For Iran and Hezbollah, Calibrating Response to Israeli Strikes Leaves No Room for Error

Hezbollah fighters. (AFP)
Hezbollah fighters. (AFP)
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For Iran and Hezbollah, Calibrating Response to Israeli Strikes Leaves No Room for Error

Hezbollah fighters. (AFP)
Hezbollah fighters. (AFP)

Two back-to-back strikes in Beirut and Tehran, both attributed to Israel and targeting high-ranking figures in Hamas and Hezbollah, have left Hezbollah and Iran in a quandary.
Analysts agree that both strikes hit too close to home to pass without a response, and were serious security breaches for Iran and Hezbollah. Calibrating that response to restore deterrence without sparking an even more damaging escalation may be the most delicate balancing act in nearly a year of teetering on the brink of a regional war.
Tuesday’s rare strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs killed a top Hezbollah commander who Israel says was responsible for a missile strike on a soccer field in the town of Majdal Shams in the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights, killing 12 children and teenagers. Hezbollah has denied responsibility for the attack, The Associated Press reported.
While the target of the strike in Beirut was a military figure, it hit a densely populated urban neighborhood on the outskirts of the capital where Hezbollah has many of its offices, killing at least five civilians — three women and two children — and wounding dozens more.
Less than 12 hours later, the Palestinian group Hamas — a Hezbollah ally also backed by Iran — announced that the chief of its political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, had been killed in an Israeli airstrike in Tehran, where he was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian president.
Israel has neither claimed nor denied responsibility for that strike, which comes nearly 10 months into the brutal war in Gaza sparked by Hamas’ deadly Oct. 7 attack on Israel. It also coincides with another push by mediators to close a cease-fire and hostage-exchange deal.
Analysts said both Hezbollah and Iran will feel compelled to retaliate, but their calculations differ.
Mohanad Hage Ali, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center who researches Hezbollah, said that although Israel also struck in Beirut’s southern suburbs in a January attack that killed Hamas official Saleh Arouri, Tuesday’s strike targeted a top Hezbollah commander and killed civilians.
“This time, we’re too far into the war, and a Hezbollah commander is the target. Hezbollah has to respond, and if they don’t, this would be a new rule: Killing civilians on the Israeli side would lead to targeting of" the Beirut suburbs, he said. “Hezbollah cannot afford this.”
Hezbollah began firing rockets over the Lebanon-Israel border the day after the war in Gaza began, in what it described as a “support front” for Hamas. Although the near-daily clashes have been deadly and have displaced tens of thousands in both Lebanon and Israel, they have remained mostly confined to the border region.
In order to reestablish deterrence after Tuesday’s strike, Ali said, “Hezbollah would need to respond beyond its now-limited geographical scope of operations. They need to strike deeper in Israeli territories, and this brings with it great risks.”
Andreas Krieg, a military analyst and senior lecturer in security studies at King’s College London, agreed that Hezbollah will feel the need to carry out a significant retaliatory strike.
“I think Hezbollah has been hit much harder, much more where it hurts” than Iran, he said. “In the Israeli-Hezbollah confrontation, this is a major escalation whereby Hezbollah has to respond adequately in a more or less timely fashion” to restore deterrence.
However, the militant group will probably hit a significant military target — such as an air force base near Haifa that appeared in a video of surveillance drone footage the group released in July — rather than a civilian target, he said, and will most likely try to calibrate the attack to cause only material damage to limit further escalation.
Nabih Awada, a Lebanese political and military analyst close to the Iranian-backed “axis of resistance” and a former fighter with the Lebanese Communist Party who spent a decade in Israeli prisons along with some of the current Hamas leaders, said Hezbollah saw the strike in Beirut as a “violation of all rules of engagement” because it targeted a civilian residential area and because Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukur was targeted “in his home rather than in a military headquarters.”
Hezbollah, he said, “has developed many equations,” including that the response to a strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs will be in Haifa.
For Iran, the situation is more complicated.
In some ways, the current moment mirrors the time in April when Israel and Iran risked plunging into a war after Israel hit an Iranian consular building in Damascus, killing two Iranian generals. Iran retaliated with an unprecedented direct strike on Israel. At that time, diplomatic efforts managed to contain the escalation.
But there are key differences. The assassination of Haniyeh took place on Iranian soil, embarrassing Tehran and making clear that Israel can easily hit targets there.
While some analysts believe that will be mitigated by the fact the target was not an Iranian figure, Iranian officials have vowed a harsh response.
Krieg said that while the killing of Haniyeh's death was “damaging reputationally” for Iran and “humiliating” because it showed that Tehran was unable to protect high-profile visitors, “Haniyeh is not an integral part of the axis of resistance.”
“His death has no strategic implications for Iran other than it being a slap in the face because you’re the host and your guest was killed while you were on watch,” he said.
As such, Krieg said he believes Iran could choose to mitigate its response.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov, an associate fellow in the International Security Program at Chatham House, said Iran might turn to its proxies to retaliate.
“They have got their people, training, arming, planning everywhere, and they can reach anywhere in the world,” she said. “They can also hit Israeli or Jewish targets globally.”
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said he expects Iran’s response to be another direct hit on Israel.
The strike on Haniyeh “wasn’t just on Iranian territory, it was in Tehran,” he said. “It was at the inauguration. It doesn’t matter who was targeted” and whether or not the target was Iranian.
Iranians, he said, are likely feeling that “if the demonstration of force in April managed to restore deterrence in the short run, that deterrence is now gone” and that they are “going to have do way more than what they did in April in order to be able to restore the balance of power."
The exchange in April did not spiral because of the diplomatic intervention by the United States and others, and the Iranian strike itself appeared carefully choreographed to cause minimal damage.
Still, Parsi said, there was also “a lot of luck” that went into keeping the escalation limited.
“It’s a pivotal moment in this conflict. I don’t think we’ve been in as difficult a moment in this conflict, given that we’ve seen what Iran is capable of in April,” Bar-Yaacov said.
If the response to the strikes does not cause Israeli casualties, a wider war could still be avoided, Ali said.
But, he added, “We are in the territory of too many ‘ifs’ to avoid a war, and this doesn’t bode well.”



