Sinwar, Israel’s Problem After 8 Months of War

Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)
Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)
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Sinwar, Israel’s Problem After 8 Months of War

Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)
Yehya Al-Sinwar...Israel has failed to find him during the Gaza War (AP)

Since the beginning of the war on the Gaza Strip in October, Israel has placed, among its top goals, the elimination of the Hamas movement’s leaders, including Yehya Sinwar.

Political and military officials in Tel Aviv accuse the man of planning the October 7 attack, which led to the killing of hundreds of Israelis and the captivity of nearly 240 others.

But after 8 months of continuous war and Israel excavating every house, tunnel and place in search of Sinwar, from the north of the Gaza Strip to its center, then to Khan Yunis and Rafah in its south, the occupation army has found no trace of the man except a short video showing him with his family in a tunnel, apparently at the beginning of the war in Khan Yunis, his hometown.

Israel’s pursuit of Sinwar, along with many of the political and military leaders of the Hamas movement, highlights a blatant intelligence failure. Sources in the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip and outside it told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Israeli occupation’s inability to find him does not mean that he has cut communication with the movement’s officials.

The sources confirmed that Sinwar was constantly informed of all developments, especially with regard to the ongoing negotiations, and communicated several times with the movement’s leaders abroad, in particular during the recent negotiations on the release of hostages and on reaching a ceasefire. He also contacted the head of the movement’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, to convey his condolences after Israel killed members of his family in an airstrike.

The sources added that only two or three people knew his whereabouts and provided for his various needs, as well as ensured his contact with the movement’s leaders inside Gaza and abroad.

“The occupation failed to reach many of the leaders of the first and second ranks at the political and military levels, but it tried to assassinate some of them, while others were injured...but Sinwar is not among them,” according to the sources.

Meanwhile, reports in Jewish media said that Sinwar was moving inside the remaining tunnels of the Hamas movement, without providing evidence of these claims. The Israeli army has constantly announced its success in destroying Hamas’ capabilities, including tunnels, in addition to the dismantling of the movement’s brigades in Khan Yunis and other areas in the Strip.

Asharq Al-Awsat tried to contact people close to Sinwar, including some of his relatives, to draw a better picture of the man’s personality and how he might make his decisions.

“Sinwar is thinking of two options... Either fulfilling the conditions of the resistance in stopping the war, withdrawing the occupation forces, and completing an honorable exchange deal, or obtaining the honor of martyrdom,” they said.

Regarding his character, and in response to Israeli claims that he is violent and stubborn, those close to Sinwar explain that he has a sociable personality, and often visits legal and local figures and even his neighbors, despite his preoccupations since his election as leader of the movement in the Gaza Strip.

“Contrary to what is seen by many as a very sharp personality, he often possesses a sense of humor, even during the meetings and interviews that he ran at the level of the movement’s leaders,” a person close to Sinwar told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He added: “But this does not negate that he is a leader... and was able to resolve any discussion.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu constantly affirms his refusal to end the Gaza war in a way that gives Sinwar and Hamas the image of victory, as part of his response to criticism by political and military officials in Tel Aviv regarding the lack of a strategic plan for the day after the war, as well as the failure to reach a deal with Hamas that guarantees the release of Israeli prisoners.

Analysts believe that Israel’s failure to catch Sinwar represents a military and political problem. Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sinwar is aware of this fact and understands that Israel wants to kill or capture him to claim that it has won the war.

“As he has spent many years in Israeli prisons, [Sinwar] understands well how Israeli leaders think, and therefore manages many aspects of the battle politically... He is described as a stubborn negotiator, who wants to impose the Palestinian conditions, especially with regard to a full cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the occupation forces from the entire Gaza Strip,” the sources said.



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.