What Is Needed on Int’l and Regional Levels to Stop the War in Sudan?

 A damaged army tank is seen on the street, almost one year into the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in Omdurman, Sudan, April 7, 2024. (Reuters)
A damaged army tank is seen on the street, almost one year into the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in Omdurman, Sudan, April 7, 2024. (Reuters)
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What Is Needed on Int’l and Regional Levels to Stop the War in Sudan?

 A damaged army tank is seen on the street, almost one year into the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in Omdurman, Sudan, April 7, 2024. (Reuters)
A damaged army tank is seen on the street, almost one year into the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in Omdurman, Sudan, April 7, 2024. (Reuters)

By Rasha Awad

The war in Sudan between the army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) entered its second year with no progress made on reaching a peaceful negotiated solution to the conflict. Some hope appears on the horizon with the announcement that the Jeddah negotiations will resume in Saudi Arabia in two weeks.

On the internal scene, the military escalation has continued on the ground and through military speeches. The situation has raised alarm among experts and observers in Sudan that the country may be headed towards a long war that may lead to the division of the country and the spillover of the conflict into the region, especially in wake of the RSF launching a drone attack on army positions in the eastern city of al-Qadarif.

Eastern Sudan has been largely spared from the war up until the April 9 attack.

Time as a decisive factor

The success of the negotiations will rely heavily on time. If the war stretches on, then new obstacles will emerge that will complicate negotiations. Such complications include defections from the army or RSF.

In this regard, Dr. Bakri al-Jak, official spokesman of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddum), warned the war could take on regional and ethnic dimensions, instead of its current ideological and political ones.

There is the possibility that the army and RSF leaderships could lose control over their forces on the ground and that the country could be divided into areas of influence and control, which would be the first step in the division of Sudan, he added.

He therefore underscored the need to speed up reaching a negotiated solution and intensifying regional and international contacts in support of peace to avert the prolongation of the war.

Internal political will

Experts estimate that one year of war has cost Sudan 100 billion dollars. Around 90 percent of factories have been destroyed, 65 percent of agricultural production has come to a halt, and 75 percent of the services sector has stopped functioning. Moreover, wasted opportunities have cost Sudan an estimated 200 billion dollars.

Around 14,000 civilians have been killed, thousands are wounded and reported missing and 11 million have been displaced.

As for the military losses, the army and RSF have both refrained from disclosing figures, but the estimates are that they have both incurred heavy losses.

In spite of these massive losses, neither side has demonstrated the political will to turn to a negotiated solution even though the majority of the millions of Sudanese people want peace.

National and regional determination

Like all wars in the region, the conflict in Sudan is unlikely to come to an end without a national drive to reach peace. It should also be coupled with effective regional and international pressure on the warring parties to agree to a negotiated solution.

Writer and analyst Al-Haj Warraq said several factors will determine whether the war will stretch on or wind down. Among them is whether the United States would come with a unified position on Sudan.

He explained that the US is currently deeply divided between Republican and Democrat strategic visions. President Joe Biden’s Democrat administration itself is divided between supporters of the civilian rule in Sudan and others who would opt for empowering the Islamists (National Congress) under the command of army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Advocates of civilian rule, meanwhile, continue to propose “empty general slogans” that offer nothing in specific, continued Warraq.

He went on to say that the declared goals of the American administration are “unachievable” because they don’t follow any specific policy and they contradict Sudan’s democratic leanings. In the end, however, several of the cards to end the war lie in American hands.

“So, the civilian democratic forces need to invest in Washington’s openness to draft a specific policy that would guarantee the end of the war, reestablish the democratic system and restore Sudan’s unity based on real federal foundations,” he stressed.

War and gold

Another significant factor in the war are the networks of looting that are funding it, especially the gold miners and smugglers. Besides financing the war, the networks have led to rampant corruption and bribery in the country.

They have played a role in tearing apart the ranks of the civilian forces. The powers pursuing peace must address this problem with the West and seek sanctions on these networks, which would be a step forward in ending the war.

Another factor that should end the war is the unification of the forces of peace and civilian democratic rule. Warraq said that even though Taqaddum was the largest coalition of civilian forces, “it needs to be more open to the people and include new forces and non-partisan figures.”

