Wary of Wars in Gaza and Ukraine, Old Foes Türkiye and Greece Test a Friendship Initiative

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (L) and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis leave after speaking to the press following their meeting in Athens during Erdogan's official visit to Greece, Dec. 7, 2023. (AFP Photo)
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (L) and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis leave after speaking to the press following their meeting in Athens during Erdogan's official visit to Greece, Dec. 7, 2023. (AFP Photo)
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Wary of Wars in Gaza and Ukraine, Old Foes Türkiye and Greece Test a Friendship Initiative

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (L) and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis leave after speaking to the press following their meeting in Athens during Erdogan's official visit to Greece, Dec. 7, 2023. (AFP Photo)
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (L) and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis leave after speaking to the press following their meeting in Athens during Erdogan's official visit to Greece, Dec. 7, 2023. (AFP Photo)

Old foes Türkiye and Greece will test a five-month-old friendship initiative Monday when Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis visits Ankara.
The two NATO members, which share decades of mutual animosity, a tense border and disputed waters, agreed to sideline disputes last December. Instead, they’re focusing on trade and energy, repairing cultural ties and a long list of other items placed on the so-called positive agenda, The Associated Press said.
Here’s a look at what the two sides hope to achieve and the disputes that have plagued ties in the past:
FOCUSING ON A POSITIVE AGENDA Mitsotakis is to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara on Monday as part of efforts to improve ties following the solidarity Athens showed Ankara after a devastating earthquake hit southern Türkiye last year.
The two leaders have sharp differences over the Israeli-Hamas war, but are keen to hold back further instability in the eastern Mediterranean as conflict also continues to rage in Ukraine.
“We always approach our discussions with Türkiye with confidence and with no illusions that Turkish positions will not change from one moment to the next,” Mitsotakis said last week, commenting on the visit. “Nevertheless, I think it’s imperative that when we disagree, the channels of communication should always be open."
“We should disagree without tension and without this always causing an escalation on the ground," he added.
Ioannis Grigoriadis, a professor of political science at Ankara’s Bilkent University, said the two leaders would look for ways “to expand the positive agenda and look for topics where the two sides can seek win-win solutions,” such as in trade, tourism and migration.
EASY VISAS FOR TURKISH TOURISTS Erdogan visited Athens in early December, and the two countries have since maintained regular high-level contacts to promote a variety of fence-mending initiatives, including educational exchanges and tourism.
Turkish citizens this summer are able to visit 10 Greek islands using on-the-spot visas, skipping a more cumbersome procedure needed to enter Europe’s common travel area zone, known as the Schengen area.
“This generates a great opportunity for improving the economic relations between the two sides, but also to bring the two stable societies closer — for Greeks and Turks to realize that they have more things in common than they think,” Grigoriadis said.
A HISTORY OF DISPUTES Disagreements have brought Athens and Ankara close to war on several occasions over the past five decades, mostly over maritime borders and the rights to explore for resources in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas.
The two countries are also locked in a dispute over Cyprus, which was divided in 1974 when Türkiye invaded following a coup by supporters of union with Greece. Only Türkiye recognizes a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence in the island’s northern third.
The dispute over the exploration of energy resources resulted in a naval standoff in 2020 and a vow by Erdogan to halt talks with the Mitsotakis government. But the two men met three times last year following a thaw in relations and a broader effort by Erdogan to re-engage with Western countries.
The foreign ministers of the two countries, Hakan Fidan of Türkiye and George Gerapetritis of Greece, are set to join the talks Monday and hold a separate meeting.
RECENT DISAGREEMENTS Just weeks before Mitsotakis’ visit, Erdogan announced the opening of a former Byzantine-era church in Istanbul as a mosque, drawing criticism from Greece and the Greek Orthodox church. Like Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia, the Chora had operated as a museum for decades before it was converted into a mosque.
Türkiye, meanwhile, has criticized recently announced plans by Greece to declare areas in the Ionian and Aegean seas as “marine parks” to conserve aquatic life. Türkiye objects to the one-sided declaration in the Aegean, where some areas remain under dispute, and has labeled the move as “a step that sabotages the normalization process.”
Grigoriadis said Türkiye and Greece could focus on restoring derelict Ottoman monuments in Greece and Greek Orthodox monuments in Türkiye. “That would be an opportunity” for improved ties, he said.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.