July 30: Iraq’s Bloodless Coup That Was Followed by Rivers of Blood

Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
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July 30: Iraq’s Bloodless Coup That Was Followed by Rivers of Blood

Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)

It’s unwise to corner Saddam Hussein and force him to accept a partner in governing Iraq. The Baath Party and Saddam himself don't favor partnerships.

The Baath Party, which regained power on July 17, 1968, has a history of significant and costly turning points.

The first major shift came on July 30 that year, enabling the party to consolidate power under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, with Saddam as his deputy.

As a journalist, I spoke with some key figures from that time and felt it was important to share their stories with the readers of Asharq Al-Awsat.

The defeat of Arab armies in the 1967 war enraged the Arab public, who blamed their governments for what was termed a “setback” but was really a disaster.

Iraqi President Abdul Rahman Arif, who had succeeded his brother Abdul Salam, appeared weak, with a loose grip on the military and little popular support.

By the spring of 1968, rumors were spreading in closed circles about various factions plotting to seize power. Some expected the country to fall under military control.

The Baath Party leadership was keeping a close watch, fearing a coup. They began planning a return to power, seeking to avenge the 1963 events that led to bloodshed and the ousting of Abdul Salam Arif, whom they had initially helped bring to power.

Salah Omar al-Ali.

The leadership wanted to avoid a violent takeover and carefully considered their strategy.

A key figure was Col. Ibrahim al-Daoud, commander of the 20,000-strong Republican Guard. If al-Daoud resisted, a bloody battle could ensue at the palace gates. There was also the risk that such a conflict might pave the way for a third faction from the military to step in as a savior.

The Baathists decided to approach al-Daoud, hoping to win him over or at least neutralize him. They noted that al-Daoud was heavily influenced by his friend Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef, the deputy director of military intelligence, known for his strong influence and rumored ties to Western intelligence. Al-Daoud was thought to follow al-Nayef’s lead closely.

The complex task required cunning and was entrusted to al-Bakr, known for his military skills and political savvy.

The coup organizers secured the cooperation of officer Saadoun Ghaidan, who commanded a force stationed at the presidential palace, including several tanks.

Al-Bakr met with al-Daoud to reveal the plan to overthrow Arif. He urged him to keep the matter secret, swearing on the Quran that it would not be shared with anyone else, especially al-Nayef. However, al-Daoud quickly informed al-Nayef on July 15.

This leak put the Baath Party leadership in a tough spot. The secret was out, and al-Nayef, a man considered dangerous and rumored to have suspicious ties with Western intelligence, knew their plans. The success or failure of the coup now depended on his actions.

Salah Omar al-Ali, a key figure in the leadership, explained: “On the morning of July 16, we informed the civilian and military groups involved about the final details of their roles.”

“We initially planned to act on July 14, the anniversary of the 1958 revolution that established the republic, but practical issues delayed us.”

“On July 16, we retrieved hidden weapons and military uniforms for disguise. At 8 p.m., we met at al-Bakr’s house in the Ali al-Salih neighborhood on 14 Ramadan Street to finalize our plans, waiting for the operation at 2:30 a.m. Then, the unexpected happened.”

An armored vehicle is seen in front of the presidential palace after the 1968 coup. (Getty Images)

Shocking message

As the Baath Party’s regional leaders were finalizing their plans, there was a knock at the door. Al-Bakr answered and came back with a small note. He announced that it was from al-Nayef. The message read: “I know about your operation. I support you and am ready to help in any way. Trust in God.”

Al-Ali recalled that al-Bakr presented the message to the group, saying: “We need to discuss this and make a decision.”

The note, delivered by a lieutenant serving as al-Nayef’s aide, was shocking.

Although the messenger was a Baathist, his actions didn’t lessen the severity of the situation.

