Iraq after the Al-Aqsa Flood: Iran’s Plan for the Rapid Collapse

How did the ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq’ emerge?

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)
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Iraq after the Al-Aqsa Flood: Iran’s Plan for the Rapid Collapse

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani chairs a meeting with top-ranking officials of the Iraqi armed forces and of the US-led coalition during the first round of talks on the future of American and other foreign troops in the country, in Baghdad on January 27, 2024. (AFP)

On the 27th day of the war on Gaza, something started to happen in Baghdad. The Popular Mobilization Forces began to show footage of an “emergency” meeting that was held in wake of the battles between the Israelis and Palestinian Hamas movement.

The meeting was attended by the majority of the main leaders of the Iraqi armed factions. Chief of Staff Abdulaziz al-Mohammedawi, known as Abou Fadak, warned of an impending war in the region.

The position of chief of staff is a senior post in the Iraqi military, but the PMF borrowed the title after 2016 to oversee military operations. As a result, Abou Fadak now boasts privileges superior to those of the PMF leader, Faleh al-Fayyad.

Abou Fadak is a former leader of the Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and he plays a central role in the armed factions. Many members of the factions believe that he is the successor of the PMF deputy leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who along with Iranian Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani, were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Abou Fadak’s warning appeared routine given the tensions in the region, but he then uttered a statement that sounded coded: “The situation in the region is sensitive and what will take place will hinge on how committed we are to what we agreed upon.”

So what had they agreed upon? And who are “they”?

The details of this agreement and the parties to it started to emerge on the 28th day of the war when Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah delivered his first televised speech since Hamas carried out its Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7. Without outlining what that “Lebanese resistance” will do next, Nasrallah praised the Iraqi factions for attacking American troops deployed in their country.

At that moment, it appeared as though the pro-Iran factions in Iraq had shifted to the forefront of the so-called Resistance Axis and that a new front to Gaza had been opened in Baghdad, which is ruled by a politically powerful government sitting on a $450 billion budget.

Ain al-Asad: The first attack

Days later, a group calling itself the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” emerged, declaring that it will start carrying out revenge attacks against American forces in Iraq and Syria after they confirmed that “they were providing support to the Israeli troops in Gaza”, they said in a statement on Telegram.

On November 17, the group announced that they had attacked the Ain al-Asad base west of Baghdad using two drones. This was the first attack carried out by the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” and the strings connecting the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and Abou Fadak’s “coded” message began to appear.

Soon after the attack, Abou Fadak would disappear from the scene, even though he had declared the state of emergency himself. More attacks would follow, reaching more than 150 against American bases in Iraq and Syria as of January 29, when this report was completed.

The attacks targeted the Ain al-Asad base, the second largest air base in Iraq after the Balad base, and Harir, which is used by the Americans as a landing site for their fighter jets when they were fighting ISIS in 2015.

The attacks also targeted American bases in Syria: Al-Tanf, al-Shadadi, al-Malikiya, al-Rukban, Abou Hajar, Tal Abdo, Rmeilan, Green Village and Al-Omar oil field.

Data from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq showed that a third of the attacks targeted the Ain al-Asad and Harir.

Since declaring a state of emergency, the PMF, which says it is affiliated with the government, was never tied to any of the attacks against the American forces. All the attacks were claimed by the Islamic Resistance.

It is said that the Resistance is formed by the several factions, such as the al-Nujaba movement, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and that they joined it after rejecting negotiations to stop the escalation, according to media leaks quoting sources close the ruling Coordination Framework coalition.

It is difficult to differentiate between this coalition, which succeeded in forming a government headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in November 2022, and armed Shiite factions.

The factions are playing a very complicated role. They hold a lot of power in the PMF, which operates under government cover, and they also enjoy “ideological immunity.” They, however, are not outwardly present in government institutions to appear as though they have “nothing to lose.”

Iraq’s Shiite to liberate Jerusalem

Two weeks before Abou Fadak declared the “state of emergency”, a medium rank Iraqi officer working for the PMF was on his way back from Syria to southern Iraq. He received a telephone call from another officer who briefed him on the “latest situation.”

Speaking on condition of anonymity to Asharq Al-Awsat, the officer said the Iraqi factions were on a state of alert without even being ordered to do so. It is as if they were “thirsting for some war.” At the time, “all we did was create incitement through the media. It was necessary to consolidate the role of the Shiites of Iraq in liberating Jerusalem,” he went on to say.

