Yazidis Fear Returning to Homeland, 10 Years after Massacre

Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily
Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily
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Yazidis Fear Returning to Homeland, 10 Years after Massacre

Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily
Yazidi women raise banners during a demonstration demanding their rights and the release of those kidnapped by ISIS militants, in Mosul, Iraq, June 3, 2024. REUTERS/Khalid Al-Mousily

Fahad Qassim was just 11 years old when ISIS militants overran his Yazidi community in the Sinjar region of northern Iraq in August 2014, taking him captive.

The attack was the start of what became the systematic slaughter, enslavement, and rape of thousands of Yazidis, shocking the world and displacing most of the 550,000-strong ancient religious minority. Thousands of people were rounded up and killed during the initial assault, which began in the early hours of Aug. 3.
Many more are believed to have died in captivity. Survivors fled up the slopes of Mount Sinjar, where some were trapped for many weeks by an ISIS siege.
The assault on the Yazidis - an ancient religious minority in eastern Syria and northwest Iraq - was part of ISIS' effort to establish a so-called “caliphate.”

At one stage, the group held a third of Iraq and neighboring Syria before being pushed back and collapsing in 2019.

Now 21, Qassim lives in a small apartment on the edge of a refugee camp in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, far from his hometown.

He was trained as a child soldier and fought in grinding battles before being liberated as ISIS collapsed in Syria's Baghuz in 2019, but only after losing the bottom half of his leg to an airstrike by the US-led forces.

"I don't plan for any future in Iraq," he said, waiting for news on a visa application to a Western country.

"Those who go back say they fear the same thing that happened in 2014 will happen again."

Qassim's reluctance to return is shared by many. A decade after what has been recognized as a genocide by many governments and UN agencies, Sinjar district remains largely destroyed.

The old city of Sinjar is a confused heap of grey and brown stone, while villages like Kojo, where hundreds were killed, are crumbling ghost towns.
Limited services, poor electricity and water supply, and what locals say is inadequate government compensation for rebuilding have made resettlement challenging.

POWER STRUGGLE
The security situation further complicates matters. A mosaic of armed groups that fought to free Sinjar have remained in this strategic corner of Iraq, holding de facto power on the ground.
This is despite the 2020 Sinjar Agreement that called for such groups to leave and for the appointment of a mayor with a police force composed of locals.
And from the skies above, frequent Turkish drone strikes target fighters aligned with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Civilians are among those killed in these attacks, adding to the sense of insecurity.

Akhtin Intiqam, a 25-year-old commander in the PKK-aligned Sinjar Protection Units (YBS), one of the armed factions in the area, defends their continued presence:

"We are in control of this area and we are responsible for protecting Sinjar from all external attacks," she said.

Speaking in a room adorned with pictures of fallen comrades, numbering more than 150, Intiqam views the Sinjar Agreement with suspicion.
"We will fight with all our power against anyone who tries to implement this plan. It will never succeed," she said.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
As the stalemate continues, Sinjar remains underdeveloped. Families who do return receive a one-time payment of about $3,000 from the government.

Meanwhile, more than 200,000 Yazidis remain in Kurdistan, many living in shabby tent settlements. The Iraqi government is pushing to break up these camps, insisting it's time for people to go home.

"You can't blame people for having lost hope. The scale of the damage and displacement is very big and for many years extremely little was done to address it," said Khalaf Sinjari, the Iraqi prime minister's advisor for Yazidi affairs.

This government, he said, was taking Sinjar seriously.

It plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars – including all previously unspent budgets since 2014 - on development and infrastructure, including for paying compensation, building two new hospitals and a university and linking Sinjar to the country’s water network for the first time. "There is hope to bring back life," said Sinjari, himself a member of the Yazidi community.

However, the presence of an estimated 50,000 ISIS fighters and their families across the border in Syria in detention centers and camps stokes fears of history repeating itself.

Efforts by some Iraqi lawmakers to pass a general amnesty law that could see the freeing of many ISIS prisoners from Iraqi jails only add to these concerns. And the Yazidi struggle for justice is stalled, with the government this year ending a UN mission that sought to help bring ISIS fighters to trial for international crimes, citing a lack of cooperation between it and the mission.
Despite the challenges, some Yazidis are choosing to return. Farhad Barakat Ali, a Yazidi activist and journalist who was displaced by ISIS, made the decision to go back several years ago.
"I'm not encouraging everyone to return to Sinjar, but I am also not encouraging them to stay at the IDP camps either," he said from his home in Sinjar city, in the stifling heat of a power cut.



