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Syrians Learn Persian, Russian amid Foreign Hegemony over Their Country

Students are seen at the Faculty of Sharia at Damascus University. (Asharq Al-Awsat file photo)
Students are seen at the Faculty of Sharia at Damascus University. (Asharq Al-Awsat file photo)
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Syrians Learn Persian, Russian amid Foreign Hegemony over Their Country

Students are seen at the Faculty of Sharia at Damascus University. (Asharq Al-Awsat file photo)
Students are seen at the Faculty of Sharia at Damascus University. (Asharq Al-Awsat file photo)

“Occupying the language is the shortest way to occupy the mind and consequently, future decision-making. It destroys and erases the identity of societies,” said Asma al-Assad, the wife of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, during a speech to students at a university in Beijing in late summer 2023.

The emphasis she placed on remaining attached to the mother tongue stands in contrast to how Russia has imposed the Russian language in Syrian public schools. The language was introduced nine years ago as Moscow expanded its influence in Syria.

Russian is facing stiff competition from Persian as Iran is the other foreign power vying for influence in the war-torn country. Russia and Iran want to control education in areas held by the regime to create a suitable environment for them to thrive and support their military influence at the expense of teaching the native language, Arabic.

Russian dominates

Even though Tehran was first to intervene in Syria’s war, years before Russia arrived on the scene, Persian has taken a backseat to Russian in public education. Russia succeeded in imposing its language as a third option besides English and French. Russia has managed to make strides in this area in the nine years since its intervention.

The trial period for teaching Russian took off in 2015 and was applied to 400 students living in coastal regions. The experience was then adopted at 217 schools in 12 provinces held by the government. By the seventh year, over 35,000 students had learned Russian with 200 teachers being recruited, revealed Syrian government reports.

Public education

Iran tried to follow in Russia’s footsteps in imposing Persian in state curricula in line with an agreement signed between Tehran and Damascus on exchanging expertise and training in the education, technical and academic fields and in rebuilding schools.

In 2021, Tehran managed to impose Persian only in public schools that it had renovated and helped resume operation. The past five years have witnessed the opening of Persian education centers in universities in Damascus and Homs and the Syrian military academy. They join other centers affiliated with the Khomeini seminary and its various branches in Syria, the al-Mahdi husseiniya in Damascus, Sayyida Ruqayya College and others.

Tehran has also opened branches of several Iranian universities in Syria, such as the al-Mustafa university, Al-Farabi university and others. Iran focused its activities on the Deir Ezzor province, especially in the areas of influence it holds in the cities of Alboukamal and al-Mayadeen bordering Iraq. These areas are Iran’s main political, cultural and social strongholds.

Exploiting poverty

Since 2018 and soon after the expulsion of the ISIS extremist group from the region, Deir Ezzor, Alboukamal and al-Mayadeen witnessed the opening of several schools, daycares and cultural centers that teach Persian and the Iranian religious ideology. They follow the example of the Iranian cultural centers in Damascus, Latakia and coastal cities.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said in May 2023 said Tehran succeeded in exploiting the deterioration of the education system due to the war and drop in the number of staff and teachers due to corruption and low salaries in Deir Ezzor to “infiltrate” the education sector.

It said Iranian cultural centers are witnessing an “alarming” surge given their great power in influencing youths. It noted how the war destroyed a large number of schools in Deir Ezzor, while others lack basic facilities, such as appropriate classrooms, libraries and science labs.

Attracting children and youths

Local sources in Deir Ezzor said Iran managed to exploit the poverty and living crisis in regions under its control in eastern Syria to attract children and youths. It has lured them through financial aid, monthly wages, meals, food baskets and recreational trips. It has also provided free cources in vocational training, such as first aid, accounting, electric appliance maintenance and others. It has also held courses on “youth empowerment.”

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the sources said Iran boasts three schools in Alboukamal and one in al-Mayadeen for nine- to 15-year-olds. The schools include over 500 students. It also boasts Persian language learning centers in government-held areas in the Deir Ezzor and Raqqa countrysides.

Iran has hired Shiite Arab and Iranian teachers, including clerics, who speak Arabic. It also holds training courses to Syrian teachers on how to teach Persian, continued the sources. Russia has also sought to train Syrian teachers on how to teach Russian, dispatching them to Moscow where they are trained.

Iran is ultimately seeking to “form a local social environment that can fuel its need for people to join its militias” in Syria.

Food for education

Members of Arab tribes in Syria’s Deir Ezzor have expressed their concern over Iran’s infiltration of education and its exploitation of poverty to pursue this goal. Mohammed, from Muhasan in Deir Ezzor, said: “Some parents agree to enroll their children in Iranian schools in return for aid, not for the love of Iranian culture.” This opposition will not, however, prevent these institutions from brainwashing children and the youths in Iranian ideology and culture.