It may have been coincidence that Iranian officials visited Baghdad in the coming days. They were delivering “urgent messages” that reflected the mood that prevailed among the factions.

In the first week since the Al-Aqsa operations, the Iranians held a series of meetings with politicians who are members of the Coordination Framework and field leaders of the armed Shiite factions.

The officer said: “They informed us that we are a part of Iran and its strength in the region. You are the hand that strikes to protect Shiism. It is time to not only liberate Jerusalem, but to rule the entire region (...) it is your golden age.”

The Iranians lamented that had Tehran been located in closer positions, such as al-Anbar in western Iraq, “we would have liberated Jerusalem in a handful of days,” the officer quoted them as saying. He revealed that Iraqi officials were “enraged” by these comments.

The Anbar province borders Syria. It boasts a vast desert and for years, was the arena for al-Qaeda and ISIS activity. After the liberation of Iraq from ISIS in 2017, the PMF units redeployed in those regions under the pretext of securing them and preventing the return of the “terrorists”.

However, an aide in the Sunni Taqadum party, led by former parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, refuted the claims. He said these armed formations “serve a political agenda aimed at preventing the representatives of the province from playing central roles that may irritate the Shiite forces.”

He added that the continued deployment of these units in areas close to the Syrian border is “very important” to Iraq to ensure that resistance groups in the region remain connected geographically.

Before the Iranian officials left Baghdad, they tasked an “Arab” figure to remain there, work closely with the Iraqi groups and follow up on the developments in Gaza. Despite various information, it remains difficult to verify who this person was and from which country he comes from.

All that this report could verify was that the factions call him “Al-Hajj” and he has effectively assumed the position of leader of the command centers of the “resistance”, revealed leaderships of local Shiite factions.

“Al-Hajj” is a title that is commonly used by members of the Lebanese Hezbollah instead of the adoption of military ranks. Media close to the party often uses the title to describe prominent Hezbollah military official Mohammed al-Kawtharani and other leaders.

It is likely that Kawtharani has been running the field operations of the pro-Iran Iraqi factions since mid-2021. A former government official said: “The Lebanese Hezbollah has effectively replaced Qassem Soleimani in Iraq.”

This ex-official used to hold a senior position in the governments of former PMs Haidar al-Abadi and Adel Abdul Mahdi. He left his post when Mustafa al-Kadhimi became prime minister in 2019.

Before the PMF declared their state of emergency, “Al-Hajj” met with leaders of the Coordination Framework and armed factions in a “safe place” south of Baghdad. They agreed to “pester the American forces with calculated strikes in several regions.” In all likelihood, these officials were party to the “coded” statement that Abou Fadak made days later.

Field leaders in Iraqi factions that were recently active in al-Anbar and Kirkuk said the groups that have upped their activity since November are one bloc inside a single system. In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat in December, they said that the tactic relies on groups that can move flexibly in setting up rockets and launching them in a short period of time.

The changes that took place in the past two months of 2023 called for their deployment in new locations to make sure their attacks can reach bases in Erbil and Syria.

So, the factions adopted an “agile” method in carrying out the attacks, said the leader of a small group in an armed faction that has been deployed north of Baghdad in for the past three months.

The groups effectively need four or six members who can launch a rocket or fire a drone while other members of the faction would secure their route and choose the location from where to fire them. Such operations generally need a large truck and one or two smaller vehicles used for surveillance and cases of emergency.

So far, it appears as though the factions have only used three types of rockets in the attacks that they carried out since November 17. All the rockets have been developed by Iran since 2022.

The rockets don’t have the capacity to cause major damage, which is in line with the current agreement, revealed the leader of the local group.

Syrian lesson

The Iraqi factions have gone through various stages of formation and restructuring. The conflict in Syria was a prime location for many of these groups to be formed. There, the Iranians needed a more organized structure so that they could firmly control the ground with the Syrian army.

The al-Nujaba movement and the Kataib Hezbollah may have been set up in Iraq, but other factions actually were formed and took shape in Syria. They grew in power after the eruption of the war in Ukraine because the Iranians feared that the Russians would be distracted by that conflict and neglect Syria.

Who came first Sudani or the ‘Framework’?

Before becoming prime minister in November 2022, Sudani seemed to be an ambitious “second class” Shiite politician.