July 30: Iraq’s Bloodless Coup That Was Followed by Rivers of Blood

Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
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July 30: Iraq’s Bloodless Coup That Was Followed by Rivers of Blood

Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)

It’s unwise to corner Saddam Hussein and force him to accept a partner in governing Iraq. The Baath Party and Saddam himself don't favor partnerships.

The Baath Party, which regained power on July 17, 1968, has a history of significant and costly turning points.

The first major shift came on July 30 that year, enabling the party to consolidate power under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, with Saddam as his deputy.

As a journalist, I spoke with some key figures from that time and felt it was important to share their stories with the readers of Asharq Al-Awsat.

The defeat of Arab armies in the 1967 war enraged the Arab public, who blamed their governments for what was termed a “setback” but was really a disaster.

Iraqi President Abdul Rahman Arif, who had succeeded his brother Abdul Salam, appeared weak, with a loose grip on the military and little popular support.

By the spring of 1968, rumors were spreading in closed circles about various factions plotting to seize power. Some expected the country to fall under military control.

The Baath Party leadership was keeping a close watch, fearing a coup. They began planning a return to power, seeking to avenge the 1963 events that led to bloodshed and the ousting of Abdul Salam Arif, whom they had initially helped bring to power.

Salah Omar al-Ali.

The leadership wanted to avoid a violent takeover and carefully considered their strategy.

A key figure was Col. Ibrahim al-Daoud, commander of the 20,000-strong Republican Guard. If al-Daoud resisted, a bloody battle could ensue at the palace gates. There was also the risk that such a conflict might pave the way for a third faction from the military to step in as a savior.

The Baathists decided to approach al-Daoud, hoping to win him over or at least neutralize him. They noted that al-Daoud was heavily influenced by his friend Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef, the deputy director of military intelligence, known for his strong influence and rumored ties to Western intelligence. Al-Daoud was thought to follow al-Nayef’s lead closely.

The complex task required cunning and was entrusted to al-Bakr, known for his military skills and political savvy.

The coup organizers secured the cooperation of officer Saadoun Ghaidan, who commanded a force stationed at the presidential palace, including several tanks.

Al-Bakr met with al-Daoud to reveal the plan to overthrow Arif. He urged him to keep the matter secret, swearing on the Quran that it would not be shared with anyone else, especially al-Nayef. However, al-Daoud quickly informed al-Nayef on July 15.

This leak put the Baath Party leadership in a tough spot. The secret was out, and al-Nayef, a man considered dangerous and rumored to have suspicious ties with Western intelligence, knew their plans. The success or failure of the coup now depended on his actions.

Salah Omar al-Ali, a key figure in the leadership, explained: “On the morning of July 16, we informed the civilian and military groups involved about the final details of their roles.”

“We initially planned to act on July 14, the anniversary of the 1958 revolution that established the republic, but practical issues delayed us.”

“On July 16, we retrieved hidden weapons and military uniforms for disguise. At 8 p.m., we met at al-Bakr’s house in the Ali al-Salih neighborhood on 14 Ramadan Street to finalize our plans, waiting for the operation at 2:30 a.m. Then, the unexpected happened.”

An armored vehicle is seen in front of the presidential palace after the 1968 coup. (Getty Images)

Shocking message

As the Baath Party’s regional leaders were finalizing their plans, there was a knock at the door. Al-Bakr answered and came back with a small note. He announced that it was from al-Nayef. The message read: “I know about your operation. I support you and am ready to help in any way. Trust in God.”

Al-Ali recalled that al-Bakr presented the message to the group, saying: “We need to discuss this and make a decision.”

The note, delivered by a lieutenant serving as al-Nayef’s aide, was shocking.

Although the messenger was a Baathist, his actions didn’t lessen the severity of the situation.

The group grew anxious and confused. Al-Nayef was known to be strong, very intelligent and ambitious, which made him a formidable figure. They considered the risks: if they canceled the operation, al-Nayef might reveal their plans, seeing it as a slight against him.

Canceling could be disastrous for the party, but involving al-Nayef was risky too. It was clear that al-Daoud had not kept his oath, complicating matters.

They ultimately decided to proceed and sent al-Nayef this message: “We intentionally kept you uninformed due to your sensitive position and concern for your safety. We informed Ibrahim al-Daoud to avoid putting you in an awkward position, knowing he would tell you. We are moving forward with the operation, and if successful, you will be Iraq’s Prime Minister, God willing.”

