was dead -- shot by an Israeli soldier, just 100 meters (yards) from his home.

He was 15. His is not an isolated case.

Since Israel launched a major military operation against armed Palestinian groups in the northern West Bank in January 2025, one Palestinian minor has been killed every week on average across the territory, up from one every three weeks in 2021, according to UNICEF.

Seventy teenagers, mostly aged 15 to 16, have been killed to date, 65 of them by Israeli forces, according to a UNICEF report dated May 12.

Then came Youssef Kaabnah, 16, killed on May 13.

Then Fahd Oweis, 15, two days later.

The Israeli military said both had "hurled stones" at soldiers.

It is almost certainly what Shtayyeh had been doing too, on April 23, in Nablus -- the largest city in the northern West Bank, a Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967.

Youssef and his friends were on a side street above a main road when a couple passing in a car spotted them throwing stones -- and the military convoy below.

One jeep stopped. Then the others.

"A soldier got out, then two more. They started shooting at the kids," the passing driver told AFP, declining to be named for safety reasons.

- 'Designed to kill' -

A neighbor filmed what followed.

Two shots. Then screams. Youssef grabbed the car door.

"He said, 'Please don't leave me, I'm scared. Take me to my father, take me home,'" the driver recalled.

Youssef's father Sameh Shtayyeh, a 48-year-old building contractor, told AFP he had no idea what had caused the soldiers to open fire on his son as he "wasn't there".

In a panic, the driver told the boy to get in the car and sped to the hospital.

By the time they reached the facility, the boy was silent. Youssef's heart had stopped.

"A gunshot wound -- entry in the back, exit through the chest," surgeon Bahaa Fattouh, who treated him, told AFP.

Doctors resuscitated him and rushed him to the operating theater. His heart stopped again.

This time, it did not revive.

"Earlier, we used to treat minor injuries -- legs, arms, rubber bullets," said Fattouh.

But since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, "we only see lethal wounds -- chest, head."

Wounds, Fattouh said, that were "designed to kill".

"Most patients die on the operating table."

- 'Standard procedure' -

AFP contacted the Israeli military on the day of the incident, and again after returning from Nablus last week.

The response was identical, word for word: "A terrorist threw stones at soldiers. The soldiers applied the standard arrest procedure, which ended with fire being directed at the suspect."

Israeli daily Haaretz recently quoted the military's commander for the West Bank, Major General Avi Bluth, saying troops had killed 42 Palestinians for throwing stones in 2025.

He described stone-throwing as "terrorism".

Standing at the spot where his son fell, Sameh Shtayyeh stares down at the road below.

"Whether he threw stones or not -- what does it matter? Where is the danger to an army patrol?" he asks bitterly.

In protests "in Israel, in France, people throw stones and bins" and face nothing worse than arrest, he said.

He buried Youssef in the family village of Tell, five kilometers (three miles) from Nablus.

Weeks later, women were still holding a vigil at the flower-covered grave, topped with a portrait of the teenager showing him on a football pitch with a ball at his feet.

His father had promised to take him to Saudi Arabia to watch Cristiano Ronaldo play.

Now, each time Sameh comes home, Youssef is not there to greet him.

His eldest son returns from school -- but Youssef is not there. He glances at the back seat of his car. Youssef is not there.


Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
TT

Russia's Growing Energy Ties with China since the Ukraine War

Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights
Flags of China and Russia are displayed in this illustration picture taken March 24, 2022. REUTERS/Florence Lo/Illustration Purchase Licensing Rights

China has increased purchases of Russian oil and gas since ‌the start of the conflict with Ukraine in 2022, with Moscow and Beijing declaring a "no limits" partnership just days before the war began. The energy relationship between the two countries is expected to be an important topic when presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on Wednesday.

Here are some facts about the energy ties between the two countries:

GAS

Russia's energy giant Gazprom supplies natural gas to China through a 3,000-km (1,865 mile) pipeline called Power of Siberia under a 30-year, $400 billion deal launched at the end of 2019.

In 2025, exports jumped by around a quarter to 38.8 billion cubic meters (bcm), exceeding the pipeline's planned annual capacity of 38 bcm.

During Putin's visit to China in September, the countries agreed to increase annual volumes on the route by an additional 6 bcm, to 44 bcm, a year. In February 2022, China also agreed to buy up to 10 bcm of gas annually ‌by 2027 via ‌a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East. The countries later ‌agreed ⁠to raise the ⁠volumes to 12 bcm.

Russia's gas exports to China are still a small fraction of the record 177 bcm it delivered to Europe in 2018-19 annually.

Russia's share in European Union gas imports has shrunk during the Ukraine war, particularly in pipeline flows. Russia remained the EU's second-largest liquefied natural gas supplier last year with a 16% share but the gap with the EU's main LNG partner, the United States, widened considerably. Russia and China are still in talks about a new Power of Siberia 2 pipeline capable of delivering 50 bcm of gas per year ⁠from Russia to China via Mongolia.

Gazprom began a feasibility study for the ‌pipeline in 2020, but the project has gained urgency as Russia ‌turns to China to replace Europe as its major gas customer. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said in September that the ‌countries signed a "legally binding memorandum" on the pipeline, but a firm contract is still elusive.