In December 2019, he resigned from the Islamic Dawa and State of Law coalition, both of which are headed by former PM Nouri al-Maliki, two months after the eruption of popular protests against the ruling Shiite-dominated political class and against Iran’s influence over Iran.

Sudani came to power after a strained period between the factions and PM Kadhimi’s government. The Coordination Framework was supposed to restore political and government influence in Iraq after its rival, cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, quit political life in June 2022.

The Framework was formed on October 11, 2021 to coordinate political work. It later transformed into a coalition that worked on preventing Sadr from forming a government with his Sunni and Kurdish allies.

The Framework did not take part in that alliance, while still vying for state positions, such as the national security agency and intelligence agency. The Framework leaders were very ambitious. They not only sought to end the 2019 protest movement, overcome Sadr and reclaim the state, but they also wanted to be the sole rulers, said a Sunni leader who was part of government formation efforts in 2022.

In other words, the government that Sudani would come to lead was not designed to serve his agenda, but to empower the Framework, with the Iranians being at the heart of this process.

Sudani tried to find room to maneuver in a wider space that was effectively controlled by the Framework.

Three MPs described Sudani as an organized administrative figure. He represented Shiites who separate their ideology from state work. Ultimately, he is viewed as a politician who is running a house that he doesn’t really own.

‘Special Iranian operation’

A former government official, who was in office between 2016 and 2019, said the formation of the cabinet was complicated despite the Framework’s optimism. Iran had set many goals: It wanted many positions and sought the withdrawal of American forces in a way that would not harm Shiite control over Iraq. It wanted to end the protest movement, seize complete control of institutions and change the rules of the game with the Kurds.

Effectively, “we were at an advanced stage of Iran’s influence in Iraq. Iran’s plans in Iraq were being discussed in the open. I later learned that the Iranians were demanding a ‘special operation’ that was launched when Sudani came to power,” he added.

Months after taking office, Sudani started to learn up close how delicate balances of power were maintained.

In January 2015, US national security coordinator Brett McGurk was in Baghdad for routine talks with the PM as part of the strategic agreement between the countries.

Less than a week later, media affiliated with Shiite parties reported that Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani was in Baghdad and that he too had met with Sudani.

At the time, leading members of the Framework, such as Hadi al-Ameri, head of the Badr organization, was leading a campaign to pressure the government to press for the withdrawal of American troops.

Shiite forces revealed at the time that the government had reached a settlement with its allies on the need to reach a truce with the factions if they wanted to negotiate the withdrawal.

The truce itself was reached with the approval of the Coordination Framework and Iran, revealed a member of the State Administration coalition, which in turn showed the contradictions within the Shiite parties which were rooted in the struggle for power.

The bulletproof vest

On November 5, the 30th day of the Gaza war, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Baghdad at night. The lasting image of that visit was the bulletproof vest that he wore and how he flew from Baghdad airport to the US embassy onboard a combat helicopter.

At the Iraqi government, state media officials said the US State Department designed this “scene” to increase pressure on Baghdad. The Americans showed that Iraq was no longer trustworthy, said a source who attended government discussions that night.

In contrast, when Shiite threats reached their peak, American officials used to move around Iraq in a completely different manner. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited the country in March 2023. He landed in broad daylight, dressed in civilian attire and shook the hands of the welcoming officers.

Sudani tried to explain to Blinken the situation on the ground: Baghdad could not tolerate the pressure. It could not appease both the Americans and the Iranians because it will be the loser in the end, said three MPs close to the PM.

According to government sources, Blinken interpreted the Iraqi tone as “desperate” and that officials were incapable of taking greater steps to deter the factions.

Sudani played the usual role adopted by governments that came to power after 2003: “He kept the door open to Washington, while Tehran continued to consolidate its position at home,” said the government official.

However, the developments in Gaza demonstrated the difficulty in maintaining this tricky balance.

Exchanging roles towards the abyss

The government official said: “The Iranian plan put in place after October 7 called for the armed factions to freely carry out attacks against the American forces. Meanwhile, the powers that formed the government would ease the pressure piled on the Americans as a result of these strikes for as long as possible.”

This approach did not defuse the divisions between the Shiite factions, which have shown a fierceness on the ground and brusque political approach aimed at gaining Iran’s favor, while also attempting to reap gains from the Iraqi government.

