Tehran, Tel Aviv Exchange Displays of Power During Gaza Conflict

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
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Tehran, Tel Aviv Exchange Displays of Power During Gaza Conflict

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stands before the coffins of seven Revolutionary Guard officers killed in the Iranian consulate strike in Syria. (EPA)

Since the start of the Gaza conflict following Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, Iran has been visibly involved in the regional crisis. This involvement spans its support for allied militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, as well as political, diplomatic and military actions under President Ebrahim Raisi.

Two hundred days into the war on Gaza, tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran have intensified. This escalation signals a shift from years of a shadow Iranian-Israeli conflict towards a potentially direct confrontation, primarily driven by Iran.

In the early days of the war, Iranian officials hinted at their ability to escalate the conflict and confront Israel by unifying fronts if Gaza continued to be targeted. This was seen as a political maneuver.

While Iran implied involvement in the confrontation, Western reports, especially American ones, differed on Iran’s role in Hamas’ Oct. 7 Al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked the war.

In the blame game and attempts to involve international parties, based on Israeli sources, some Western newspapers accused Iran of orchestrating the attack. On the other hand, media outlets and agencies turned to Iranian sources to challenge the Israeli narrative.

As Iran tried to leverage Israel’s surprise over the Al-Aqsa Flood, Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders sent a strong message. They mentioned Iran’s motives for the attack, including revenge for Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani’s killing in a US strike in early 2020. Yet, Iran swiftly denied any direct link to Hamas’ attack to avoid upsetting the delicate balances it has achieved in the region.

Diplomatic moves

Iran has been quick to amp up its regional diplomacy under Raisi, aiming to improve ties with neighboring countries and counter its international isolation, especially after the Ukraine conflict complicated efforts to revive its nuclear deal with Western powers.

Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian’s recent statement at Tehran University, suggesting that Iran must be consulted for any Palestine agreement, has meanwhile raised eyebrows.

Abdollahian’s visits to Jeddah, Geneva, and New York for Palestine-related conferences have sparked questions in Iranian media about the authorities’ delayed actions on pressing domestic issues, including nuclear negotiations to lift US sanctions.

However, the aftermath of the war has somewhat eased Western pressure on Iran’s nuclear program, with Western powers avoiding turning to the UN Security Council or issuing condemnations of Iran because they don’t want to deepen the crisis with Tehran amid the Gaza conflict.

Iran has highlighted its ties to powers around Israel while pursuing diplomacy. It continues to support Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, with top Iranian officials, like the foreign minister, visiting Doha, Beirut, and Damascus to coordinate with the two groups.

Iran also backs armed groups linked to Tehran, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi militias in Yemen and Iraqi armed factions.

The Iranians see the Gaza war as the greatest evidence of coordination between diplomacy and field activities by the Revolutionary Guard and allied groups. However, Tehran officially denies direct involvement in decisions or operations of these groups, though it still supports their actions.

Maritime developments

In early November, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for disrupting Israel’s key supply routes by blocking maritime access for energy, food and trade.

Following his statement, the Houthi militias in Yemen began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea.

These attacks sparked renewed tensions at sea. The US and UK responded with strikes on Houthi positions to deter further assaults. Meanwhile, Western and regional powers formed maritime alliances to safeguard navigation routes.

The Revolutionary Guard further heightened tensions by announcing Iranian naval escorts to the Red Sea and threatening to block key waterways like the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar, as well as disrupting navigation in the Mediterranean.

They also formed a “Naval Basij” unit comprising maritime units of groups loyal to Iran.

Israel strikes back

As tensions rose in the Red Sea and Iran-aligned factions targeted US forces, Israel launched two precise airstrikes in December. The first, in Damascus on December 2 killed two Revolutionary Guard officers: Brigadier Generals Panah Taghizadeh and Mohammad-Ali Ataie Shourcheh.

They were reportedly killed during “advisory operations” at a military base in the Sayyida Zainab area.

On December 25, Razi Mousavi, the logistics chief for the Revolutionary Guard in Syria and Lebanon, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his home in the Sayyida Zainab area. The strike came shortly after he left his office at the Iranian embassy compound.

The third strike occurred in the Mazzeh area on January 20, killing Brig. Gen. Hojjatollah Amidwar, the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence chief in Syria, and four other Iranian officers.

Later, the Revolutionary Guard reported the deaths of three more officers in separate operations in Damascus, Homs and Deir Ezzor between February and March.

Losses and heightened tensions

As tensions rose, Damascus saw the deadliest blow to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in the ongoing power struggle between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

The Iranian consulate in Mazzeh was struck, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Revolutionary Guard forces in Syria and Lebanon, along with Hezbollah’s advisory council member and five other senior Guard officers.

Iran promised retaliation, sparking intense speculation, and Khamenei declared the consulate Iranian soil and pledged a response.

Israel remained quiet after all the attacks, while Iran launched over 300 missiles and drones two weeks later. Israel claimed to have intercepted most.

Khamenei stated Iran aimed to show its power.

In response, Israel threatened retaliation deep in Iranian territory. Western powers tried to discourage Israel, but it struck a military airport near Isfahan. Satellite images showed damage to the S-300 radar system protecting nuclear facilities.

The exchange continues, with its lessons likely to keep tensions high between Israel and Iran, even after the dust settles in the Gaza conflict.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.