Tehran, Tel Aviv Exchange Displays of Power During Gaza Conflict

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
TT

Tehran, Tel Aviv Exchange Displays of Power During Gaza Conflict

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)

Since the start of the Gaza conflict following Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, Iran has been visibly involved in the regional crisis. This involvement spans its support for allied militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, as well as political, diplomatic and military actions under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Two hundred days into the war on Gaza, tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran have intensified. This escalation signals a shift from years of a shadow Iranian-Israeli conflict towards a potentially direct confrontation, primarily driven by Iran.

In the early days of the war, Iranian officials hinted at their ability to escalate the conflict and confront Israel by unifying fronts if Gaza continued to be targeted. This was seen as a political maneuver.

While Iran implied involvement in the confrontation, Western reports, especially American ones, differed on Iran’s role in Hamas’ Oct. 7 Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked the war.

In the blame game and attempts to involve international parties, based on Israeli sources, some Western newspapers accused Iran of orchestrating the attack. On the other hand, media outlets and agencies turned to Iranian sources to challenge the Israeli narrative.

As Iran tried to leverage Israel’s surprise over the Al-Aqsa Flood, Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders sent a strong message. They mentioned Iran’s motives for the attack, including revenge for Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani’s killing in a US strike in early 2020. Yet, Iran swiftly denied any direct link to Hamas’ attack to avoid upsetting the delicate balances it has achieved in the region.

Diplomatic moves

Iran has been quick to amp up its regional diplomacy under Raisi, aiming to improve ties with neighboring countries and counter its international isolation, especially after the Ukraine conflict complicated efforts to revive its nuclear deal with Western powers.

Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s recent statement at Tehran University, suggesting that Iran must be consulted for any Palestine agreement, has meanwhile raised eyebrows.

Abdollahian’s visits to Jeddah, Geneva, and New York for Palestine-related conferences have sparked questions in Iranian media about the authorities’ delayed actions on pressing domestic issues, including nuclear negotiations to lift US sanctions.

However, the aftermath of the war has somewhat eased Western pressure on Iran’s nuclear program, with Western powers avoiding turning to the UN Security Council or issuing condemnations of Iran because they don’t want to deepen the crisis with Tehran amid the Gaza conflict.

Iran has highlighted its ties to powers around Israel while pursuing diplomacy. It continues to support Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, with top Iranian officials, like the foreign minister, visiting Doha, Beirut, and Damascus to coordinate with the two groups.

Iran also backs armed groups linked to Tehran, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi militias in Yemen and Iraqi armed factions.

The Iranians see the Gaza war as the greatest evidence of coordination between diplomacy and field activities by the Revolutionary Guard and allied groups. However, Tehran officially denies direct involvement in decisions or operations of these groups, though it still supports their actions.

Maritime developments

In early November, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for disrupting Israel’s key supply routes by blocking maritime access for energy, food and trade.

Following his statement, the Houthi militias in Yemen began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea.

These attacks sparked renewed tensions at sea. The US and UK responded with strikes on Houthi positions to deter further assaults. Meanwhile, Western and regional powers formed maritime alliances to safeguard navigation routes.

The Revolutionary Guard further heightened tensions by announcing Iranian naval escorts to the Red Sea and threatening to block key waterways like the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar, as well as disrupting navigation in the Mediterranean.

They also formed a “Naval Basij” unit comprising maritime units of groups loyal to Iran.

Israel strikes back

As tensions rose in the Red Sea and Iran-aligned factions targeted US forces, Israel launched two precise airstrikes in December. The first, in Damascus on December 2 killed two Revolutionary Guard officers: Brigadier Generals Panah Taghizadeh and Mohammad-Ali Ataie Shourcheh.

They were reportedly killed during “advisory operations” at a military base in the Sayyida Zainab area.

On December 25, Razi Mousavi, the logistics chief for the Revolutionary Guard in Syria and Lebanon, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his home in the Sayyida Zainab area. The strike came shortly after he left his office at the Iranian embassy compound.

The third strike occurred in the Mazzeh area on January 20, killing Brig. Gen. Hojjatollah Amidwar, the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence chief in Syria, and four other Iranian officers.

Later, the Revolutionary Guard reported the deaths of three more officers in separate operations in Damascus, Homs and Deir Ezzor between February and March.

Losses and heightened tensions

As tensions rose, Damascus saw the deadliest blow to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in the ongoing power struggle between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

The Iranian consulate in Mazzeh was struck, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria and Lebanon, along with Hezbollah’s advisory council member and five other senior Guard officers.

Iran promised retaliation, sparking intense speculation, and Khamenei declared the consulate Iranian soil and pledged a response.

Israel remained quiet after all the attacks, while Iran launched over 300 missiles and drones two weeks later. Israel claimed to have intercepted most.

Khamenei stated Iran aimed to show its power.

In response, Israel threatened retaliation deep in Iranian territory. Western powers tried to discourage Israel, but it struck a military airport near Isfahan. Satellite images showed damage to the S-300 radar system protecting nuclear facilities.

The exchange continues, with its lessons likely to keep tensions high between Israel and Iran, even after the dust settles in the Gaza conflict.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
TT

What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.