MP Sajjad Salem stressed that the majority of the “resistance” operations have nothing to do with the developments in Gaza. He explained that the factions are “extorting the Shiite partners and government for political gains.”

Take for instance, the Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose leader Qais Khazali is carrying out political roles to protect the government by getting rid of the “armed militia” label.

Khazali oversees the “media of the resistance”, said trusted sources that have known him since 2015. They revealed that the majority of the leaks that claim to uncover the behind-the-scenes details of the armed factions are actually being released by him to test the political waters.

He has also played a role in silencing opponents of Iran’s influence.

The Iranians view him as very politically ambitious and that he quickly learned how to maneuver and manipulate the public opinion. They believe that it is useful to have someone like him to “modernize the Shiite house and make it more dynamic,” said the former government official.

Khazali is the “only cornerstone” in the strategy of “changing roles” that Iran has adopted. He suspected that the factions on the ground are “irritated by the political favor he enjoys.”

Iran has set a long-term plan for Iraq, but it is stumbling at the details, such as the disputes among the factions, said the official.

Direct confrontation

On the 39th day of the Gaza war, the US carried out a missile strike against the al-Nujaba movement headquarters in Baghdad. It killed a leading member of the group who was running field operations in Syria.

That day, the Americans opened a direct confrontation with the factions, dropping the delicate rules of engagement that placed weight on the partnership with the Sudani government.

On the ground, the armed factions soon changed their positions as a precaution from more American attacks.

The government was meanwhile losing the initiative with all parties. It could not take the initiative from them, and it could not withstand the pressure from the Americans.

The former government official said the heads of Shiite factions and the Iranians discussed the possibility of coming up with a scapegoat to rein in the Americans. The suggestion was rejected and raised fear among Shiite leaders about their political future and future of the government.

The former government official said the Iranians are determined to continue to put pressure on the Americans. Perhaps they want to hold negotiations with them but under certain conditions.

New deal or another collapse

The “changing of roles” is an approach that Shiite factions cannot adopt or excel at, said Akeel Abbas, an Iraqi academic. Such a position cannot be adopted in such strained times, he added, noting that the Al-Aqsa Flood exposed the fragility of the Coordination Framework.

The Sudani government did not have the means to control the conflict between the Americans and the armed factions. Now, it is at a loss and has to deal with parties that have stood back and remained silent and militias that have sought escalation.

Some see an opportunity in the escalation. Selin Uysal, a former Iraq desk officer at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said it was now possible for the US to ease the pressure and introduce new rules to the game because the current active dynamism could lead to unintentional results.

The Americans are taking a risk by quickly using up the room they have to maneuver, while the regional tensions are expected to remain high for several weeks, if not months, to come, she added.

Having a government that is close to Iran – like the one in Baghdad - may be a favorable element during this escalation because this gives Washington a channel of communication to defuse the tensions on the ground, she explained.

An innovative solution is necessary to preserve all parties’ security interests, such as an organized transitional negotiated process over the future of the international coalition. This would give the government and the factions greater room to rein in the more extreme militias, which are not only acting at Iran’s orders but also seeking political gain, she said.

Something of the scapegoat scenario can be implemented here, she suggested.



Trump’s Greenland Ambitions Strain MAGA Ties with Europe’s Far-Right

 Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
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Trump’s Greenland Ambitions Strain MAGA Ties with Europe’s Far-Right

 Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)
Sunlight reflects off the windows of homes set against snow covered mountains in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 24, 2026. (AFP)

Tensions over US President Donald Trump's plans to take control of Greenland have driven a wedge in the once iron-clad link between MAGA and Europe's far-right.

The rift seems to signal that ideological alignment alone may not be enough to temper worries among European nationalists over Trump's interventionism abroad.

Far-right leaders in Germany, Italy and France have strongly criticized Trump's Greenland plans. Even Nigel Farage, a longtime ally of Trump and head of the Reform UK nationalist party, called Trump's Greenland moves “a very hostile act.”

During a debate Tuesday in the European Parliament, far-right lawmakers typically aligned with Trump overwhelmingly supported halting a EU-US trade pact over their uneasiness with his threats, calling them “coercion” and “threats to sovereignty."

MAGA's trans-Atlantic partners

Such a divergence between Trump and his European acolytes came as some surprise.