Other sources in Damascus said it was unlikely that Iran will succeed in spreading its culture in the eastern provinces given that the environment there is “historically hostile to the Persian culture” since the majority of the residents there are Sunni Arabs. The locals there will not provide a “secure and peaceful social environment to Iran,” especially with Russia competing with it in the education sector.

The sources revealed that Russia had offered at the beginning of the year three tons of aid to teachers in Deir Ezzor. It included stationery and books on teaching Russian that have benefitted 300 teachers.

Russian outpaces Persian

The sources said Iran’s attempts to infiltrate the education system in coastal regions have failed. They added that Tehran opened religious schools during the war, but they were all closed in 2017 after the Syrian Awqaf Ministry demanded that Syrian Sharia be included in official curricula and after parents complained of attempts to spread Shiism.

They noted that Russian is more popular in coastal regions where Russian forces are deployed and have mingled with the locals. The same applies in Aleppo, which is an industrial and business hub. Students who have learned Russian have an advantage and could have the opportunity to travel to Russia to pursue higher studies. Or they could remain in Syria and work at Russian ports, airports and industrial investments.

In the Damascus countryside and southern Sweida region, Russian forces are seen more as occupiers who have not integrated in everyday life even though they are preferred to the Iranians. The suspicions towards the Russians pale in comparison to the animosity towards the Iranians. But regardless, both Moscow and Tehran are applying what Asma al-Assad spoke of in Beijing about “occupying language” to erase societies and their identities.

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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Assad Viewed Lebanon the Same Way Saddam Viewed Kuwait

Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Assad Viewed Lebanon the Same Way Saddam Viewed Kuwait

Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)

Former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said that the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad viewed Lebanon the same way the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein viewed Kuwait. He added that Assad “considered Lebanon a historic mistake that could be corrected by bringing it back into the Syrian fold.” He emphasized that Assad wanted “nothing more, nothing less than to annex Lebanon,” noting that he upheld his constitutional oath during 14 summit meetings with the Syrian president.

Gemayel made these comments in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, where he discussed Lebanon’s experience during the long “Assad era” and other key moments.

In the 1970s, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party, received an invitation from Assad to visit Damascus. He brought along his sons Amine and Bashir. The Syrian president warmly welcomed them into his home, but the honeymoon did not last long.

Reminiscing stirred up painful memories for Gemayel, who carries two deep wounds: the assassination of his son, MP and Minister Pierre Gemayel, in 2006 amid a wave of killings that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, in 1982. Amine Gemayel assumed the presidency that same year, following two political earthquakes: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and his brother’s assassination.

Hafez al-Assad welcomes Amine Gemayel in Damascus. (Photo courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Hafez al-Assad and the ‘Lebanese mistake’

Asked what Hafez al-Assad wanted from Lebanon, Gemayel said: “You’re asking a foregone question, as the French saying goes. He wanted to annex Lebanon—nothing more, nothing less. Syrian politicians, even before Assad, couldn’t accept Lebanon’s existence. They saw it as an artificial country that should be part of Syria. They believed Lebanon was wrongly separated due to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Beirut’s port is closer to Damascus than Tartus, so they believed Lebanon was an inseparable part of Syria.”

“Assad also held this view. He couldn’t digest the idea of Lebanon as a stable, independent country. His ultimate goal was annexation. Every agreement or relationship Syria pursued was aimed at eventually achieving this annexation,” he revealed.

“Assad told me plainly, in a one-on-one meeting: ‘Don’t forget that Lebanon is part of Syria. We’re one country. Colonial powers divided us, and it’s in your interest as Lebanese to return to the Syrian fold. No matter how circumstances change, Lebanon must return to Syria.’”

“He was that blunt. He even tried to soften it by comparing it to European unity. ‘Europe united, why can’t we do the same?’ He argued that the countries had shared interests: political, security, economic. So why not unite?”

Asked whether Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait reminded him of Assad’s attempt to annex Lebanon, Gemayel said: “Yes. To Saddam, Kuwait was what Lebanon was to Hafez al-Assad.” He noted that Iraqi leaders claimed colonial powers had stolen Kuwait from Iraq—just as Syrian leaders believed colonialism had stolen Lebanon from Syria.

Still, Gemayel clarified: “Despite all this, I maintained a normal relationship with Assad. Even affection, you could say. We respected each other. He understood my position and would say, privately, that if he were in my place, he’d do the same. And I understood his views, though our ideologies were completely opposed.”

Amine Gemayel and Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

“Assad would get infuriated by my rejections at times. He thought Lebanon was ripe for the picking—and there I was, blocking him. But he respected me for it. He knew that, in my place, he might have acted the same way. Still, he believed it was in Syria’s interest to ‘unite’ with Lebanon.”

