‘Iraqi Resistance’ Ready for ‘Wider War’ in Lebanon

Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
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‘Iraqi Resistance’ Ready for ‘Wider War’ in Lebanon

Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

When Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein warned of the outbreak of war in Lebanon, his disturbing words were expected to receive a stormy response from Iraqi factions loyal to Iran about preparations to support Lebanon’s Hezbollah. But this did not happen.

On June 13, Hussein was speaking in a joint press conference with his acting Iranian counterpart, Ali Bagheri Kani, and without prior context, he fired a “warning shot” about South Lebanon, while Baghdad is committed to the truce under a government that is increasingly admired by the Americans.

“If a war breaks out there, the entire region will be affected, not just Lebanon,” Hussein said.

For many, the words of the Iraqi chief diplomat were a “message” based on information provided by the Iranian visitor, Bagheri Kani, who, two weeks before his arrival in Baghdad, was holding “normal” meetings in Beirut and Damascus about the “close and lasting partnership.”

Two figures in the Coordination Framework told Asharq Al-Awsat that when Kani arrived in Baghdad, he spoke with Iraqi officials about “a possible war that Israel is planning in South Lebanon.”

In an attempt to understand the position of the military factions, Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to an Iraqi faction leader, who said: “We were asked about our position if the Lebanon front were to witness further escalation. We replied: We are ready, (...) we will go there.”

A diplomat confirmed that Bagheri had not made the request “in this manner,” while an Iraqi expert interpreted Hussein’s words as an attempt to achieve “political balance between the government and the resistance,” ruling out the chances of a “wider war”.

Who is seeking to expand the war, Iran or Israel?

For months, the regions of South Lebanon and northern Israel have been witnessing the most violent exchange of attacks since the 2006 war, within the framework of unconventional rules of engagement that make it a war in doses, with high costs, especially on the side of Hezbollah in the South.

Lebanese sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the toll of the past months is equivalent to the damage of a comprehensive war.

Amos Hochstein, advisor to US President Joe Biden, who arrived in Israel on Monday, and from there to Beirut, conveyed a message to dissuade Netanyahu from any possible escalation that might push Iran to intervene directly in Lebanon, through its arms in Iraq.

Aqeel Abbas, a political science professor in Washington, believes that Netanyahu “wants this war more than Hezbollah and Iran,” because the latter wants to maintain the pattern of frequent strikes from South Lebanon to ease pressure on Hamas in Gaza.

Hezbollah itself also wants to maintain the “dynamic of deterrence” at its current level, as any open military operation by the Israelis will annihilate the Lebanese infrastructure, according to Abbas.

Iran waves the Hezbollah card

Before Bagheri Kani’s visit to Baghdad, Iran was transmitting messages to the Iraqis suggesting that it was facing three intractable problems: The vacuum left by the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdullahian, the enormous pressure from the Americans and the West regarding the nuclear program, and Tehran’s position in the Gaza ceasefire deal, which will ultimately force it to abandon one of its axes in the region.

In this context, Iran is seeking to put the South Lebanon card on the table to improve its conditions in the negotiations. It is not clear how this hypothesis fits with the case of Hezbollah, as many observers say that the group is exhausted and limited in its movement. However, the Iraqi politician responded by saying: “No one has yet confirmed the fact that Hezbollah is exhausted, while it can at any time cause a harmful blow to the Israelis.”

To a large extent, Aqeel Abbas agrees with this suggestion, pointing to an Israeli and American concern over “Hezbollah’s military and technological capabilities,” even after months of attrition.

“Hands on the trigger, Lebanon”

When the Iraqi minister issued his warning on Lebanon, Baghdad was at a safe distance from the flames of the Gaza war in the region. The government was able to maintain the truce with the US forces for months, while Prime Minister Mohammad Shiaa al-Sudani tried to balance between Iran’s requirements and the ambitions of the factions.

Since the death of Raisi, the leaders of the Shiite parties and factions have not heard many important messages from the Iranians.

A Shiite faction leader in Baghdad, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said that unannounced visits by Iranian military figures to Iraq have decreased since Raisi’s death.

He noted that before Bagheri Kani’s visits to Baghdad and Erbil, the Iranians addressed direct questions to the Hezbollah Brigades and the Nujaba Movement about their willingness to participate in the South Lebanon confrontations with Israel.

The faction leader told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We told them, yes, of course. Hands on the trigger...”

Hezbollah does not want the Iraqis’ involvement

“Indeed, we are preparing for any emergency in Lebanon (...) we know what the crown jewel of the resistance in the region (Hezbollah) is facing,” said a field commander of an influential Shiite faction, which is active in Nineveh Governorate (northern Iraq). He also claimed that he informed the IRGC about his readiness to fight alongside the resistance in Lebanon.

It seems that Tehran wants the “concerned parties” to express this position publicly, while Hezbollah is under enormous pressure by the Israelis who are planning for a wider war with the aim of disintegrating the “resistance in South Lebanon.”

However, the participation of the Iraqi factions in a war alongside Hezbollah is not guaranteed. Even though the Iraqis are offering “human equipment,” the Lebanese faction has not informed any of the “resistance comrades” that they would be allowed to deploy in the field, on Lebanese territory.

