Washington and Tehran in Iraq... Impossible Enmity or Possible Friendship?

A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)
A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)
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Washington and Tehran in Iraq... Impossible Enmity or Possible Friendship?

A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)
A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)

For the first time in two months, a change was observed in the Iraqi political discourse towards both Iran and the United States.
Although both Tehran and Washington have been comfortable for years in making Iraq an arena for settling their scores, the Iraqi perspective, whether for balancing the relationship between the two parties or the way it deals with the independence of its political decision, differed with the change of governments that succeeded after 2003.

The positions of the powers, blocs, parties, components, and subsequently the armed factions that are often described as loyal to Iran, vary ebb and flow in terms of the nature of the relationship with both Iran and the United States, and often extend towards the Arab Gulf region first and the rest of the Arab countries that are relatively close to Iraq, such as Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.
After the arrival of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to office in October 2022, the Iraqi political discourse regarding Iran and America changed relatively.
Al-Sudani tried to insert the term “productive diplomacy” in the context of Iraq’s relations with its external regional and international environment.
Although Sudani’s approach goes towards activating the economic, development and investment dimension between Iraq and countries of the world, the relationship between Tehran and Washington during the past two decades was not based on this consideration.
Iraq’s dealings with these two powers remained based on a rule of playing on the paradox of impossible hostility for both of them and possible friendship, but from the perspective of the country’s sovereignty.
Both Tehran and Washington violated what Sudani tried to establish since he assumed office until the Gaza War, as both capitals chose their preferred arena to settle their scores on.
During his meeting on Tuesday with the Turkish Defense Minister, Sudani said that the security of Iraq and Turkiye are “interconnected, as is the case with the security of neighboring countries.”
In another meeting with the Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Sudani stressed that Iraq “rejects any unilateral actions undertaken by any country in contravention of international principles that are based on mutual respect for sovereignty.”
The official Iraqi discourse has begun to escalate in its rejection of these practices, which reflects efforts to consolidate the country’s sovereignty despite the difficulties that stand in the way, including the strength of Iran’s influence inside Iraq and the weakness of Baghdad’s opinion within American institutions.

 



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.