How Russia's Grab of Crimea 10 Years Ago Led to War with Ukraine and Rising Tensions with the West

In this pool photograph distributed by Russia's state agency Sputnik, Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a videoconference ceremonies to launch the construction of Unit 7 at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant and a high-speed railway line between Moscow and Saint Petersburg, at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence, outside Moscow, on March 14, 2024. (Photo by Mikhail Metzel / POOL / AFP)
In this pool photograph distributed by Russia's state agency Sputnik, Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a videoconference ceremonies to launch the construction of Unit 7 at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant and a high-speed railway line between Moscow and Saint Petersburg, at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence, outside Moscow, on March 14, 2024. (Photo by Mikhail Metzel / POOL / AFP)
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How Russia's Grab of Crimea 10 Years Ago Led to War with Ukraine and Rising Tensions with the West

In this pool photograph distributed by Russia's state agency Sputnik, Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a videoconference ceremonies to launch the construction of Unit 7 at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant and a high-speed railway line between Moscow and Saint Petersburg, at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence, outside Moscow, on March 14, 2024. (Photo by Mikhail Metzel / POOL / AFP)
In this pool photograph distributed by Russia's state agency Sputnik, Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a videoconference ceremonies to launch the construction of Unit 7 at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant and a high-speed railway line between Moscow and Saint Petersburg, at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence, outside Moscow, on March 14, 2024. (Photo by Mikhail Metzel / POOL / AFP)