The group grew anxious and confused. Al-Nayef was known to be strong, very intelligent and ambitious, which made him a formidable figure. They considered the risks: if they canceled the operation, al-Nayef might reveal their plans, seeing it as a slight against him.

Canceling could be disastrous for the party, but involving al-Nayef was risky too. It was clear that al-Daoud had not kept his oath, complicating matters.

They ultimately decided to proceed and sent al-Nayef this message: “We intentionally kept you uninformed due to your sensitive position and concern for your safety. We informed Ibrahim al-Daoud to avoid putting you in an awkward position, knowing he would tell you. We are moving forward with the operation, and if successful, you will be Iraq’s Prime Minister, God willing.”

Essentially, they made two decisions: to entice al-Nayef with the prime ministership and to eliminate al-Nayef and al-Daoud as soon as possible. The task of storming the Republican Palace was given to the party’s regional leaders.

Before the operation, they gathered at the home of Abdul Karim al-Nadda, al-Bakr’s brother-in-law, who worked for the railway and lived near the radio station in the Salhiya area.

The emotions were high as the nine leadership members, including al-Bakr and Saddam, met with others, including Hardan al-Tikriti. The total number present was less than twenty. The plan required al-Daoud and Ghaidan to be waiting for them.

Storming the palace

The team put on military uniforms and officer badges. At the planned time, a military truck arrived, and they climbed aboard, while another group took two civilian cars. They reached the palace entrance dressed in their military gear and carrying rifles. Ghaidan was waiting at the tank battalion entrance and opened the gate for them. Several young party members, who had secretly trained to operate tanks, joined them.

They were surprised to find that the tanks around the palace were modern and the trainees had trouble operating them. Fortunately, one young man managed to start a tank and moved from one to another, helping them complete the encirclement of the palace.

They set up their command post at the tank battalion headquarters. Al-Bakr called Abdul Rahman Arif, who was asleep. The two men knew each other well. Surprised, Arif asked, “What’s going on?” Al-Bakr responded: “The revolutionary leadership has taken control of the country.”

“Please surrender to avoid any conflict. We guarantee your safety and that of your family. This is not a personal attack; it’s to prevent further bloodshed under your weak leadership. Surrender now.”

Finding the situation serious, Arif tried contacting division commanders outside Baghdad but got no response. Ten minutes later, al-Bakr called again, insisting Arif surrender. In a final warning, al-Bakr said: “If you don’t surrender, you’ll be responsible for your and your family’s safety.”

To reinforce the message, they fired artillery shells over the palace. Hearing this, Arif realized there was no negotiating and contacted them to arrange his surrender. Arif came out and was taken in a small military vehicle to the tank battalion headquarters.

At the start of the operation, a team was dispatched to arrest Prime Minister Taher Yahya at his home. This move marked the Baath Party’s return to power, achieved without any bloodshed.

Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef and Ibrahim al-Daoud.

Potential threats

When asked about Saddam Hussein’s actions during those crucial hours, al-Ali said: “Saddam acted just like the others; he wore a military uniform and carried a rifle, following the lead of the other party members.”

Despite his many criticisms today, Saddam’s bravery and ruthlessness were clear. At the time, he was not a dominant figure and did not control decisions. He was a loyal party member who followed orders.

After the Baath Party took power, its leaders saw Prime Minister al-Nayef and Defense Minister al-Daoud as potential threats.

Al-Ali, involved in the plot against them, described the situation: “We held a meeting to discuss our decisions, including removing al-Nayef and al-Daoud. Al-Bakr said we had to include al-Nayef because he knew our plan and could have turned against us. We promised him the prime ministership, and he did not betray us.”

“However, I was concerned that removing al-Nayef might be seen as treachery, given the bloody history with the Communists in 1963. I suggested we keep cooperating with him and reassess if his behavior changed. We agreed, and al-Nayef began his role as prime minister.”

A few days later, al-Bakr called an urgent meeting and urged the leadership to quickly remove al-Nayef. He explained that he was rapidly working against the party and had recruited military officers without realizing some were Baathists.

“Act fast before he can undermine us,” al-Bakr warned. “Plan his removal, and I’ll support whatever you decide.”

Officers salute al-Nayef before his ouster.

The next day, we met at the home of Saleh Mahdi Al-Ammash, the Interior Minister, since we feared al-Nayef might trap us if he knew our plans. We decided to remove both al-Nayef and al-Daoud.

We had military units in Jordan. We planned for al-Daoud to inspect them while secretly sending party members to arrest him and send him to Spain. At the same time, we would act against al-Nayef.

On July 30, al-Daoud was captured and sent to Spain. Meanwhile, we targeted al-Nayef. After lunch at the palace, he went to al-Bakr’s office. Saddam and I entered with rifles and demanded his surrender. At first, he resisted but then begged us, citing his family.

We needed to act quickly and discreetly. We told al-Nayef to leave as if nothing had happened and warned him not to signal his guards. He was escorted to a car by Saddam, who warned him not to resist. The car left through a rear gate, and al-Nayef was flown out to Morocco.