An attack by the IRGC on the house of a Kurdish businessman in Erbil raised questions among the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Masoud Barzani, about Iran’s message and purpose.
The bombing, which Iran said was aimed at “eliminating a target” who was “spying for Israel,” is interpreted differently by allied and competing forces in Iraq. But the context links Iran’s ballistic missiles to a “multi-purpose message.”
Two days before the raid, the President of the Kurdistan Region, Nechervan Barzani, conducted a visit to Baghdad without obtaining from the ruling Coordination Framework a guarantee that the attacks by pro-Iranian factions on Erbil would stop.
Rather, he heard from politicians a “warning” in a “friendly” tone stating that the Kurds’ “desire that the international coalition remains in the region would breach the “agreed upon” fragile truce, as suggested by party and government officials.
Barzani, who is described as “the face of soft Kurdish politics,” has worked over the past years to ease the tension between Baghdad and Erbil, before expressing a bold position last week, as political pressure was mounting in Baghdad.
Last Tuesday, Barzani agreed with the leader of the International Coalition, General Joel Vowell, that the presence of foreign troops was important for the Iraqis in fighting ISIS and developing local military forces.
Following this meeting, Kurdish politicians heard “worrying impressions” from Baghdad talking about “a rapid rush towards the crossroads.”
Today, many believe that the message was delivered through ballistic missiles, and that exerting intense pressure on Erbil would force it to accept the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraqi territory, which represents a “strategic Iranian goal,” as stated by a prominent political advisor.
However, other observers ask: Why did Tehran decide to send this message on its own, on such a devastating scale? Why didn’t it let the Iraqi factions continue the “routine” attacks on the Harir base in Erbil?
During the past two weeks, the armed factions intensified their strikes on American forces stationed in Erbil, while their drone attacks on the Ain al-Assad base, west of the country, declined significantly.
The recent bombing, in terms of context, method and results, is somewhat similar to a strike launched by the IRGC, in March 2022, on the house of businessman Baz Barzanji. Thus, Kurdish figures are suggesting that the IRGC attack was “an attempt to cut off the arms of the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader in trade and energy.”
But Shiite politicians in Baghdad believe that Iran does not need to conduct such attacks, as long as gains can be achieved through “pressure maneuvers,” as it has been doing with the Kurds over the past two decades.
The most convincing hypothesis for the leaders of Kurdish and Shiite parties in Erbil and Baghdad links the recent IRGC strike to its regional scope extending from the Gaza Strip to the Red Sea. Iran, which fears losing its Houthi arm in Yemen, decided to bring closer the confrontation with the Americans in Erbil, in order to buy time or freeze the Western military buildup in warm waters.