A decade ago, President Vladimir Putin seized Crimea from Ukraine, a bold land grab that set the stage for Russia to invade its neighbor in 2022.
The quick and bloodless seizure of the diamond-shaped peninsula, home to Russia's Black Sea fleet and a popular vacation site, touched off a wave of patriotism and sent Putin's popularity soaring. “Crimea is ours!” became a popular slogan in Russia.
Now that Putin has been anointed to another six-year term as president, he is determined to extend his gains in Ukraine amid Russia's battlefield successes and waning Western support for Kyiv.
Putin has been vague about his goals in Ukraine as the fighting grinds into a third year at the expense of many lives on both sides, but some of his top lieutenants still talk of capturing Kyiv and cutting Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea.
The largest conflict in Europe since World War II has sent tensions between Moscow and the West soaring to levels rarely seen during even the chilliest moments of the Cold War.
When he seized Crimea in 2014, Putin said he persuaded Western leaders to back down by reminding them of Moscow’s nuclear capabilities. It's a warning he has issued often, notably after the start of his full-scale invasion; in last month's state-of-the-nation address, when he declared the West risks nuclear war if it deepens its involvement in Ukraine; and again on Wednesday, when he said he would use that arsenal if Russia's sovereignty is threatened.
Analyst Tatiana Stanovaya says Putin feels more confident than ever amid “the Kremlin’s growing faith in Russia’s military advantage in the war with Ukraine and a sense of the weakness and fragmentation of the West.”
The senior fellow at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center noted that Putin’s speech last month “created an extremely chilling impression of an unraveling spiral of escalation.”
The 71-year-old Kremlin leader has cast the war in Ukraine as a life-or-death battle against the West, with Moscow ready to protect its gains at any cost. His obsession with Ukraine was clear in an interview with US conservative commentator Tucker Carlson, with Putin delivering a long lecture that sought to prove his claim that the bulk of its territory historically belonged to Russia.
He made that argument 10 years ago when he said Moscow needed to protect Russian speakers in Crimea and reclaim its territory.
When Ukraine’s Kremlin-friendly president was ousted in 2014 by mass protests that Moscow called a US-instigated coup, Putin responded by sending troops to overrun Crimea and calling a plebiscite on joining Russia, which the West dismissed as illegal.
Russia then annexed Crimea on March 18, 2014, although the move was only recognized internationally by countries such as North Korea and Sudan.
Weeks later, Moscow-backed separatists launched an uprising in eastern Ukraine, battling Kyiv’s forces. The Kremlin denied supporting the rebellion with troops and weapons despite abundant evidence to the contrary, including a Dutch court’s finding that a Russia-supplied air defense system downed a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing all 298 people aboard.
Russian hard-liners later criticized Putin for failing to capture all of Ukraine that year, arguing it was easily possible at a time when the government in Kyiv was in disarray and its military in shambles.
Putin instead backed the separatists and opted for a peace deal for eastern Ukraine that he hoped would allow Moscow to establish control over its neighbor. The 2015 Minsk agreement brokered by France and Germany, following painful defeats suffered by Ukrainian forces, obliged Kyiv to offer the separatist regions broad autonomy, including permission to form their own police force.
Had it been fully implemented, the agreement would have allowed Moscow to use the separatist areas to dictate Kyiv’s policies and prevent it from ever joining NATO. Many Ukrainians saw the deal as a betrayal of its national interests.
Russia viewed the election of political novice Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president in 2019 as a chance to revive the anemic Minsk deal. But Zelenskyy stood his ground, leaving the agreement stalled and Putin increasingly exasperated.
When Putin announced his “special military operation” in Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, he hoped the country would fall as quickly and easily as Crimea. But the attempt to capture Kyiv collapsed amid stiff Ukrainian resistance, forcing Russian troops to withdraw from the outskirts of the capital.
More defeats followed in fall 2022, when Russian troops retreated from large parts of eastern and southern Ukraine under a swift counteroffensive by Kyiv.
Fortunes changed last year when another Ukrainian counteroffensive failed to cut Russia's land corridor to Crimea. Kyiv’s forces suffered heavy casualties when they made botched attempts to break through multilayered Russian defenses.
As Western support for Ukraine dwindled amid political infighting in the US and Kyiv ran short of weapons and ammunition, Russian troops intensified pressure along the over 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line, relying on hundreds of thousands of volunteer soldiers and the newly supplied weapons that replaced early losses.
After capturing the key eastern stronghold of Avdiivka last month, Russia has pushed deeper into the Donetsk region as Zelenskyy pleads with the West for more weapons.
Testifying before the US Senate last week, CIA Director William Burns emphasized the urgency of US military aid, saying: "It’s our assessment that with supplemental assistance, Ukraine can hold its own on the front lines through 2024 and into early 2025.”
Without it, he said, “Ukraine is likely to lose ground — and probably significant ground — in 2024,” adding, “you're going to see more Avdiivkas.”
The dithering Western support has put Ukraine in an increasingly precarious position, analysts say.
“Russia is gaining momentum in its assault on Ukraine amid stalled Western aid, making the coming months critical to the direction of conflict,” said Ben Barry, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, in an analysis. “In a worst-case scenario, parts of Kyiv’s front line could be at risk of collapse.”
Putin demurred when asked how deep into Ukraine he would like to forge, but he repeatedly stated that the line of contact should be pushed long enough to protect Russian territory from long-range weapons in Ukraine's arsenal. Some members of his entourage are less reticent, laying out plans for new land grabs.
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy head of Russia’s Security Council who has sought to curry Putin’s favor with regular hawkish statements, mentioned Kyiv and the Black Sea port of Odesa.
“Ukraine is Russia,” he bluntly declared recently, ruling out any talks with Zelenskyy’s government and suggesting a “peace formula” that would see Kyiv's surrender and Moscow's annexation of the entire country.
Russian defense analysts are divided over Moscow’s ability to pursue such ambitious goals.
Sergei Poletaev, a Moscow-based military expert, said the Russian army has opted for a strategy of draining Ukraine resources with attacks along the front line in the hope of achieving a point when Kyiv’s defenses would collapse.
“What matters is the damage inflicted to the enemy, making the enemy weaken faster,” he said.
Others say Russia's attacks seeking to exhaust Ukraine's military are costly for Moscow, too.
Russian and Ukrainian forces are locked in a stalemate that gives Moscow little chance of a breakthrough, said Ruslan Pukhov, head of the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies think tank.
“The Ukrainian defense is quite strong, and it doesn’t allow Russian troops to achieve anything more substantial than tactical gains,” he said.
Such a positional war of attrition "could be waged for years,” Pukhov added, with both parties waiting for the other to “face internal changes resulting in a policy shift.”