The leaders of the two Shiite factions in Baghdad and Nineveh agree that “(Hezbollah) will not welcome the Iraqis, because it views them as unqualified, lack a cohesive entity, and are at best bad allies, with countless problems in decision-making.”

What increases the conviction that the Iraqi factions will not engage in the South Lebanon War is the rare understanding between the Iranians and the government in Baghdad to protect the existing formula of stability.

A senior official in the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi said: “Iraq is the crown jewel of the Iranians, more than Hezbollah, and they will not risk it in the South Lebanon war.” He added that Hussein’s words were a form of “pressure to prevent war, not the contrary.”

Abbas believes that Tehran does not want to facilitate [Donald] Trump’s victory by striking the Americans under the mandate of his rival, Biden.

In the context, the former Iraqi official stated that Iran wants to keep the war away from Iraq’s borders, because “they are now keener on calm in Iraq.”

The Syrian model in Lebanon

The former Iraqi official said “a comprehensive war is only present in the imagination of the Lebanese.”

However, if such a war erupted, “Hezbollah would not likely need the Iraqi brigades.”

But if war breaks out, “Iran will not leave Hezbollah alone. This will not happen (...). It will definitely do something,” said the official.

A pessimistic scenario indicates that the “broader” war will break out in South Lebanon, pushing Iran to resort to the Syrian model.

The Iraqi official said: “This would mean dividing the map of Lebanon according to certain calculations, between factions from Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan...”

However, there is no decisive information regarding a broader war in the South and the engagement of pro-Iranian Iraqi factions. Iran is trying to use all the cards with caution to make amendments in its favor in the “day after” the Gaza deal, and fears that the “arenas” it manages will spiral into a war in which it will lose the ability to maneuver.



Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
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Sudan's Relentless War: A 70-Year Cycle of Conflict


Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)
Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, pictured during their alliance to oust Omar al-Bashir in 2019 (AFP)

While world conflicts dominate headlines, Sudan’s deepening catastrophe is unfolding largely out of sight; a brutal war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced millions, and flattened entire cities and regions.

More than a year into the conflict, some observers question whether the international community has grown weary of Sudan’s seemingly endless cycles of violence. The country has endured nearly seven decades of civil war, and what is happening now is not an exception, but the latest chapter in a bloody history of rebellion and collapse.

The first of Sudan’s modern wars began even before the country gained independence from Britain. In 1955, army officer Joseph Lagu led the southern “Anyanya” rebellion, named after a venomous snake, launching a guerrilla war that would last until 1972.

A peace agreement brokered by the World Council of Churches and Ethiopia’s late Emperor Haile Selassie ended that conflict with the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord.

But peace proved short-lived. In 1983, then-president Jaafar Nimeiry reignited tensions by announcing the imposition of Islamic Sharia law, known as the “September Laws.” The move prompted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, and a renewed southern insurgency that raged for more than two decades, outliving Nimeiry’s regime.

Under Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 military coup, the war took on an Islamist tone. His government declared “jihad” and mobilized civilians in support of the fight, but failed to secure a decisive victory.

The conflict eventually gave way to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, better known as the Naivasha Agreement, which was brokered in Kenya and granted South Sudan the right to self-determination.

In 2011, more than 95% of South Sudanese voted to break away from Sudan, giving birth to the world’s newest country, the Republic of South Sudan. The secession marked the culmination of decades of war, which began with demands for a federal system and ended in full-scale conflict. The cost: over 2 million lives lost, and a once-unified nation split in two.

But even before South Sudan’s independence became reality, another brutal conflict had erupted in Sudan’s western Darfur region in 2003. Armed rebel groups from the region took up arms against the central government, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. What followed was a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign that drew global condemnation and triggered a major humanitarian crisis.

As violence escalated, the United Nations deployed one of its largest-ever peacekeeping missions, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), in a bid to stem the bloodshed.

Despite multiple peace deals, including the Juba Agreement signed in October 2020 following the ousting of long-time Islamist ruler, Bashir, fighting never truly ceased.

The Darfur war alone left more than 300,000 people dead and millions displaced. The International Criminal Court charged Bashir and several top officials, including Ahmed Haroun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Alongside the southern conflict, yet another war erupted in 2011, this time in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The fighting was led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N), a group composed largely of northern fighters who had sided with the South during the earlier civil war under John Garang.

The conflict broke out following contested elections marred by allegations of fraud, and Khartoum’s refusal to implement key provisions of the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, particularly those related to “popular consultations” in the two regions. More than a decade later, war still grips both areas, with no lasting resolution in sight.

Then came April 15, 2023. A fresh war exploded, this time in the heart of the capital, Khartoum, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Now entering its third year, the conflict shows no signs of abating.

According to international reports, the war has killed more than 150,000 people and displaced around 13 million, the largest internal displacement crisis on the planet. Over 3 million Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries.

Large swathes of the capital lie in ruins, and entire states have been devastated. With Khartoum no longer viable as a seat of power, the government and military leadership have relocated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan.

Unlike previous wars, Sudan’s current conflict has no real audience. Global pressure on the warring factions has been minimal. Media coverage is sparse. And despite warnings from the United Nations describing the crisis as “the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe,” Sudan's descent into chaos remains largely ignored by the international community.