Türkiye, Iran and Morocco Increase their Influence in the Sahel  

Nigerien security officers face demonstrators gathered in front of the French base in Niamey on September 2. (AFP)
Nigerien security officers face demonstrators gathered in front of the French base in Niamey on September 2. (AFP)
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Türkiye, Iran and Morocco Increase their Influence in the Sahel  

Nigerien security officers face demonstrators gathered in front of the French base in Niamey on September 2. (AFP)
Nigerien security officers face demonstrators gathered in front of the French base in Niamey on September 2. (AFP)

Türkiye, Iran and Morocco are stepping up their initiatives towards ruling military regimes in the African Sahel, seeking to diversify their partners, in the wake of France's withdrawal from the region.

Standing in front of the Burkina Faso television cameras, the director of the Turkish Space Agency displayed a catalog of fighter planes and combat helicopters, which is tempting for military regimes fighting terrorist groups, AFP said in a report on Monday.

The Burkinabe Foreign Minister, Karamoko Jean Marie Traoré, then reminded him of one of the mantras of the Sahelian regimes whose armies are underequipped: “For us it is a question of developing endogenous capacities in order to reduce our dependence.”

They are dependent on foreign forces, notably from France and other Western countries, which deployed in the region more than a decade ago and are reluctant to deliver offensive equipment to armies accused of committing abuses against civilian populations.

And while the French troops were packing their bags to leave the Sahel region, combat drones delivered by Türkiye became the centerpieces of Mali and Burkina Faso’s armies, which are both engaged in conflicts.

In early 2024, Mali received a new batch of Turkish Baykar drones, prized for their performance, earning the CEO of the manufacturing company, Haluk Bayraktar, a decoration in Ouagadougou in April bestowed by Burkina's strongman, Captain Ibrahim Traoré.

“The defense sector is the driving force behind the Turkish foreign policy in African countries,” said Federico Donelli, a political scientist and author of the book “Turkey in Africa.”

He explained that while Moscow is imposing itself as the main ally of military regimes in the Sahel region, Ankara is pursuing an “invasive” policy by trying to position itself as an alternative to both the Europeans and Russia.

According to the Institute for International Political Studies – ISPI, former Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu “was the first high-level international figure to meet the military council in Mali after the August 2020 coup.”

It added that Ankara has adopted a conciliatory position with the military council in Niger, which borders Libya, where Ankara has many interests.

Ankara is also developing a project for a trans-Saharan corridor linking the Gulf of Guinea countries to Algeria, another North African stronghold of Turkish investment, according to Donelli.

Competing with Morocco, Iran

Morocco had kicked off a rival project. In September, Rabat said it offers to “make its road, port and rail infrastructures available to the Sahel countries, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger,” to strengthen their international trade.

In January 2024, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso said they withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

“Türkiye has military capabilities. We have had excellent relations with Morocco since independence and they are more about economic development,” according to a government source in Niger.

Morocco and Türkiye, which enjoy longstanding influence in the region, could face new competition from Iran.

Since 2020, Tehran has increased its influence in the region, particularly amid the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

In October, Tehran signed several cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso in the fields of energy, urban planning, higher education and construction.

At the end of January, Tehran, a producer of combat drones, announced the establishment of two universities in Mali, and the signing of various cooperation agreements.

Thierry Coville from the Paris-based Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) said the Iranians sign dozens of agreements and none of them work. “They don't have the funding to support deals, or to compete seriously with Türkiye or Saudi Arabia,” he added.

But could Iran, which has increased its production of enriched uranium to 60%, eventually covet the uranium reserves of Niger that have been exploited by the French company Orano?

“This is our resource; we can sell it to anyone we want,” said a Nigerian government source.



Ceasefire Ends Iran-Israel War, Stakeholders Weigh Costs and Benefits

US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
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Ceasefire Ends Iran-Israel War, Stakeholders Weigh Costs and Benefits

US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump (Reuters)

In a stunning development, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire that effectively ended the conflict between Iran and Israel.

The announcement came shortly after a carefully calibrated Iranian retaliation targeted a US military base in Qatar, an attack that caused no casualties or material damage.

Trump expressed gratitude to Iran for pre-warning Washington about the strike, framing the gesture as a face-saving move.

The question now gripping regional and international capitals is: What have the United States, Iran, and Israel each gained if the ceasefire holds?

United States

The United States has once again asserted itself as the dominant and decisive power in the Middle East. It delivered a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear facilities without escalating into full-scale war, thereby undermining the very justification for Israel’s initial strike on Tehran.

Recent events have underscored that Israel cannot engage Iran militarily without close coordination with Washington, nor can it exit such a conflict without a pivotal American role.

The confrontation has also highlighted the unparalleled strength of the US military machine, unmatched by any other power, large or small.

Iran, for its part, clearly showed reluctance to escalate the conflict in a way that could trigger direct, open confrontation with the United States.

Trump himself demonstrated tactical skill by combining military pressure with diplomatic overtures, swiftly moving to invite Iran back to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, the limited role of Europe and the modest involvement of Russia became apparent, unless aligned with US efforts. China appeared “distant but pragmatic,” despite its broad interests in Iran and a vested concern in keeping the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz open.

Iran

Iran demonstrated that the devastating initial strike it suffered from Israel did not undermine its military or political resolve despite the severity of the attack.

The Tehran regime confirmed that, although Israeli fighter jets controlled Iranian airspace briefly, its missile arsenal remained capable of unleashing scenes of destruction across Israeli cities unseen since the founding of the Jewish state. Iran’s missile forces, it showed, could sustain a costly war of attrition against Israel.

Tehran also succeeded in preventing calls for regime overthrow from becoming a shared objective in a US-Israeli war against it.

Yet, Iran appeared to lack a major ally comparable to the United States or even a lesser power, despite its “strategic” ties with Russia and China.

The confrontation revealed Tehran’s inability to fully leverage its proxy forces in Gaza and Lebanon following the fallout of the “Al-Aqsa flood” escalation.

The exchange of strikes further highlighted Israel’s clear technological superiority and the success of Israeli intelligence in penetrating deep inside Iran itself, raising alarming concerns in Tehran.

Israel

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can claim credit for persuading the Trump administration to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly those beyond the reach of the Israeli military.

Israeli forces succeeded in gaining control over distant Iranian airspace within days, a feat Russia has not achieved after three years of war in Ukraine.

Israeli intelligence breakthroughs inside Iran played a crucial role in the conflict, culminating in Israel’s public release of videos it labeled “Mossad-Tehran branch” and drone bases.

Netanyahu can argue that he made a difficult decision to attack Iran and convinced the Israeli public that the fight was existential. He can also remind critics that he expelled Iran from Syria and curtailed Hezbollah’s ability to wage war on Israel.

He may also point to new regional power balances he has imposed - part of his broader ambition to reshape the Middle East - with Israel maintaining the region’s most powerful military force.

However, Netanyahu’s policies risk renewed clashes with many, especially as tensions over Gaza and the “two-state solution” resurface.

Observers say the gains made by the parties at the end of the Iran-Israel conflict remain fragile and could shift depending on how events unfold.

Any calm could enable Israeli opposition forces to reopen debates on Netanyahu’s “wars” and their costs. It might also prompt the Iranian public to question their leadership’s responsibility for the military setbacks and Iran’s regional and global standing.

For now, the spotlight remains firmly on the primary player: Trump.