Essentially, they made two decisions: to entice al-Nayef with the prime ministership and to eliminate al-Nayef and al-Daoud as soon as possible. The task of storming the Republican Palace was given to the party’s regional leaders.

Before the operation, they gathered at the home of Abdul Karim al-Nadda, al-Bakr’s brother-in-law, who worked for the railway and lived near the radio station in the Salhiya area.

The emotions were high as the nine leadership members, including al-Bakr and Saddam, met with others, including Hardan al-Tikriti. The total number present was less than twenty. The plan required al-Daoud and Ghaidan to be waiting for them.

Storming the palace

The team put on military uniforms and officer badges. At the planned time, a military truck arrived, and they climbed aboard, while another group took two civilian cars. They reached the palace entrance dressed in their military gear and carrying rifles. Ghaidan was waiting at the tank battalion entrance and opened the gate for them. Several young party members, who had secretly trained to operate tanks, joined them.

They were surprised to find that the tanks around the palace were modern and the trainees had trouble operating them. Fortunately, one young man managed to start a tank and moved from one to another, helping them complete the encirclement of the palace.

They set up their command post at the tank battalion headquarters. Al-Bakr called Abdul Rahman Arif, who was asleep. The two men knew each other well. Surprised, Arif asked, “What’s going on?” Al-Bakr responded: “The revolutionary leadership has taken control of the country.”

“Please surrender to avoid any conflict. We guarantee your safety and that of your family. This is not a personal attack; it’s to prevent further bloodshed under your weak leadership. Surrender now.”

Finding the situation serious, Arif tried contacting division commanders outside Baghdad but got no response. Ten minutes later, al-Bakr called again, insisting Arif surrender. In a final warning, al-Bakr said: “If you don’t surrender, you’ll be responsible for your and your family’s safety.”

To reinforce the message, they fired artillery shells over the palace. Hearing this, Arif realized there was no negotiating and contacted them to arrange his surrender. Arif came out and was taken in a small military vehicle to the tank battalion headquarters.

At the start of the operation, a team was dispatched to arrest Prime Minister Taher Yahya at his home. This move marked the Baath Party’s return to power, achieved without any bloodshed.

Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef and Ibrahim al-Daoud.

Potential threats

When asked about Saddam Hussein’s actions during those crucial hours, al-Ali said: “Saddam acted just like the others; he wore a military uniform and carried a rifle, following the lead of the other party members.”

Despite his many criticisms today, Saddam’s bravery and ruthlessness were clear. At the time, he was not a dominant figure and did not control decisions. He was a loyal party member who followed orders.

After the Baath Party took power, its leaders saw Prime Minister al-Nayef and Defense Minister al-Daoud as potential threats.

Al-Ali, involved in the plot against them, described the situation: “We held a meeting to discuss our decisions, including removing al-Nayef and al-Daoud. Al-Bakr said we had to include al-Nayef because he knew our plan and could have turned against us. We promised him the prime ministership, and he did not betray us.”

“However, I was concerned that removing al-Nayef might be seen as treachery, given the bloody history with the Communists in 1963. I suggested we keep cooperating with him and reassess if his behavior changed. We agreed, and al-Nayef began his role as prime minister.”

A few days later, al-Bakr called an urgent meeting and urged the leadership to quickly remove al-Nayef. He explained that he was rapidly working against the party and had recruited military officers without realizing some were Baathists.

“Act fast before he can undermine us,” al-Bakr warned. “Plan his removal, and I’ll support whatever you decide.”

Officers salute al-Nayef before his ouster.

The next day, we met at the home of Saleh Mahdi Al-Ammash, the Interior Minister, since we feared al-Nayef might trap us if he knew our plans. We decided to remove both al-Nayef and al-Daoud.

We had military units in Jordan. We planned for al-Daoud to inspect them while secretly sending party members to arrest him and send him to Spain. At the same time, we would act against al-Nayef.

On July 30, al-Daoud was captured and sent to Spain. Meanwhile, we targeted al-Nayef. After lunch at the palace, he went to al-Bakr’s office. Saddam and I entered with rifles and demanded his surrender. At first, he resisted but then begged us, citing his family.

We needed to act quickly and discreetly. We told al-Nayef to leave as if nothing had happened and warned him not to signal his guards. He was escorted to a car by Saddam, who warned him not to resist. The car left through a rear gate, and al-Nayef was flown out to Morocco.