“The Syrian army was already in Lebanon and had co-opted many Lebanese leaders who were ‘pilgrimaging’ to Syria. Assad thought the moment was right. He also mobilized pro-Syrian Palestinian factions,” recalled Gemayel.

“I stood in the way of this dream, which led to fierce political clashes between us—an intellectual struggle, if you will, between his push for unity and my defense of Lebanese independence. We had mutual respect. I met Assad 14 times during my presidency.”

Telling Assad ‘no’ required extraordinary courage’

“I debated, resisted, and stood firm. Facing Assad—his weight, his stature in Syria and the Arab world was no easy task. I had no army, no stable institutions, and Lebanese political leaders were scattered. The situation in Lebanon was dire,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Eventually, even my own allies turned on me. Assad had even co-opted a faction of the Lebanese Forces. He thought I’d cave and sign the papers. But I didn’t. That moment was one of the hardest. Saying ‘no’ to Assad under those conditions required extraordinary courage.”

Asked whether the May 17 Lebanese-Israeli Agreement was the most difficult point in his relationship with Assad, Gemayel said: “No. The hardest point was the Tripartite Agreement between Amal, the Progressive Socialist Party, and the Lebanese Forces. With that agreement, Assad fully controlled the Lebanese scene—especially after winning over leaders like Elie Hobeika and Samir Geagea.”

“Assad believed Lebanon was in his grasp. Only I stood in the way. He didn’t care much about my position but needed my signature. As president, I had taken an oath to preserve the constitution and sovereignty.”

“Despite enormous internal and external pressure—even from within the Christian camp—I stood alone. But I was committed to the Lebanese cause. Ultimately, we won. The public, especially the Christian community, rallied around me. The other leaders who had sold out were exposed. That moment saved Lebanon’s sovereignty and its democratic system.”

Asked by Asharq Al-Awsat, if Assad resented him for sabotaging the Tripartite Agreement, Gemayel replied: “Assad thought he had Lebanon in the bag and was just waiting for congratulations. The day of the signing, King Hussein of Jordan was set to visit Syria. They delayed his visit to finalize the agreement. That’s how important it was to them.”

Pierre Gemayel and Hafez al-Assad. (AFP)

“Assad was frustrated, maybe even bitter. He couldn’t believe that I—stripped of power—dared to say no. But he respected me for it,” added Gemayel.

“After the deal collapsed, I was in Morocco. Syria’s ambassador, a close Alawite to Assad, visited me and conveyed Assad’s respect. It was a message to reopen communication. Assad may have been furious, but he still respected how I stood firm as a young leader facing such odds.”

The bomb on the presidential plane

Asked whether he feared assassination like Kamal Jumblatt, Gemayel replied: “All kinds of pressure were used to make me sign. One story Assad told me—casually—was about how Sadat informed him he was going to Jerusalem. Assad opposed it strongly. After Sadat left the room, Assad’s people asked if they should stop him, maybe even blow up his plane.”

“Assad said he thought about it, but his conscience stopped him. The way he told me the story, it felt like a warning. Like he wouldn’t make the same ‘mistake’ again,” said Gemayel.

“There were several attempts to assassinate me. The most serious one was when I was flying to Yemen. My plane had been rigged with a bomb. The pilot, a meticulous man named Makawiy, noticed a minor issue with the radio and refused to fly. They discovered a wire under the cockpit leading to a bomb.”

“Syrian intelligence was at the airport and immediately seized the bomb and equipment to block any investigation. Who else could rig a presidential plane under heavy guard? Clearly, only they had that kind of access.”

Amine Gemayel and his father Pierre during Bashir Gemayel’s funeral. (Getty Images)

Syrian intelligence behind Bashir’s assassination

Asked whether he believed Syrian intelligence was behind his brother Bashir’s assassination, Gemayel said: “That’s a fact. The killer was from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which was under direct Syrian intelligence control under Assad Hardan. The bomb was planted in Bashir’s office by Habib Chartouni, who had access to the building.”

“After the Syrian army ousted Michel Aoun from the presidential palace under President Elias Hrawi, they sent one unit to the palace and another to Roumieh Prison to free Chartouni. He walked free and gave a speech thanking Syria. That says everything.”

“Chartouni was initially too afraid to detonate the bomb, but party leaders pressured him. The operation was directly linked to Syrian intelligence,” added Gemayel.

Final meeting with Assad

Gemayel recounted his last meeting with Assad, two days before the end of his term: “We were trying to reach a deal: electing Michel al-Daher as president in exchange for certain guarantees. While I was with Assad explaining the plan, he received a note about a meeting in Lebanon between Geagea and Army Commander Michel Aoun.”

“He saw it as a coup attempt and ended the meeting abruptly. I returned to Beirut, but we couldn’t resolve the situation. Despite this, Assad—though ill—insisted on accompanying me to the airport, saying: ‘We are brothers no matter what.’”