Far-right parties surged to power in 2024 across the European Union, rattling the traditional powers across the bloc’s 27 nations from Spain to Sweden. Their political groupings now hold 26% of the seats in the European Parliament, according to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Less than a year ago, Europe's far-right parties gathered in Madrid to applauded Trump's election under the banner “Make Europe Great Again,” while Elon Musk, before his fall from Trump’s graces, had boosted European far-right influencers and figures on X, including Germany’s radical right Alternative for Germany party.

US Vice President JD Vance drew scorn from within Germany and across Europe after he met with AfD leader Alice Weidel during elections in February. The party, with which mainstream parties refuse to work, upset German politics by doubling its presence in the Bundestag to become the nation's second-largest party.

Yet deep divisions within MAGA itself over Trump’s approach to foreign affairs has reverberated in Europe, with his actions over Greenland, Venezuela and Iran forcing his political allies to favor their ideological convictions over their deference to the US president.

Sovereignty trumps shared values

France’s far-right National Rally has at times vaunted its ideological closeness to Trump, particularly on immigration.

A year ago, the party sent one of its senior figures, Louis Aliot, to attend Trump’s inauguration. In turn, Trump has staunchly defended party leader Marine Le Pen, describing her conviction for embezzling EU funds as a “witch hunt.”

Jordan Bardella, the 30-year-old National Rally’s president and a MEP, has praised Trump’s nationalist views, saying to the BBC last month that a “wind of freedom, of national pride” was blowing across Western democracies.

In recent days, however, Bardella has appeared to distance himself from the US administration. In his New Year’s address, he criticized US military intervention in Venezuela aimed at capturing then-President Nicolás Maduro, calling it “foreign interference” designed to serve “the economic interests of American oil companies.”

Going further, Bardella on Tuesday denounced Trump’s “commercial blackmail” over Greenland.

“Our subjugation would be a historic mistake,” Bardella said.

Another Trump ally, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, echoed this sentiment. In an interview on Rai television Wednesday, she said that she told Trump during a call that his tariffs threat over Greenland was “a mistake.”

Reluctance to criticize on the EU's eastern flank

Yet the reactions among European right-wing leaders has not been lockstep. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, widely regarded as the trailblazer of Trump’s brand of illiberal populism, has been careful to avoid even the slightest criticism of the US president.

Facing what is likely to be the toughest election of his 16 years in power in April, Orbán has built his political identity around his affinity with Trump, promising voters that his close relationship with the president will pay hefty dividends.

Trump, Orbán has insisted, is Europe’s only hope for peace amid the war in Ukraine and a guarantor of national sovereignty.

Orbán has sought to cast Trump's threats on Greenland and capture of Maduro either as beneficial for Hungary, or none of its business.

“It’s an in-house issue ... It’s a NATO issue,” Orbán said of Trump’s plans for Greenland during a news conference earlier this month, adding that any proposed change to Greenland's sovereignty can be discussed within NATO.

Despite his staunch advocacy of national sovereignty, Orbán also praised the US action in Venezuela, calling the country a “narco state” and suggesting Maduro’s ouster could benefit Hungary through future cheaper oil prices on world markets.

Hungary’s reluctance to push back on Trump’s actions reflected similar positions among far-right leaders in the EU’s eastern flank.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki, seen as an ally of both Orbán and Trump, said in Davos this week that the tensions over Greenland should be solved “in a diplomatic way” between Washington and Copenhagen — not a broader European coalition. He called on Western European leaders to tone down their objections to Trump’s conduct.

In the neighboring Czech Republic, prime minister and Trump ally Andrej Babis has declined to speak out against the US threats to Greenland, and warned against the EU allowing the issue to cause a conflict with Trump.

In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico has remained silent on Trump’s Greenland designs, even as he met with the president in his Mar-a-Lago resort last week.

Still, Trump’s deposing of Maduro led Fico to “unequivocally condemn” the action, calling it a “kidnapping” and the “latest American oil adventure.”

Disruption or division ahead

The ideology linking MAGA and its European allies might survive recent disagreements by doubling down on old, shared grievances, said Daniel Hegedüs, Central Europe director of the German Marshall Fund.

He pointed to recent votes against Brussels’ leadership in European Parliament by far-right European lawmakers on the EU migration pact and halting the massive trade deal with the Mercosur bloc of five South American nations.

“If Trump continues that way, posing a threat to the sovereignty of European countries, then of course that will divide the European radical right,” he said.