Trump Carves Up World and International Order with It

Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP
Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP
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Trump Carves Up World and International Order with It

Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP
Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP

By casting doubt on the world order, Donald Trump risks dragging the globe back into an era where great powers impose their imperial will on the weak, analysts warn.
Russia wants Ukraine, China demands Taiwan and now the US president seems to be following suit, whether by coveting Canada as the "51st US state", insisting "we've got to have" Greenland or kicking Chinese interests out of the Panama Canal.
Where the United States once defended state sovereignty and international law, Trump's disregard for his neighbors' borders and expansionist ambitions mark a return to the days when the world was carved up into spheres of influence.
As recently as Wednesday, US defense secretary Pete Hegseth floated the idea of an American military base to secure the Panama Canal, a strategic waterway controlled by the United States until 1999 which Trump's administration has vowed to "take back".
Hegseth's comments came nearly 35 years after the United States invaded to topple Panama's dictator Manuel Noriega, harking back to when successive US administrations viewed Latin America as "America's backyard".
"The Trump 2.0 administration is largely accepting the familiar great power claim to 'spheres of influence'," Professor Gregory O. Hall, of the University of Kentucky, told AFP.
Indian diplomat Jawed Ashraf warned that by "speaking openly about Greenland, Canada, Panama Canal", "the new administration may have accelerated the slide" towards a return to great power domination.
The empire strikes back
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has posed as the custodian of an international order "based on the ideas of countries' equal sovereignty and territorial integrity", said American researcher Jeffrey Mankoff, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
But those principles run counter to how Russia and China see their own interests, according to the author of "Empires of Eurasia: how imperial legacies shape international security".
Both countries are "themselves products of empires and continue to function in many ways like empires", seeking to throw their weight around for reasons of prestige, power or protection, Mankoff said.
That is not to say that spheres of influence disappeared with the fall of the Soviet Union.
"Even then, the US and Western allies sought to expand their sphere of influence eastward into what was the erstwhile Soviet and then the Russian sphere of influence," Ashraf, a former adviser to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, pointed out.
But until the return of Trump, the United States exploited its position as the "policeman of the world" to ward off imperial ambitions while pushing its own interests.
Now that Trump appears to view the cost of upholding a rules-based order challenged by its rivals and increasingly criticized in the rest of the world as too expensive, the United States is contributing to the cracks in the facade with Russia and China's help.
And as the international order weakens, the great powers "see opportunities to once again behave in an imperial way", said Mankoff.
Yalta yet again
As at Yalta in 1945, when the United States and the Soviet Union divided the post-World War II world between their respective zones of influence, Washington, Beijing and Moscow could again agree to carve up the globe anew.
"Improved ties between the United States and its great-power rivals, Russia and China, appear to be imminent," Derek Grossman, of the United States' RAND Corporation think tank, said in March.
But the haggling over who gets dominance over what and where would likely come at the expense of other countries.
"Today's major powers are seeking to negotiate a new global order primarily with each other," Monica Toft, professor of international relations at Tufts University in Massachusets wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs.
"In a scenario in which the United States, China, and Russia all agree that they have a vital interest in avoiding a nuclear war, acknowledging each other's spheres of influence can serve as a mechanism to deter escalation," Toft said.
If that were the case, "negotiations to end the war in Ukraine could resemble a new Yalta", she added.
Yet the thought of a Ukraine deemed by Trump to be in Russia's sphere is likely to send shivers down the spines of many in Europe -- not least in Ukraine itself.
"The success or failure of Ukraine to defend its sovereignty is going to have a lot of impact in terms of what the global system ends up looking like a generation from now," Mankoff said.
"So it's important for countries that have the ability and want to uphold an anti-imperial version of international order to assist Ukraine," he added -- pointing the finger at Europe.
"In Trump's world, Europeans need their own sphere of influence," said Rym Momtaz, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.
"For former imperial powers, Europeans seem strangely on the backfoot as nineteenth century spheres of influence come back as the organising principle of global affairs."