Iran Presidential Candidate Jalili Is Fiercely Loyal to Khamenei

Presidential candidate Saeed Jalili votes at a polling station in a snap presidential election to choose a successor to Ebrahim Raisi following his death in a helicopter crash, in Tehran, Iran June 28, 2024. Stringer/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
Presidential candidate Saeed Jalili votes at a polling station in a snap presidential election to choose a successor to Ebrahim Raisi following his death in a helicopter crash, in Tehran, Iran June 28, 2024. Stringer/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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Iran Presidential Candidate Jalili Is Fiercely Loyal to Khamenei

Presidential candidate Saeed Jalili votes at a polling station in a snap presidential election to choose a successor to Ebrahim Raisi following his death in a helicopter crash, in Tehran, Iran June 28, 2024. Stringer/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
Presidential candidate Saeed Jalili votes at a polling station in a snap presidential election to choose a successor to Ebrahim Raisi following his death in a helicopter crash, in Tehran, Iran June 28, 2024. Stringer/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

Saeed Jalili, a zealous ideologue loyal to Iran's supreme leader, plans to resolve the country's social, political and economic ills by adhering rigidly to the hardline ideals of the 1979 revolution if he wins the country's presidential election.

Jalili was narrowly beaten in Friday's first round vote by moderate Massoud Pezeshkian but the two men will now face a run-off election on July 5, since Pezeshkian did not secure the majority of 50% plus one vote of ballots cast needed to win outright.

Jalili, a former diplomat, describes himself as a pious believer in "velayat-e faqih", or rule by supreme jurisprudence, the system of Islamic government that provides the basis for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's paramount position.

His staunch defense of the 45-year-old revolution appears designed to appeal to hardline, religiously-devout lower-income voters but offered little to young and urban Iranians frustrated by curbs on political and social freedoms.

Once Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Jalili, 58, was one of four candidates in the election for a successor to Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a helicopter crash in May.

He is currently a member of a body that mediates in disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council, a body that screens election candidates for their political and Islamic qualifications.

A staunch anti-Westerner, Jalili's advance to the second round signals the possibility of an even more antagonistic turn in the republic's foreign and domestic policy, analysts said.

Foreign and nuclear policy are the domain of Khamenei, who wields supreme command of the armed forces, has the power to declare war and appoints senior figures including armed forces commanders, judicial heads and the head of the state media.

However, the president can influence the tone of foreign and domestic policy.

Insiders and analysts say Khamenei, 85, seeks a strongly loyal president to run the government day-to-day and to be a trusted ally who can ensure stability, amid maneuvering over the eventual succession to his own position.

UNCOMPROMISING STANCE

Jalili is an opponent of Tehran's 2015 nuclear pact with major powers that was negotiated on the Iranian side by a group of pragmatic officials open to detente with the West.

Then-President Donald Trump reneged on the accord in 2018 and reimposed sanctions that have crippled Iran's economy. With the possible return of Trump to the White House after November's US presidential election and Jalili's possible election win, the deal's resurgence seems improbable.

Before the nuclear pact, Jalili served as Iran's top nuclear negotiator for five years from 2007, a period in which Tehran took a confrontational and uncompromising approach to discussions with global powers about its uranium enrichment program.

In those years, three UN Security Council resolutions were imposed on Iran, and several attempts to resolve the dispute failed.

During the current election campaign, Jalili was heavily criticized in debates on state TV by other candidates for his uncompromising nuclear stance and his opposition to Iran signing up to two conventions on financial crime recommended by the Financial Action Taskforce, an international crime watchdog.

Some hardliners, like Jalili, argue that the acceptance of the Convention on Combating the Financing of Terrorism and the Convention on Combating Transnational Organized Crime could hamper Iran's support for its paramilitary proxies across the region, including Lebanon's Hezbollah.

PRODUCT OF THE REVOLUTION

Jalili has been trying for the presidency for years. He finished third in the 2013 contest, and stood again in 2021 but eventually withdrew to support Raisi.

Born in the city of Mashhad in 1965, Jalili lost his right leg in the 1980s in fighting during the Iran-Iraq war and joined the Foreign Ministry in 1989. Despite his hardline views, he is outwardly soft-spoken.

He gained a doctorate in political science at Imam Sadiq University, a training ground for Iranian leaders.

For four years from 2001, he worked at Khamenei's office.

When hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005, he chose Jalili to be his adviser, and within months made him deputy foreign minister.

Jalili was appointed in 2007 as the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, a post that automatically made him chief nuclear negotiator.



Why Does Israel Insist on Hezbollah to Withdraw North of Litani River?

Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)
Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)
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Why Does Israel Insist on Hezbollah to Withdraw North of Litani River?

Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)
Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)

Lebanese fears became reality early Tuesday when the Israeli military announced a “limited ground operation” in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah.

This move comes after 15 days of escalating violence, which began with the explosion of Hezbollah’s pagers and communication devices and the assassination of key leaders, culminating in the killing of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah.

Israeli officials stated their intent to “do everything necessary to return northern residents” to their homes and to use “all means” to push Hezbollah “beyond the Litani River.”

These remarks are viewed as serious threats.

The issue of the Litani River gained attention again on August 11, 2006, when the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701.

This resolution called for a complete ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, ending the July war pitting Hezbollah against the Israeli army.

Resolution 1701 established a zone between the Blue Line, the border between Lebanon and Israel, and the Litani River in southern Lebanon, banning all armed groups and military equipment except for the Lebanese Armed Forces and UN peacekeepers (UNIFIL).

Hezbollah initially accepted the resolution but later violated it by fully redeploying in southern Lebanon.

Israel has also repeatedly breached the resolution, failing to withdraw from the occupied Lebanese territories of Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills.

It has conducted numerous air violations and recently bombarded southern villages, displacing over a million Lebanese residents.

Retired military analyst Brig. Gen. Saeed Kozah told Asharq Al-Awsat that

Israel aims to push Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River, believing this would reduce the threat by about 40 kilometers from its settlements.

Meanwhile, as Israel ramped up its military actions against Lebanon, air raid sirens continued to sound in Israeli settlements near the border.

This followed Hezbollah’s launch of dozens of rockets at military sites and settlements, including the city of Haifa.

The area of southern Lebanon around the Litani River covers about 850 square kilometers and is home to around 200,000 residents, 75% of whom are Shiite.

Observers believe this is a key reason why Hezbollah is unwilling to withdraw from the region.

Kozah noted that Hezbollah’s refusal to retreat is tied to its desire to “declare victory,” similar to its stance after the 2006 July war, as it does not want to admit defeat.

Kozah stated that while a Hezbollah withdrawal would reduce direct ground and rocket attacks, it would not eliminate the risk of missiles launched from the Bekaa Valley and other parts of Lebanon.

He emphasized that Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles could be fired from various locations, including Syria.