“We don’t know whether this division will stay with us or whether they can again unite forces around issues where they can cooperate. Those issues can be damaging enough for the European Union.”


US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
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US Buildup Balances Iran Deterrence, Day-After Risks

US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

As the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, several destroyers, and fighter aircraft, are expected to arrive in the Middle East in the coming days, a familiar but increasingly pressing question is back in play: Is Washington preparing the ground for another strike on Iran, or orchestrating a calibrated show of force designed to raise the psychological and political cost for Tehran without tipping into war?

The answer is not binary. The same military buildup can serve dual purposes: a defensive deterrent to shield US bases and allies, and a pressure tool that keeps the option of attack alive without formal warning.

According to US officials cited by media outlets, the movement of the force, alongside discussions about deploying additional air defense systems, comes at a sensitive moment following a broad crackdown on protests inside Iran.

President Donald Trump, for his part, has publicly insisted that he would prefer nothing happens militarily. Still, he has tied that preference to two conditions: that Tehran does not resume any nuclear path approaching the weapons threshold, and that it does not proceed with executions of protesters.

Three messages in one buildup

The first message is directed at Iran itself. Washington wants to signal that it can rapidly reposition forces and that it considers the “deterrence window” open. Months ago, the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, and Trump is now reminding Iranians that it will happen again if the same activity resumes.

The second message is aimed at allies and regional adversaries alike. The buildup is not only a threat to Tehran but also an umbrella to protect US interests and bases from potential Iranian retaliation, especially as Iran’s military leadership has openly warned that any attack would make US bases and interests legitimate targets.

Such threats are not new, but they raise the sensitivity of any US decision.

Today’s reinforcements could amount to a preemptive defense aimed at limiting losses if events spiral out of control.

The third message is domestic and political. Trump is also brandishing non-military tools such as “secondary tariffs” on countries that trade with Iran, seeking to combine pressure instruments between sanctions and military deterrence.

In January, he announced a punitive tariff mechanism targeting states that trade with Tehran.

Nuclear ambiguity

The nuclear file adds another layer of uncertainty. The International Atomic Energy Agency has not verified Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium for months. At the same time, estimates circulate of a large quantity enriched to 60 percent, a level technically close to the 90 percent required for a weapon.

This monitoring gap creates two contradictory dilemmas. Hardliners argue that ambiguity implies the possibility of covert rebuilding and therefore justifies tougher pressure.

Advocates of de-escalation counter that the same ambiguity makes any strike a blind gamble that could miss targets or widen the war, without guaranteeing that the program will be halted.

From this perspective, the military buildup could become a language of negotiation: raising the cost for Tehran to accept stricter verification arrangements, or to absorb an internal retreat without appearing defeated.

The Iranian street

If a strike were carried out, what would the Iranian street gain today, after the system has already suppressed protests? Here, limited expectations appear more realistic than grand promises.

Even in Washington, there is a clear debate: any military intervention, particularly a “limited strike” against instruments of repression such as the Revolutionary Guard, may not change the outcome of an internal confrontation if the opposition is fragmented, unarmed, and unorganized.

Analyses in the US press have warned that bombing alone does not “make a revolution.”

It may temporarily halt repression, but it does not dismantle the security apparatus without a lengthy and costly campaign.

Worse, a strike could produce the opposite effect: national mobilization in favor of the system through a narrative of “external aggression,” a hardening of repression under the banner of fighting agents and terrorism, expanded arrests or harsher sentences, and an uncontrolled slide toward internal conflict if some pillars of the state break while others remain intact.

With protest momentum receding after the crackdown, and with continued restrictions on the internet and communications, the “street effect” does not appear to be at its peak in a way that would allow Trump, if he wished, to tie any strike to a quick internal political outcome.

In recent days, there have been signs of debate inside Iran about easing the shutdown. Still, the information environment remains unstable to the point that state television was hacked, and inciting messages were broadcast.

The day after

The question prompting warnings in some Washington circles is this: what if a strike were decisive and weakened the head of the system or paralyzed its center, but the state did not collapse in an orderly way? This is where the specter of “the day after” looms large.

Michael Doran, a researcher at the Hudson Institute, warns that Iran, as a multi-ethnic state with sensitive border regions, could face fragmentation or internal conflict if the center of power collapses suddenly, as in historical cases where “state identity” eroded rapidly after a regime fell.