It also needs to develop its internal structure to make it more effective, he suggested.

The unification of an effective and united movement of civilian democratic forces will help “remove the legitimacy of the war”, said Al-Jak, who stressed the need for the forces to refrain from adopting the narrative of either of the warring parties. Rather, they should work on stopping them.

*Rasha Awad is a Sudanese researcher and spokesperson of Taqaddum.



What Message is Hamas Sending by Resuming Rocket Fire on Israel?

Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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What Message is Hamas Sending by Resuming Rocket Fire on Israel?

Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Emergency personnel work at an impact scene following a hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza strip towards Israel, in Ashkelon, Israel April 6, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

The launch of 10 rockets by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, toward Israel on Sunday surprised many observers, marking a sharp escalation in rocket fire that had largely been limited to one or two missiles since Israel broke a truce on March 18.

Most recent rocket attacks were believed to have come from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but Sunday’s barrage was claimed by Hamas, signaling a possible shift in the dynamics of the conflict.

According to Israeli claims, the rockets were fired from the al-Zawaida area, north of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. However, field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat the rockets were launched from a different location — one that has rarely been used for such operations.

The recent rocket barrage by Hamas may have carried a deeper strategic message, the sources told Asharq Al-Awsat, suggesting the attack was intended to raise questions within Israel about the group’s ability to access its missile arsenal — or hint at a regained capacity to manufacture rockets.

Hamas sources declined to specify when the rockets used in the latest attack were produced but stressed that the decision to launch was shaped primarily by field conditions and the assessment of fighters and commanders on the ground.

“At times, we aim to send specific political messages,” said a Hamas source, who requested anonymity.

“For example, we want to underline that Israel has failed to defeat the movement and its military wing, despite carrying out assassinations of senior and field-level commanders,” they added.

Hamas has denied that its latest rocket barrage was a direct response to the recent assassinations of senior figures, saying the attack was part of its broader reaction to what it described as “ongoing massacres” committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.

“This was a routine response within the framework of confronting continuous Israeli aggression,” the Hamas source told Asharq Al-Awsat, rejecting suggestions that the assault was linked to specific events.

The timing of the rocket fire raised eyebrows, coming just hours after a rare protest in Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, where demonstrators chanted against Hamas, condemned the rocket attacks, and demanded an end to the war.

Protesters also called for Hamas to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and stop speaking on behalf of its residents.

Asked whether the barrage was meant to send a message to a restless population, Hamas sources denied any connection.

“The rocket fire had nothing to do with the protest in Jabalia,” one source said, pointing to similar demonstrations in recent weeks that were not followed by rocket launches.

When pressed about the implications of such protests for the group’s future in Gaza, the source said internal discussions had taken place.

“The movement recognizes people’s right to express themselves — but not at the expense of the resistance,” the source said.

“There must be clear national guidelines that prioritize ending the war while preserving the legitimacy of the resistance,” they added.

Gaza Governance

Hamas also pushed back against accusations that it is clinging to power in Gaza, placing blame on rival faction Fatah and Israel for blocking proposals aimed at resolving the territory’s political deadlock.

“Hamas has no issue stepping down from governing Gaza,” a source said. “The real obstacle lies with others who have rejected every proposal laid on the table.”

The source pointed to a proposed community support committee, formed with Egyptian mediation, which was meant to take over governance duties. “We showed maximum flexibility, but neither Fatah nor Israel accepted this mechanism,” the source added.

As for whether stepping down from power could weaken Hamas's influence in Gaza, the source appeared unconcerned. “The movement is confident in its endurance,” the source said.

“Even if Hamas relinquishes control and enters a long-term ceasefire, it will continue to exist and maintain its presence,” they affirmed.

A Fatah delegation had held talks with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty two days ago, focusing primarily on internal Palestinian reconciliation and the future governance of Gaza, as Hamas signaled readiness to hand over administrative responsibilities to a proposed community support committee.

Multiple Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group had informed Egyptian officials of its willingness to allow a minister from the Palestinian Authority’s Ramallah-based government to head the committee, with a deputy from Gaza appointed to assist.

A Hamas delegation is expected to travel to Cairo in the coming days to continue discussions with Egyptian officials on the evolving plans for Gaza’s administration and broader efforts to resolve the internal Palestinian divide.