Russia's liquefied natural ‌gas exports to China rose last year by 18.2% to 9.79 million metric tons, according to China's customs data, cited by TASS news agency.

Russia was, after Australia and Qatar, the third-largest supplier of LNG to China, which is the world's largest buyer of seaborne gas.

OIL China is Moscow's top client for oil shipments via the sea and pipelines. Exports have been ‌high amid Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. China's imports from Russia were at 2.01 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025 (or 100.72 ⁠million metric tons in ⁠total), a decline of 7.1%, according to China's General Administration of Customs. That represented 20% of China's total imported oil by volume.

Yury Ushakov, Putin's foreign policy aide, said Russian oil exports to China grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026 to 31 million tons.

China, which is the world's top oil importer, primarily buys Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) crude exported via the Skovorodino-Mohe spur of the 4,070-km (2,540-mile) ESPO pipeline, which connects Russian oil fields to refineries in China and from the Russian Far East port of Kozmino. Russia's oil pipeline operator Transneft has said it was expanding the ESPO pipeline to increase exports via Kozmino, seeking to complete the expansion work in 2029. China also imports oil from the Pacific island of Sakhalin, taking Sakhalin Blend and Sokol oil grades. The availability of ESPO Blend oil has remained high since July 2025, when exports had been expanded to 1 million barrels per day. Transneft has kept exports via Kozmino at around this level.

Russia has also agreed to raise its oil exports to China via Kazakhstan through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2.5 million tons per year to 12.5 million tons.


Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
TT

Mohammed Awda Emerges as New Qassam Brigades Chief after Killing of Al-Haddad

Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)
Palestinian Hamas fighters stand guard on the day of the handover of hostages held in Gaza since the deadly October 7 2023 attack, as part of a ceasefire and a hostages-prisoners swap deal between Hamas and Israel, in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, February 22, 2025. (Reuters)

Multiple Hamas sources in the Gaza Strip revealed that the movement’s armed wing, the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, is now led by Mohammed Awda, succeeding Ezzedine al-Haddad, who was killed by Israel last Friday after decades of pursuit.

Three Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Awda had effectively been selected to command the Qassam.

He was close to al-Haddad and remained in regular contact with him, particularly over plans to “rebuild the organizational structure” after the killings of former Qassam commanders Mohammed Deif and Mohammed Sinwar, they added.

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, Israel has eliminated a series of Qassam commanders and key figures involved in planning and directing Hamas’s attack on Israeli communities near Gaza during nearly two years of war in the enclave.

One source said Awda, who headed military intelligence within the Qassam at the time of the Oct. 7 attack, had been offered leadership of the armed wing after the killing of Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, but declined, leading the role to pass to al-Haddad.

The two other sources said they could not independently verify that account.

Awda appears to face no serious rival for the position as he remains one of the core members of the movement’s military council. The only other surviving member of the original council is home front commander Imad Aqel, whom Hamas sources said did not play a direct role in planning or supervising the Oct. 7 operation, unlike “other commanders who were not informed of the full details or even the zero hour.”

Military intelligence role

Awda previously oversaw military intelligence operations in Gaza, including gathering information on Israeli military positions around the enclave.

Sources said he also supervised the exploitation of surveillance equipment uncovered after an Israeli undercover unit infiltrated Gaza and remained there for an extended period before being exposed in November 2018. Hamas officials at the time described the information recovered from the devices as an “intelligence treasure.”

The military intelligence branch under Awda concentrated heavily on identifying vulnerabilities in the Israeli army’s Gaza Division.

According to the sources, Awda later assumed responsibility for the northern sector after al-Haddad became commander of the Qassam Brigades. In that role, he coordinated with newly appointed commanders in Gaza City and northern Gaza while continuing to oversee intelligence operations.

Early Hamas ties

Sources said Awda’s relationship with Hamas dates back to the first Palestinian intifada, which erupted in 1987. He also spent time in the “Majd” security apparatus established by slain Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar to pursue Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel.

Believed to be in his late forties or early fifties, Awda ranked among the early members of the Qassam Brigades during the second intifada, which began in late 2000.

He is originally from the Khulafaa al-Rashideen area of Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza.

For years, the area functioned as a military hub for the Qassam Brigades. Mohammed Deif and several senior commanders were based there, and it became an early meeting point between Deif and a generation of future Qassam leaders, including Awda.

Although Awda’s career has been closely associated with intelligence and security operations, he also advanced through field command positions.

He served for several years as commander of the central Jabalia battalion, worked in military manufacturing and later headed the “northern brigade” between 2017 and 2019.

During his tenure as northern brigade commander, Awda hosted Mohammed Sinwar, then responsible for overseeing the Brigades’ military and strategic operations.

Hamas sources credit Awda with playing a major role in transforming the military intelligence branch into one of the most influential divisions in the Qassam.

“Awda has always preferred intelligence work and avoided direct field operations,” one Hamas source said. “He also avoids relying on personal guards or drivers, preferring to move alone because of his strict security precautions.”

Awda has reportedly survived several assassination attempts, both before and during the Gaza war. After the ceasefire of Oct. 10, 2025, his father’s home in Jabalia refugee camp was bombed, killing his eldest son, Amr.