‘Iraqi Resistance’ Ready for ‘Wider War’ in Lebanon

Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
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‘Iraqi Resistance’ Ready for ‘Wider War’ in Lebanon

Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani
Iran's acting foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein arrive for a joint news conference in Baghdad, Iraq June 13, 2024. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

When Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein warned of the outbreak of war in Lebanon, his disturbing words were expected to receive a stormy response from Iraqi factions loyal to Iran about preparations to support Lebanon’s Hezbollah. But this did not happen.

On June 13, Hussein was speaking in a joint press conference with his acting Iranian counterpart, Ali Bagheri Kani, and without prior context, he fired a “warning shot” about South Lebanon, while Baghdad is committed to the truce under a government that is increasingly admired by the Americans.

“If a war breaks out there, the entire region will be affected, not just Lebanon,” Hussein said.

For many, the words of the Iraqi chief diplomat were a “message” based on information provided by the Iranian visitor, Bagheri Kani, who, two weeks before his arrival in Baghdad, was holding “normal” meetings in Beirut and Damascus about the “close and lasting partnership.”

Two figures in the Coordination Framework told Asharq Al-Awsat that when Kani arrived in Baghdad, he spoke with Iraqi officials about “a possible war that Israel is planning in South Lebanon.”

In an attempt to understand the position of the military factions, Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to an Iraqi faction leader, who said: “We were asked about our position if the Lebanon front were to witness further escalation. We replied: We are ready, (...) we will go there.”

A diplomat confirmed that Bagheri had not made the request “in this manner,” while an Iraqi expert interpreted Hussein’s words as an attempt to achieve “political balance between the government and the resistance,” ruling out the chances of a “wider war”.

Who is seeking to expand the war, Iran or Israel?

For months, the regions of South Lebanon and northern Israel have been witnessing the most violent exchange of attacks since the 2006 war, within the framework of unconventional rules of engagement that make it a war in doses, with high costs, especially on the side of Hezbollah in the South.

Lebanese sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the toll of the past months is equivalent to the damage of a comprehensive war.

Amos Hochstein, advisor to US President Joe Biden, who arrived in Israel on Monday, and from there to Beirut, conveyed a message to dissuade Netanyahu from any possible escalation that might push Iran to intervene directly in Lebanon, through its arms in Iraq.

Aqeel Abbas, a political science professor in Washington, believes that Netanyahu “wants this war more than Hezbollah and Iran,” because the latter wants to maintain the pattern of frequent strikes from South Lebanon to ease pressure on Hamas in Gaza.

Hezbollah itself also wants to maintain the “dynamic of deterrence” at its current level, as any open military operation by the Israelis will annihilate the Lebanese infrastructure, according to Abbas.

Iran waves the Hezbollah card

Before Bagheri Kani’s visit to Baghdad, Iran was transmitting messages to the Iraqis suggesting that it was facing three intractable problems: The vacuum left by the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdullahian, the enormous pressure from the Americans and the West regarding the nuclear program, and Tehran’s position in the Gaza ceasefire deal, which will ultimately force it to abandon one of its axes in the region.

In this context, Iran is seeking to put the South Lebanon card on the table to improve its conditions in the negotiations. It is not clear how this hypothesis fits with the case of Hezbollah, as many observers say that the group is exhausted and limited in its movement. However, the Iraqi politician responded by saying: “No one has yet confirmed the fact that Hezbollah is exhausted, while it can at any time cause a harmful blow to the Israelis.”

To a large extent, Aqeel Abbas agrees with this suggestion, pointing to an Israeli and American concern over “Hezbollah’s military and technological capabilities,” even after months of attrition.

“Hands on the trigger, Lebanon”

When the Iraqi minister issued his warning on Lebanon, Baghdad was at a safe distance from the flames of the Gaza war in the region. The government was able to maintain the truce with the US forces for months, while Prime Minister Mohammad Shiaa al-Sudani tried to balance between Iran’s requirements and the ambitions of the factions.

Since the death of Raisi, the leaders of the Shiite parties and factions have not heard many important messages from the Iranians.

A Shiite faction leader in Baghdad, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, said that unannounced visits by Iranian military figures to Iraq have decreased since Raisi’s death.

He noted that before Bagheri Kani’s visits to Baghdad and Erbil, the Iranians addressed direct questions to the Hezbollah Brigades and the Nujaba Movement about their willingness to participate in the South Lebanon confrontations with Israel.

The faction leader told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We told them, yes, of course. Hands on the trigger...”

Hezbollah does not want the Iraqis’ involvement

“Indeed, we are preparing for any emergency in Lebanon (...) we know what the crown jewel of the resistance in the region (Hezbollah) is facing,” said a field commander of an influential Shiite faction, which is active in Nineveh Governorate (northern Iraq). He also claimed that he informed the IRGC about his readiness to fight alongside the resistance in Lebanon.

It seems that Tehran wants the “concerned parties” to express this position publicly, while Hezbollah is under enormous pressure by the Israelis who are planning for a wider war with the aim of disintegrating the “resistance in South Lebanon.”

However, the participation of the Iraqi factions in a war alongside Hezbollah is not guaranteed. Even though the Iraqis are offering “human equipment,” the Lebanese faction has not informed any of the “resistance comrades” that they would be allowed to deploy in the field, on Lebanese territory.

The leaders of the two Shiite factions in Baghdad and Nineveh agree that “(Hezbollah) will not welcome the Iraqis, because it views them as unqualified, lack a cohesive entity, and are at best bad allies, with countless problems in decision-making.”

What increases the conviction that the Iraqi factions will not engage in the South Lebanon War is the rare understanding between the Iranians and the government in Baghdad to protect the existing formula of stability.

A senior official in the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi said: “Iraq is the crown jewel of the Iranians, more than Hezbollah, and they will not risk it in the South Lebanon war.” He added that Hussein’s words were a form of “pressure to prevent war, not the contrary.”

Abbas believes that Tehran does not want to facilitate [Donald] Trump’s victory by striking the Americans under the mandate of his rival, Biden.

In the context, the former Iraqi official stated that Iran wants to keep the war away from Iraq’s borders, because “they are now keener on calm in Iraq.”

The Syrian model in Lebanon

The former Iraqi official said “a comprehensive war is only present in the imagination of the Lebanese.”

However, if such a war erupted, “Hezbollah would not likely need the Iraqi brigades.”

But if war breaks out, “Iran will not leave Hezbollah alone. This will not happen (...). It will definitely do something,” said the official.

A pessimistic scenario indicates that the “broader” war will break out in South Lebanon, pushing Iran to resort to the Syrian model.

The Iraqi official said: “This would mean dividing the map of Lebanon according to certain calculations, between factions from Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan...”

However, there is no decisive information regarding a broader war in the South and the engagement of pro-Iranian Iraqi factions. Iran is trying to use all the cards with caution to make amendments in its favor in the “day after” the Gaza deal, and fears that the “arenas” it manages will spiral into a war in which it will lose the ability to maneuver.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.