Doran notes that minorities, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and Turkmen, are concentrated along the periphery and have cross-border extensions, making neighboring states directly invested in Iran’s internal fate.

The most dangerous scenario, in this logic, is not only fragmentation but also the persistence of the system in another form: the Revolutionary Guard and security services retaining control, shedding the religious ideological cover, and adopting a nationalist or military guise.

That would amount to a change of head rather than a change of regime.

He urges avoiding the idea of “appointing a successor” for Iran from outside or presuming the shape of the state in advance, as this could inflame ethnic sensitivities and plant the seeds of early conflicts.

What has changed from previous buildups is that Washington is no longer facing only the question of “do we strike?” but also “what comes after the strike?” inside Iran and across the region. This equation makes the decision harder. A strike may satisfy the logic of deterrence. Still, it could also open doors that cannot be closed if policy is not designed around uncertainty, rather than the illusion of quick stability.


ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
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ISIS Detainees at the Crossroads of Security Pressures and Politics in Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani meets with US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack in Baghdad, January 22, 2026 (Reuters)

The issue of ISIS detainees transferred from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq has moved to the forefront of Baghdad’s security and political agenda, coinciding with intensified efforts to form a new government and determine the next prime minister.

Long confined to narrow security and technical discussions, the issue has entered broader political debate following Iraqi steps to receive a number of the detainees inside its territory, in coordination with concerned international parties. While the move carries direct security implications, it has also unfolded against a highly sensitive domestic political backdrop.

On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, urged “countries around the world, particularly European Union states,” to repatriate their nationals held as ISIS detainees, following their transfer from Syria to Iraq.

 

An Iraqi border guard at a checkpoint along the Syrian border in Sinjar, January 22, 2026 (AP)

From a Border Liability to a Domestic Challenge

For years, the presence of thousands of ISIS members in detention facilities beyond Iraq’s direct control has been a persistent security concern for Baghdad, given the proximity of those prisons to the Iraqi-Syrian border and the region’s fragile security conditions. The transfer of some detainees into Iraq has shifted the challenge from a cross-border threat to a domestic issue requiring complex security, judicial, and logistical arrangements.

Iraqi authorities say handling the detainees falls within the state’s responsibility toward its citizens and individuals accused of crimes committed on Iraqi soil, while also reducing the risk of a potential security breakdown at detention sites outside the country.

At the same time, political circles have raised questions about the security burden, societal repercussions, and Iraq’s capacity to manage the issue over the long term.

Where Security and Politics Converge

The renewed focus on the detainee issue has coincided with a sensitive phase of negotiations among political forces within the Coordination Framework coalition over government formation and the selection of a prime minister.

Although fundamentally a security matter, the timing has propelled the issue into political debate, particularly as international actors welcomed steps taken by the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while regional players monitored developments in Baghdad with caution.

On Friday, US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack praised what he described as Baghdad’s “exceptional leadership” and its firm commitment to helping protect the international community from the continuing threat posed by ISIS detainees, speaking on behalf of the US president and secretary of state.

Some political factions view the handling of ISIS detainees as a test of the Iraqi government’s ability to manage complex issues in coordination with the international community. Others see it as a highly sensitive issue that must be handled independently of political pressure or diplomatic signals between capitals with influence over Iraqi affairs.

 

Iraqi border guards are deployed along the Syrian border amid tight security measures (AP)

Complex Domestic Calculations

Within Iraq, debate over the detainees is inseparable from concerns about the possible resurgence of extremist cells, prison attacks, or escape attempts — scenarios Iraq has experienced in the past. As a result, security discussions have focused on intelligence readiness, securing detention facilities, and expediting judicial procedures for suspects.

Politically, most parties are careful to avoid appearing lenient on terrorism, yet they differ on the timing and approach to managing the issue, particularly amid a political transition whose outcome remains unsettled.

The detainee issue also highlights Baghdad’s effort to strike a balance between responding to international security concerns and asserting its sovereignty and national interest. Countries concerned with foreign fighters and ISIS dossier are pushing for lasting solutions, while Iraqi authorities are keen to prevent the country from once again becoming a theater for the fallout of regional and international conflicts.

In this context, the issue of ISIS detainees is no longer merely an isolated security concern; it has become a complex issue intertwining considerations of border control, sovereignty, security readiness, internal political tensions, and sustained international attention to the ISIS group.